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VI Thesis Abstract 
 
The aim of the present thesis was to examine imitation of biological motion in adults 
with autism spectrum disorders. Using a novel behavioural protocol, adults with 
autism and matched neurotypical control adults imitated models that displayed 
distinctly different, but biological believable kinematics. In Chapter Two it was 
observed that adults with autism exhibited low-fidelity imitation of atypical 
biological motion. In Chapter Three it was observed that when selective-attention 
instructions were provided, although eye movements recorded during action- 
observation was similar to controls, imitation of atypical biological motion was still 
impaired. In Chapter Four across three experiments it was shown that adults with 
autism exhibit reasonably high-fidelity imitation of atypical biological motion. This 
was achieved by presenting the to-be-imitated biological models in a fixed 
presentation structure which is known to facilitate greater integration and 
consolidation of sensorimotor information. This suggestion was supported by a 
further study where firstly participants were required to complete a secondary motor 
task during the inter-trial delay, and when the presentation structure was randomised 
(similar to Chapters Two and Three) resulting in low-fidelity imitation of atypical 
biological motion. These findings across the present thesis will be discussed in light 
of a critical evaluation with respect to current literature on imitation in autism, as 
well as implications for theoretical accounts of impaired imitation in autism and 
related sensorimotor control processes. Future considerations and translational 
research will be discussed, with the intention of offering prospective social 


















1.1 Aim of the Chapter 
 
The following introductory chapter outlines the rational and aims of this thesis. 
There will first be an overview of literature pertaining to imitation, which includes 
reference to the different definitions and types, associated models, and a description 
of the underlying neural structures. This will be followed by comment on the nature 
of stimuli imitated and at this point, an overview of literature examining the 
imitation abilities of individuals with autism spectrum disorders will be provided. 
Finally, there will be an appraisal of the current theories as well as the sensorimotor 
processes associated with imitation in autism spectrum disorders, after that the 




Copying other people shapes evolutionary and cultural development, and in 
particular the acquisition of novel actions. This process is known as imitation when 
it involves copying novel bodily features associated with a movement performed by 
a human model (e.g., using the left foot, and movement dynamics, to kick the ball 
into the box) (Thorndyke, 1898; Heyes, 2001; Want & Harris, 2002; Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). Imitation behaviours begin very 
early in life (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). For instance, 42 hours after 
birth new-born infants have been shown to mirror (i.e., imitate) simple actions of 
others such as facial expressions (e.g., lip smacking) and hand gestures (e.g., 
pointing) (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; 1983; 1997). To successfully imitate an 
individual translates visual information observed (i.e., action-observation) from a 
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human action (i.e., biological motion) into a sensorimotor representation that 
contains the outcome-goal (i.e., touching the ear) and the form (i.e., limb velocity) to 
achieve said outcome-goal (Hobson & Lee, 1999). The sensorimotor representation 
serves as a motor-plan and is mapped onto the motor system for motor-execution, as 
well as providing the expected consequences of the movement required for motor 
control (Flanagan & Wing, 1997). During motor-execution the expected sensory 
consequences are compared to the actual sensory (i.e., visual, proprioceptive) input, 
such that any resulting inconsistencies can be minimised by online adjustments 
throughout the movement (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, 
& Schultz, 2010). Following motor-execution, the sensorimotor representation is 
consolidated based on further processing of afferent and efferent sensorimotor 
information (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, & 
Flanagan, 2011). This motor process is recurrent on a trial-by-trial basis through 
repeated exposures to the model combined with physical attempts at imitating the 
model, where error is reduced as the observer adapts their movement to be more like 
the model (Miller & Dollard, 1941; Sheffield, 1951; Carroll & Bandura, 1982). 
Higher-order (cognitive/attentional) and lower-level (visuomotor) mechanisms are 
involved in these processes (Bandura, 1977; Byrne & Russon, 1998), which are 
embedded within a system linking perception with action (Prinz, 1997; Brass & 
Heyes, 2005). 
 
1.2.1 Types of Imitation 
An individual may be able to produce one type of imitation, yet may have 
impairments in another type (Hamilton, 2008).  It is therefore necessary at this point 
to distinguish between different types of imitation, as each encompasses varying 
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functions and accordingly have different underlying processes. The subsections 
below will briefly discuss different forms of imitation. 
 
1.2.1.1 Spontaneous Imitation 
This form of imitation occurs without any premeditation or external stimulus, 
rather they involve non-specific prompts such as a demonstrator playing with a toy 
then handing it to the observer, saying “you can play”. Spontaneous imitation is 
stereotypically examined using systematic naturalistic observations and parent 
questionnaires both measuring rates (i.e., how many times the individual imitates the 
actions of the observer) of imitation. 
 
1.2.1.2 Elicited Imitation 
Somewhat the opposite to spontaneous imitation, elicited imitation occurs 
with explicit instructions to imitate the actions. For example, a demonstrator shows 
the observer and action and then says “now you can do it” or “your turn”. Elicited 
imitation is normally examined using accuracy measures, where the observer’s 
actions are compared to that of the demonstrators and provided a score based on 
these comparisons (e.g., providing a score of two for fully correct imitation, one for 
partially correct imitation, and zero for incorrect imitation). These to-be-imitated 
actions are characterised by the presence and/or absence of an object (i.e., actions on 
objects versus gestures; Vivanti, Nadig, Ozonoff & Rogers, 2008), whether the 
actions are directed towards a goal (i.e., visual targets) or not (meaningful versus 
non-meaningful actions; Wild, Poliakoff, Jerrison, & Gowen, 2012), and whether 
these actions are simple or complex (i.e., single versus sequential actions; Rogers, 




Emulation occurs as a function of imitating the goal of an action (i.e., action 
end-point) but not the form (i.e., velocity of the limb) to achieve the goal 
(Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). For example, when children imitated the 
contralateral hand gestures (e.g., touching the ear and/or dots on a table) of an 
experimenter sat facing them, they reached for the correct object yet preferred to use 
the ipsilateral limb. This preference was diminished when then hand movements 
were directed at space rather than physical objects (Bekkering, Wöhlschlager, & 
Gattis, 2000; Gleissner, Bekkering, & Meltzoff, 2000; Wöhlschlager, Gattis, & 
Bekkering, 2003). These hand errors suggested that perception-action coupling is 
directed by goals inferred by the imitation, such as the physical object at which an 
action is directed (i.e., a particular ear) and the agent of that action (i.e., a particular 
limb) (Bekkering et al., 2000). 
 
1.2.1.4 Automatic Imitation 
Frequently referred to as ‘mimicry’, automatic imitation occurs when an 
observer spontaneously and unintentionally matches the action (e.g., raising the 
index finger; yawn) of a model (Heyes, 2011). For example, when required to 
execute finger movements (tapping; lifting of the index finger) in response to a video 
stimulus of compatible (i.e., same) or incompatible (i.e., different) finger 
movements, responses were initiated faster when the stimulus was compatible (i.e., 
when a finger lifting response was made in the presence of an finger lifting stimulus) 
rather than incompatible (i.e., when a finger lifting response was made in the 
presence of a finger tapping stimulus) (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001). The 
finding of shorter movement responses when the response effector is compatible 
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with the observed effector, compared to incompatible, is often referred to as levels of 
automatic imitation (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005). Previous work has 
shown similar levels of automatic imitation in individuals with and without autism 
spectrum disorders (e.g., Press, Richardson, & Bird, 2010; Sowden, Koehne, 
Catmur, Dziobek & Bird, 2016) which will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
1.2.1.5 True Imitation 
Often referred to as ‘hierarchical imitation’ (Byrne & Russon, 1998) or 
simply ‘imitation’ (Whiten & Ham, 1992), here an observer imitates the goal of an 
action, as well as the form to achieve the goal. For instance, an observer will imitate 
the upper limb kinematics (i.e., velocity) displayed by the demonstrator in order to 
achieve the goal of drawing a shape on a digital graphics tablet (Williams, Casey, 
Braadbaart, Culmer, & Mon-Williams, 2014). It is known that this particular type of 
imitation places a large emphasis on both the goal and the form to achieve the goal 
(Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014). 
 
1.2.1.6 Imitation in the Current Thesis 
These different forms of imitation contain different levels of intricacy and 
require attention to different aspects of an observed action. The key distinction 
between ‘automatic’ and ‘true’ imitation is that the former is an involuntary process 
that leads to an observer nonconsciously copying certain movement properties 
displayed by a model. This requires said movements (e.g., finger tapping) to be 
already stored within the observer’s sensorimotor repertoire (Heyes, 2011). In 
contrast, true imitation is a voluntary/explicit process where on a trial-by-trial basis, 
a movement pattern is copied that is not already stored in the observer’s 
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sensorimotor repertoire (Vogt et al., 2007). In the current thesis, true imitation will 
be examined as it is central to development in the broader context of motor 
behaviour in autism spectrum disorders. For example, true imitation underpins the 
acquisition of everyday sensorimotor skills such as writing with a pen, or tying shoes 
laces, or riding a bicycle. 
 
1.2.2 Imitation for Social Cognition 
In addition to being an influential facilitator in the acquisition of novel 
sensorimotor behaviours, imitation also serves a social function, as studies have 
found imitative abilities to be correlated to socio-cognitive skills (Meltzoff & 
Decety, 2003) such as language (Bates et al., 1988), play (Fiese, 1990), joint 
attention (Carpenter, Nagall, & Tomasello, 1998), and measures of Theory of Mind 
(Perra, Williams, Whiten, Fraser, Benzie, & Perrett, 2008).When individuals are 
unaware that they are being imitated, they report increased levels of closeness 
(Kühn, Müller, van Baaren, Wietzker, Dijksterhuis, & Brass, 2010), altruistic 
behaviour (van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003), trust 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2005), and a positive social attitude (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). 
Through investigation of the ‘chameleon effect’ (i.e., nonconscious imitation of 
postures, facial expressions, gestures and behaviours of another during social 
interaction), Chartrand and Bargh (1999) reported that when working with another 
on a task (i.e., description of a photograph) participants unintentionally matched 
their own body positions (e.g., arms crossed) to that of the partner. Furthermore, 
increased levels of affection were reported by participants whose actions (e.g., 
posture) were unintentionally imitated by another during social interaction. From 
these findings, it was suggested the chameleon effect is underpinned by a mechanism 
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that links perception with action (Prinz, 1997). In addition to these findings, it has 
also been shown that having a pro-social attitude can positively influence on 
imitation. For instance, when required to arrange five words such that they formed a 
grammatically correct sentence containing pro-social (e.g., friend; team) or anti-
social (e.g., obstinate; distrust) words, individuals who arranged pro-social sentences 
demonstrated significantly higher levels of automatic imitation compared to 
individuals who arranged anti-social words (Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; 
Cook & Bird, 2011). These findings are a result of imitation being bi-directionally 
associated with positive social interaction, and is a key component of building 
positive social relationships (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).  
 
1.2.3 Neural Models of Imitation 
Although the current thesis is written from a behavioural-psychological 
perspective, it is important to highlight the neurophysiological underpinnings of 
imitation, as certain influential accounts of associated with imitation in autism 
spectrum disorders are underpinned by differences in how the visual motor processes 
operate and are controlled during imitation. For example, neurophysiological studies 
using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and/or Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS), have shown similar responses within the human brain during 
action-observation and motor-execution (e.g., Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1996). Extending upon original work 
(Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) that showed neurons 
are active in the inferior premotor cortex (IPMC) of the macaque monkey during 
action-observation of goal-directed actions (e.g., grasping, holding and tearing), 
Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, and Rizzolatti (1995) stimulated human motor cortex (MC) 
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using single pulse TMS during: (1) observation of an experimenter grasping an 
object; (2) observation of same object; (3) observation of an experimenter tracing 
geometrical figures; and (4) detection of a dimming light. Results showed that motor 
evoked potentials (MEP; motor evoked potential recorded from peripheral muscles 
using electromyography (EEG)) were significantly greater during action-observation 
compared to non-action-observation. In addition, MEPs during action-observation 
positively correlated with motor-execution of the same actions, indicating a common 
coding between observed and motor actions (Fadiga et al., 1995). Later work by 
Buccino et al. (2004) imaged (fMRI) novice participants while imitating guitar 
chords during four events (action-observation; motor-planning; motor-execution; 
inter-trial processing). Results indicated a neural circuit that is active throughout all 
phases of imitation consisting of inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and the posterior part 
of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), plus the adjacent premotor cortex (PMC), which 
becomes active during action-observation. Then during motor-planning, the middle 
frontal gyrus (MFG; area 46), dorsal pre-motor cortex, superior parietal lobule and 
rostral mesial areas additionally become active (Buccino et al., 2004). Activation 
throughout the specific phases of the imitation process highlights the neural circuit 
that translates an observed action into a motor action (see also Iacoboni, Woods, 
Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 1999; Iacoboni et al., 2001; Vogt et al., 
2007; Di Dio, Di Cesare, Higuchi, Roberts, Vogt, & Rizzolatti, 2013). This circuit is 
referred to as the human ‘mirror neuron system’ (for a review see Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni, 2005) with the core components being the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which 




1.2.4 Models of Imitation 
 
1.2.4.1 Dual-Route Model 
The model was first put forward by Rumiati and Tessari (2002) and predicted 
that two pathways are operating during imitation. There is a semantic route which is 
utilised for known, meaningful goal-directed actions, and a direct route which is 
used for novel actions that do not have a goal (i.e., non-meaningful action). During 
imitation both systems are operating but depending on the specific context, are 
modulated in order to achieve the imitation goal. For example, if the action is known 
(e.g., reaching for a pen), an observer uses the semantic route that relies upon pre-
existing sensorimotor representations that are selected and scaled to meet the task 
demands. Alternatively, if the action is novel and non-meaningful, such as gestures 
that can be described only in terms of postures (e.g., a hand moving across the 
forehead), an observer engages a direct route to imitation, which recruits visuomotor 
mapping processes to code biological motion (i.e., human action) in order to 
represent the novel movement kinematics (e.g., limb velocity). Follow up work by 
Tessari and Rumiati (2004) provided support for the predictions of the dual-route 
model (see also Rumiati et al., 2005; Rumiati & Tessari, 2007; Carmo & Rumiati, 
2009; Rumiati, Carmo, & Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 2009). For example, across three 
experiments participants imitated meaningful (pantomimes of object use) and non-
meaningful (similar to meaningful yet they were not recognised) actions where the 
stimulus was presented in a blocked or random structure. Overall, and consistent 
with their previous work (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002) imitation was more accurate 
when imitating meaningful compared to non-meaningful actions. Furthermore, when 
the stimulus presentation was blocked, participants used the semantic route for 
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known actions and direct route for novel actions, with greater imitation accuracy 
exhibited for the former. When stimulus presentation was randomised, there was no 
difference in imitation accuracy. The authors concluded that imitation was processed 
though the direct route when the stimulus was unfamiliar within a random 
presentation, and through the semantic route when the stimulus was more familiar in 
a blocked presentation structure. Given that participants were constrained for time 
with reduced cognitive resources, they used the most convenient route for imitation. 
The current thesis examined true imitation, which involves imitating an action that is 
not stored within the observer’s sensorimotor repertoire and thus would be more in-
line with processing though a direct route. 
 
1.2.4.2 Goal-Directed Imitation 
It has also been suggested that during imitation (e.g., upper-limb pointing 
movement) an observer cognitively decomposes an observed movement by 
representing a hierarchy of goals and sub-goals. This goal hierarchy follows the 
functionality of the action where the end-point (i.e., final goal of the action) of the 
movement is given more importance than the form to achieve the goal (i.e., limb 
selection; limb velocity). This suggestion is now more commonly referred to as to as 
the goal-directed theory of imitation (GOADI; Bekkering et al., 2000). Recent 
behavioural (Hayes, Hodges, Scott, Horn, & Williams, 2007; Horn, Williams, Scott, 
& Hodges, 2007; Hayes, Dutoy, Elliott, Gowen, & Bennett, 2016) and neuroimaging 
(Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; Hamilton & Grafton, 2007) work examining goal-
directed imitation exemplifies this suggested pattern. For instance, in a study 
examining goal-directed and goal-less imitation, participants observed and 
subsequently imitated a series of aiming movements that varied in overall speed 
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(fast; slow), across two conditions where visual targets (dots on table) were either 
present (i.e., goal-directed) or removed (i.e., goal-less). In-line with the model of 
goal-directed imitation, it was suggested the end-point (i.e., final goal of the action) 
of the movement was prioritised, leading to the end-goal of the movement being 
imitated rather than the form. In contrast, during goal-less imitation, where 
constraining end-goal (i.e., targets removed) information is removed, visual attention 
is directed to the form to achieve the goal leading to more accurate imitation of the 
kinematics. Results showed that when visual targets were removed (i.e., goal-less 
condition), participants modulated their movement kinematics (i.e., peak velocity 
was significantly higher in the ‘fast’ trials) such that they became closer to the model 
(Wild, Poliakoff, Jerrison, & Gowen, 2010), compared to the goal-directed imitation 
(i.e., when visual targets were present). Wild and colleagues suggested that different 
processes mediate imitation of goal-directed and goal-less movements, where 
accurate imitation of goal-less imitation (i.e., when visual targets were removed) is 
facilitated by direct visuomotor mapping (e.g., Rumiati & Tessari, 2002), and end-
goal imitation occurs through a sematic route (Rumiati et al., 2009) or is positioned 
higher in the goal hierarchy and prioritised based on goal achievement (e.g., 
GOADI; Wöhlschlager et al., 2003). 
 
1.2.4.3 Associative Sequence Learning 
 This was first put forward by Cecilia Heyes (Heyes & Ray, 2000; Heyes, 
2001; 2005) and suggested that the development of the mirror neuron system 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) is based to some extent on sensorimotor experience. 
In other words, these links express mirror neuron system activation allowing action-
observation to prime, or develop, motor-execution. Here then, activation of the 
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motor representation is paired with a corresponding perceptual representation (i.e., 
observation of the finger) and through experience (i.e., trial-by-trial basis) a 
bidirectional associative link is created where activation of one representation primes 
the other. Action-observation of a novel movement (i.e., biological motion) during 
imitation involves two processes. First, there are horizontal links that use sensory 
(i.e., visual) representations of actions in a sequence (i.e., sensory 1 activates sensory 
2) which enable an observer to acquire what the action looks like. Second, there are 
vertical links that operate before the novel movement is observed and results in a 
sensory representation of the action components (i.e., sensory 1) becoming 
associated with a motor representation of the same component. 
Support for the suggestion that Associative Sequence Learning is a general 
visuomotor mechanism that modulates the development of mirror neuron activity 
comes from training studies (Heyes et al., 2005; Bird, Brindley, Leighton, & Heyes, 
2007; Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 
2009; Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010; Catmur, Mars, Rushworth, & Heyes, 
2011; Cooper, Cook, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2013; Cavello, Heyes, Becchio, Bird, & 
Catmur, 2014). For example, individuals performed a counter-mirror protocol that 
required compatible or incompatible sensorimotor training (Catmur, Walsh, & 
Heyes, 2007). During compatible training, participants executed index-finger 
movements, whilst simultaneously observing index-finger movements. During 
incompatible training, participants executed index-finger movements, whilst 
simultaneously observing little-finger movements. After incompatible training, 
TMS-induced MEPs recorded from the little finger abductor muscle were greater 
during observation of index-finger movement compared to a little-finger movement. 
These findings demonstrate the sensorimotor system was reconfigured during 
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correlated sensorimotor training, and thus indicate imitation is associated with a 
general mechanism involving lower-level visuomotor processes that represent 
biological motion, as opposed to a specialised mechanism that mediate the 
translation of visual information into a motor action (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). 
 
1.3 Biological Motion 
 
In the context of a human movement, biological motion refers to the visual-sensory 
information contained in a movement that describes a particular action (Kozlowski 
& Cutting, 1977). For instance, an individual can be judged to be walking, jumping, 
or throwing an object based upon how the arms and legs move in relation each other. 
Thus, during imitation, and more specifically true imitation, attention is directed 
towards the biological motion kinematics (e.g., timing and magnitude of velocity of 
the limb) of the observed demonstrator/model in order to gain a reference of the to-
be-imitated action. Importantly, there is evidence that the human mirror neuron 
system, which underpins imitation, processes biological (i.e., human) and non-
biological (i.e., robotic) motion differently (Grossman et al., 2000; Grèzes, Fonlupt, 
Bertenthal, Delon-Martin, Segebarth, & Decety, 2001). Using Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET), participants were scanned during observation of a manual 
grasping action performed by either a human model or a robot model. Results 
indicated a significant neural response within the premotor cortex, which is 
responsible for action encoding (Gallese et al., 1996), during observation of a human 
model only (Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004). Furthermore, 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) data recorded during observation of vertical hand 
movements showed activation was consistent with sensorimotor learning when the 
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hand movements displayed kinematics that had biological (i.e., human) compared to 
non-biological (i.e., robotic) velocity profile (Press, Cook, Blakemore, & Kilner, 
2011; for a larger review of biological motion and the action observation network, 
see Press, 2011). These above findings demonstrate that that the human mirror 
neuron system that underpins imitation is tuned to processes biological motion 
differently to non-biological (Grossman et al., 2000; Grèzes et al., 2001; Tai et al., 
2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). 
Biological motion models used in perception studies (e.g., Johansson, 1973) 
and imitation studies (Horn, Williams, Scott and Hodges, 2005) are typically 
generated using point light displays. These models were originally created by 
attaching small light bulbs to the joints of a demonstrator, and actions were recorded 
in a dark room (Johansson, 1973). With the advancements in technology, reflective 
markers are attached and recorded using three-dimensional motion capture systems 
(i.e., Vicon Nexus). In the imitation task across the present programme of work, a 
single white-dot will be presented (similar to point light displays) as the model. 
Given that the mirror neuron system is tuned to biological motion (Grossman et al., 
2000; Grèzes et al., 2001; Tai et al., 2004) the models will display a biological (i.e., 
human) velocity profile. These velocity curves are characteristically bell-shaped and 
are typical (Figure 1.2b) of a natural reach-to-grasp action (e.g., reaching for a pen; 
cup of coffee). Here then, the individual moves the limb slowly in the initial phase of 
the movement, accelerates through the middle and slows down to accurately grasp 
the pen (Flash & Hogan, 1985; Elliott, Hansen, Grierson, Lyons, Bennett, & Hayes, 
2010). In comparison, the non-biological model will present a constant velocity 
profile. This velocity model is computer generated and had no deviations in the 
perpendicular axis (Figure 1.2b). 
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1.4 Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
Autism spectrum disorder (henceforth referred to as autism across for the remainder 
of this thesis) is a neurodevelopmental developmental disorder primarily classified 
by atypicalities in social interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication, as well 
as a restricted repertoire of interest and activities (American Psychiatric Association 
(APA), 1994, 2000, 2013). Autism was first identified by Leo Kanner (1943) and 
Hans Asperger (1944). In 1943, Kanner published a seminal paper entitled ‘autistic 
disturbance of affective contact’ where he described eleven cases of children who 
were unable to establish social relationships with others. He described the autistic 
child as remote and if they spoke, they used rote-learned phrases or words; and did 
not just show simple repetitive movements (e.g., flapping of hands) but more 
elaborate rituals. In each of these cases, individual differences in various characters 
were identified suggesting that the disorder comprised a syndrome (Kanner, 1943). 
A year later Asperger published a seminal paper entitled ‘autistic psychopathy in 
childhood’. He described case studies where children showed deficiencies in social 
interaction as well as behavioural differences including: impairments in nonverbal 
communication; peculiarities in verbal communication; social adaptation and special 
interests (Asperger, 1944). 
 
1.4.1 Characteristics of Autism 
Building upon the work of Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) there are now 
clearer core characteristics that define autism (American Psychiatric Association, 




1.4.1.1 Social Development 
The foremost characteristic that differentiates autism from other 
developmental disorders is the development of social skills. This unusual social 
development becomes apparent during childhood, as during social interaction, a 
toddler with autism typically make less eye contact (i.e., looking at the person face; 
Senju & Johnson, 2009) and less turn-taking (i.e., waiting for the other person to 
finish talking before they speak), as well not possessing the ability to use simple 
movements to express themselves (i.e., pointing at objects). During the ages between 
5 and 8 years old, children with autism are less likely to show poor social 
understanding (Sigman, Dijamco, Gratier, & Rozga, 2004). They are unable to 
respond to emotions (i.e., responding to someone with a sad face) as well as non-
verbal communication (i.e., making gestures). Moreover, though this may be due to 
difficulty in processing emotions, adults with autism consistently perform worse on 
tasks involving face and emotional recognition (Bird & Cook, 2013). Though not a 
core characteristic, the lack of social development often leads to difficulties in 
forming and maintaining relationships, resulting in increased reports of loneliness in 
adults with autism (Burgess & Gutstein, 2007). 
 
1.4.1.2 Communication 
As early as 12 months old, children with autism exhibit delays in the 
development of communicative skills. These delays include the onset of babbling 
(i.e., articulate sounds that are not recognisable words), unusual gestures (e.g., hand 
gestures), diminished responsiveness (i.e., responding to a stimulus) together with 
vocal patterns that are not in sync with others. These difficulties continue into 24 and 
36 months, as children with autism have also shown frequent and less diverse 
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babbling, consonants (i.e., basic speech sound) and word combinations, as well as 
their gestures (i.e., facial expressions; finger pointing) are less integrated with words 
(Noens, Berckelaer-Onnes, Verpoorten, & van Duijn, 2006). Furthermore, both 
individuals with autism have shown deficits in language development. For example, 
although children (aged ~ 8 years) and adolescents (aged ~ 15 years) with autism 
showed similar performance as matched neurotypicals on basic language tasks (e.g., 
spelling and vocabulary), both autism groups performed significantly worse than 
matched typically developing children and adolescents on complex language tasks 
involving comprehension and figurative language (Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 
2006). 
 
1.4.1.3 Repetitive Behaviours  
The final core characteristic of autism is the display of restricted and 
repetitive behaviours. In accordance with the Repetitive Behaviour Scale-Revised 
(RBS-R; Lam & Aman, 2007), these behaviours include those that are stereotyped 
(constant movements such as hand flapping), compulsive (i.e., actions that have rigid 
rules intended to reduce anxiety), ritualistic (i.e., unvarying pattern of daily activities 
e.g., morning routine), and restricted (activities which are limited in variety e.g., 
playing with the same toy). As well as a stubbornness to change (e.g., refusing to be 
interrupted; moving furniture in a room) and behaviours that cause injury to 
themselves (e.g., eye-poking, hand-biting and head-banging). Although none of 
these repetitive and/or self-injuring behaviours are specific to autism, an elevated 
pattern of occurrence and severity characterise the disorder (Bodfish, Symons, 




1.4.2 Diagnosis of Autism 
Per the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013), a diagnosis of autism requires at least six 
items from three main behavioural symptom categories. Firstly, social interaction 
difficulties include solidarity, making less frequent eye movements compared to 
typically developing children, as well as unusual and/or unfitting behaviours (e.g., 
aloofness; remoteness). Secondly, communication difficulties include a significant 
delay in language attainment and a failure to comprehend feelings and empathy 
towards others. Finally, restricted interests and repetitive behaviours include an 
inflexibility adherence to rituals and stereotyped behaviours (e.g., flapping of hands). 
Moreover, they require a delay and/or impairments in at least one or more categories 
including social interaction, language, and symbolic or imaginative play. These 
behavioural symptoms attributed to the categorisation of autism ordinarily present 
themselves within early childhood (i.e., between 18 and 24 months old) and persist 
throughout the lifespan of the individual, though their presentation typically varies 
throughout development. Due to these wide range of variant symptoms, autism sits 
under the general category for pervasive development disorder (PDD), which also 
encompasses those who are identified as having low-functioning autism (LFA) with 
an intelligence quotient (IQ) score typically below 70 (as well as other types of 
biological causes), and those who are identified as having high-functioning autism 
(HFA) with normal (> 70) to high (> 85) IQ scores (Ghaziuddin & Mountain-
Kimchi, 2004). In addition, Asperger’s disorder (AD) is distinguished from autism 





1.4.3 Theory of Mind in Autism 
One of the earliest and most prominent theory to account for these 
atypicalities in communication and social interaction in autism, and at one time 
considered to be the primary reason of the disorder, is the Theory of Mind (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995) or ‘mindblindness’ (Frith, 2001) 
hypothesis. Theory of Mind is an ability to make inferences concerning the goals, 
desires, beliefs, and mental states of another individual (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). For example, if an observer witnesses a person reaching for a biscuit from a 
tin container labelled ‘biscuits’, it could be assumed that the person would like a 
biscuit and believe that there are biscuits in the container, even if the observer is 
already aware the container is empty. With regards to imitation, if an individual does 
not possess Theory of Mind and the ability represent the mental states of others, then 
they would have difficulties to form and manage representation of self and other 
(i.e., self-other mapping). One of the first studies on Theory of Mind in autism was 
reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) and studied the “Sally-Anne” false-belief test. 
In this test, children are presented with a story in which Sally has a basket, and Ann 
has a box. The story proceeds where Sally puts her marble in the basket and leaves 
the room. While Sally is away, Ann takes the marble from her basket and put it in 
the box. Sally returns to look for the marble. The child is then asked “where will 
Sally look for her marble?” If the child points to the previous location of the marble 
(i.e., basket), they pass by appreciating the doll’s now false belief. If, however, they 
point to the current location they fail by not taking into account Sally’s belief. It was 
reported that 85 % of unimpaired children and 86 % of children with Down’s 
Syndrome answered the false-belief question correctly, compared to only 20 % of 
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children with autism who answered the false-belief question correctly (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; see also Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986). 
 
1.4.4 Prevalence Rates of Autism 
In comparison with earlier reports of autism (e.g., Eisenberg & Kanner, 
1955), advances in understanding of symptoms, together with diagnostic criteria, 
have influenced prevalence rates of autism. Prevalence rates monitor the number of 
known cases reported within one period of time or a span of time. Initially, autism 
was seen as a relatively uncommon disorder, with prevalence rates of 4 per 10,000 
individuals (Rutter, 1978). This estimation has increased noticeably over the years 
with prevalence rates reported to be 157 per 10,000 in the United Kingdom (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2009). This year-on-year increase can be clearly demonstrated by the 
work of Gurney and colleagues (Gurney, Fritz, Ness, Sievers, Newschaffer, & 
Shapiro, 2003) who reported an increase of autism prevalence among children aged 
6-11 years in the state of Minnesota (USA) from 251 in 1991-1992 to 4094 from 
2001-2002 (an increase of 1531 %). As can be seen in Figure 1.1, in 2010 the 
prevalence rate of autism within the United Kingdom was reported to be 39 boys, 
and 8 girls, per 10,000 children (Figure 1.1a; Taylor, Hershel, & MacLaughlin, 
2013). Globally, prevalence rates were reported to be 5.8 and 3.0 per 10,000 in boys 
and girls respectively (Figure 1.1b; Baxter, Brugha, Erskine, Scheurer, Vos, & 
Scott, 2014). Importantly, when interpreting these rates caution must be taken as 
differences in methodology and diagnostic tests have produced varying results. The 
increase in awareness of autism, as well as improved diagnostic techniques and 
reporting practices, has contributed towards an increase in the prevalence rates of 





Figure 1.1 (a) Mean prevalence rates of autism in the United Kingdom from 2005-
2010 presented as a function of gender and year (adapted from Taylor et al., 2013).   
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1.5 Imitation in Autism 
 
Given the complexity of characteristics associated with autism and the obvious 
benefits of imitation for social interaction, imitation abilities in individuals with 
autism have received considerable examination (Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Smith 
& Bryson, 1994; Rogers, 1999; Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse, & Wehner, 2003; 
Rogers & Williams, 2006; Hamilton, 2013; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014; Vivanti & 
Rogers, 2014). For example, Edwards (2014) performed a meta-analysis of fifty-
three studies to examine whether individuals with autism show significant imitation 
deficits and whether they are specific to autism. A random-effects model showed 
individuals with autism showed deficits with autism with an average of 0.81 SDs 
below neurotypical individuals. Furthermore, this observed deficit was specific to 
autism, as moderator analysis indicated that average Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS; a semi-structured instrument for diagnosing and assessing autism) 
scores positively correlated with autism imitation abilities. Finally, the manner in 
which imitation was operationalised affected the size of the imitation differences 
between individuals with and without autism. However, the study setting, novelty of 
actions, format of imitation tasks, or the number of actions to imitate were not found 
to significantly affect the sizes of the imitation differences between individuals with 
and without autism. 
Much of the work examining imitation in individuals with autism has mainly 
focused on spontaneous and elicited imitation. One of the first studies (DeMyer et 
al., 1972) that explicitly examined spontaneous imitation abilities in children with 
autism involved non-specific prompts (e.g., a demonstrator plays with a toy, then 
hands it to the observer, saying “you can play”). It was reported that compared to 
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neurotypical children, children with autism were better at imitating in contexts that 
required motor-object imitation (copying the object) than in contexts that required 
body movements to imitated (e.g., a standing jump). Another method to examine 
spontaneous imitation in autism is through automatic imitation (i.e., mimicry). 
Several studies using automatic imitation have found that compared to matched 
neurotypicals, individuals with autism show intact automatic imitation responses 
(Leighton, Bird, Charman, & Heyes, 2008; Sowden et al., 2016). For instance, when 
adults with autism and neurotypical adults were required to perform hand actions 
following observation of either a human or robotic hand actions, adults without 
autism showed an automatic imitation effect, which was more profound after 
observing human compared to robotic actions (‘animacy’ bias). Importantly, adults 
with autism also showed a similar automatic imitation effect and greater animacy 
bias than neurotypical adults (Bird, Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007). 
Other research examining imitation abilities in autism examined elicited 
imitation. These to-be-imitated actions are typically characterised by whether they 
are directed towards a goal (meaningful/familiar) or not (non-meaningful/novel). 
Studies examining elicited imitation have regularly reported difficulties in imitation 
of non-meaningful actions in individuals with autism (Stone, Ousley, & Littleford, 
1997; Bernier, Dawson, Webb, & Murias, 2007; Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De 
Weerdt, 2007; Rogers, Young, Cook, Giolzetti, & Ozonoff, 2010). For example, 
Rogers et al. (1996) examined imitation and pantomime in adolescents with autism. 
Seventeen adolescents with autism were matched (chronological age and verbal IQ) 
with fifteen typically developing adolescents and completed three tasks. First, in the 
hand imitation task participants were required to imitate single or sequential hand 
actions that were either meaningful (familiar e.g., put arms over head, clasp together 
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and shake) or non-meaningful (novel e.g., extend arm and hand straight out in front 
of body, with fingers fanned out, and thumb pointed to ceiling). Results indicated 
that aside from single meaningful actions, neurotypical adolescents demonstrated 
greater imitation performance (number of perfect scores) compared to autistic 
adolescents. Second, in a facial imitation task participants were required to imitate 
single or sequential (three movements consisting of movements from single 
movements) facial actions that were meaningful (e.g., happy, sad, frightened) or 
non-meaningful (e.g., tongue protrusion with mouth open). Results demonstrated 
that typically developing adolescents imitated non-meaningful sequential facial 
actions with higher accuracy than adolescents with autism. Finally, in a pantomime 
task, participants were required to pantomime single and sequential meaningful 
actions with the use of common (e.g., toothbrush) objects. Furthermore, they 
completed two control tasks where participants imitated using objects in an 
appropriate way and where they demonstrated the real use of the object without a 
model. Results showed that typically developing adolescents had greater accuracy 
when imitating single and sequential actions that did not require the use of an object 
(Rogers et al., 1996). 
In another study that concentrated solely on imitation of non-meaningful 
actions in individuals with autism, Hobson and Lee (1999) examined whether 
children with autism had specific problems imitating the style (e.g., harsh 
movement) in which the action is performed. Sixteen adolescents with autism were 
matched (chronological age and verbal IQ) with sixteen typically developing 
adolescents and completed four non-meaningful imitation tasks: (1) Pipe-rack and 
stick (strumming and stick across the ridges of the pipe-rack three times); (2) frog 
and roller brow-wiping (laying a synthetic frog on the palm of the hand and wiping 
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forehead three times); (3) stamp and ink-pad (holding a handle of a stamp, pressing 
the stamp on the ink-pad, and then transferring it onto a sheet of paper); (4) rolling 
policeman (pushing a spring mechanism on a toy policeman that stood on wheels 
such that it moved forward). In each of the tasks, the action was to be performed in 
either a harsh (i.e., abrupt) or gentle (i.e., elegant) style (except the rolling policeman 
task which required the policeman to be depressed with either the wrist or index and 
middle finger). Results indicated that fewer children with autism imitated the style of 
the action. That is, they were able to perform the same goal-directed action (e.g., 
move a stick across a wooden pipe-rack), but failed to imitate the style (e.g., gentle 
or harsh movement to strum the stick across the wooden pipe-rack) with which the 
action was performed (Hobson & Lee, 1999; see also Hobson & Hobson, 2008). 
A number of other more recent studies have confirmed that individuals with 
autism show a priority towards imitating the goal of the action, over imitating the 
form to achieving the goal (Cossu et al., 2012; Salowitz et al., 2013). In a study by 
Hamilton, Brindley and Frith (2007) examining goal-directed imitation and action 
understanding, autistic children were matched (verbal mental age) with typically 
developing children and completed four action-representation tasks. For example, 
when testing Bekkering’s goal-directed imitation task (Bekkering et al., 2000), 
participants sat across from an experimenter and copied their hand movements to a 
target (dot on a table) using mirror imitation. Results indicated that children with 
autism displayed similar goal-directed imitation strategies as typically developing 
children. Here then, when required to imitate the contralateral trials (congruent 
target; incongruent limb), they chose to imitate the end-point of the action (i.e., 
target on a table) over the limb selected (i.e., congruent limb) to perform the 
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movement. Thus, the data provides evidence that both typical and autistic children 
understand and imitate the goal of an action. 
Up until recent years, imitation in autism was quantified using descriptive 
measures (e.g., Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999), where a quantitative form 
score is used to measure imitation performance (e.g., providing a score of two for 
fully correct imitation). Though this is a suitable approach, more recently kinematic 
analysis has been used to examine imitation of biological motion (e.g., Wild et al., 
2010; Williams et al., 2014). Kinematic measures have the advantage of being able 
to quantify exactly what properties of the movement are, or are not, imitated in 
autism, such as biological motion kinematics. During examination of goal and goal-
less imitation (Wild et al., 2012), adults with autism and matched (age, sex and IQ) 
controls observed a human model perform a series of upper-limb pointing 
movements that were differentiated by speed (fast, slow). In addition, context was 
manipulated such that the model aimed to visual-targets (dot on table) or an end-
space. According to the goal-directed theory of imitation (Bekkering et al., 2000), 
when the visual-targets are removed (i.e., end-space) an imitator is likely to focus 
attention towards imitating the model’s movement (i.e., kinematics) as opposed to 
simply reaching for the goal (i.e., visual-target). Consistent with this theory, the 
results from Wild et al. (2012) showed only control participants imitated the 
different movement speeds when targets were removed. In comparison, participants 
with autism failed to modulate the movement speed in either condition. Moreover, 
using similar apparatus to that in the current thesis, it has also been shown that 
autistic individuals have some trouble imitating spatial properties of an action. In a 
study by Stewart, McIntosh, and Williams (2013), participants were required to 
imitate actions using a stylus on a graphics tablet performed by a human or non-
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human (only the end-point of the movement seen) model. Imitation accuracy was 
calculated by comparing against a ‘ghost control’ (the end-point of the movement 
was replaced by a dot on the screen) condition. Compared to matched (chronological 
age) controls who exhibited no differences in imitation following observation of 
human or non-human model, adolescents with autism exhibited differences in action 
duration and path length in both observation conditions. 
To summarise, studies examining imitation in individuals with autism make 
it apparent that there are differences in imitation abilities compared to matched 
controls. Early work that used non-specific prompts indicated that individuals with 
autism imitate less frequently (DeMyer et al., 1972), yet imitation is intact in tasks 
that measure rapid and nonconscious matching of others actions (Bird et al., 2007; 
Leighton et al., 2008; Sowden et al., 2016). Studies that explicitly instructed to 
imitate indicated that individuals with autism can successfully imitate the goal (i.e., 
meaningful) of an observed action (Hamilton et al., 2007; Jiménez, Lorda, & 
Méndez, 2014) yet they have difficulties imitating the form of the action (i.e., non-
meaningful) to achieve the goal (Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999). 
Examining imitation of kinematic features of the movement isolates the contribution 
of lower-level processes and has provided novel contributions to further 
understanding towards specific imitation deficits in those with autism, such as 
movement speed (Wild et al., 2012) and path length (Stewart et al., 2013). 
 
1.6 Processing Accounts of Imitation in Autism 
 
Over the year’s researchers have attempted to identify the underlying processes 
underpinning impaired imitation in autism which will be discussed below: 
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1.6.1 Mirror Neuron System; Self-Other Mapping Processing 
One of the earliest presuppositions towards a greater understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms of impaired imitation in individuals with autism is reflected 
by a restricted capacity to form and manage representation of self and other (i.e., 
self-other mapping). Through the discovery of mirror neurons (Di Pelligrino et al., 
1992) and a system that underpins self-other mapping (Iacoboni et al., 1999) it was 
subsequently suggested that early developmental failures within the mirror neuron 
system in autism were responsible for the reported discrepancies in self-other 
mapping, accompanying other aspects of social-cognition such as Theory of Mind 
(Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). This suggestion is now commonly 
referred to as the ‘mirror neuron system’ hypothesis and is still one of the most 
prominent accounts for imitation difficulties in autism. This hypothesis has been 
supported by further reviews of the literature (Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004; 
Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006), as well as behavioural and neuroimaging studies 
showing different activity within the mirror neuron system during action-observation 
and imitation in autism (Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, Altschuler, Ramachandran, 
& Pineda, 2005; Théoret, Halligan, Kobayashi, Fregni, Tager-Flusberg, & Pascual-
Leone, 2005; Williams, Waiter, Gilchrist, Perrett, Murray, & Whiten, 2006). For 
instance, Dapretto and colleagues (2006) examined the mirror neuron system in 
children with autism and typically developing children (matched for chorological 
age and full-scale IQ) when imitating five facial expressions (anger, fear, neutral, 
happiness, and sadness) during one of two sessions: (1) they were required to imitate 
the observed facial expression, or; (2) simply sit and observe the facial expression. 
Behavioural data indicated that both autistic and typically developing children 
successfully imitated different facial expressions, which was accompanied by similar 
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eye movement patterns (fixations on the demonstrator’s eyes during action-
observation and motor-execution). Neuroimaging data showed that during imitation 
of facial expressions, typically developing children exhibited similar neural activity 
to that previously illustrated in neurotypical adults (e.g., Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, 
Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003). The data also showed that autistic children showed 
inactivity within a core component (IFG) of the mirror neuron system during 
imitation of the facial expressions which positively correlated with autism severity 
(Dapretto et al., 2006). 
Williams and colleagues also used fMRI paradigm to examine the neural 
mechanisms during imitation in autism (Williams et al., 2006). Fifteen autistic 
adolescents and matched (age and IQ) control adolescents were scanned while either 
observing, executing or imitating index finger movements following three stimuli: 
(1) animation of index or middle finger being lifted; (2) photograph with black cross 
marking the index or middle finger; (3) plain background with black cross on left or 
right side of screen. Though imitation of finger sequences was similar between 
group, fMRI data showed robust differences between the autism and control 
adolescents in neural activity. The autism group did not show activation within the 
somatosensory cortex during non-imitative action. In addition, contrary to the 
control group, during imitation the autism group did not show activation of the right 
posterior middle temporal gyrus at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). They did, 
however, show such activation during action-observation. These findings (Dapretto 
et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2006) of altered activity within the mirror system result 
in problems with integrating visual analysis, motor action, proprioception and 
emotional processing during the self-other mapping in imitation. Finally, this 
suggestion of altered self-other mapping has also been reported in recent behavioural 
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work (Stewart et al., 2013). When autistic adolescents and matched (age) 
neurotypicals imitated motor actions on a graphics tablet performed by a human or 
non-human (only the end-point of the movement seen) model, autistic adolescents 
showed significantly less imitation accuracy in action duration and path length in 
both conditions. By using a model that displayed only the movement end-point (i.e., 
non-human model), and controlling for general factors associated with memory, 
spatial reasoning, motor control, attention, and social context, it was suggested that 
deficits in imitation were linked to impaired neural processes underpinning self-other 
mapping, and that these led to difficulties with representing the observed movement 
kinematics and mapping this to the motor system for imitation. 
 
1.6.2 Social Top-Down Model 
Through the increased evidence associated with intact spontaneous and 
elicited imitation of actions in autism (Hamilton et al., 2007; Bird et al., 2007; 
Leighton et al., 2008; Press et al., 2010; Wild et al., 2012; Sowden et al. 2016), 
combined with differences in the regions of previously reported abnormal brain 
activity (Dapretto et al., 2006; Grèzes, Wicker, Berthoz, & De Gelder, 2009) but 
typical responses when viewing goal-directed actions (Dinstein, Thomas, 
Humphreys, Minshew, Behrmann, & Heeger, 2010; Marsh & Hamilton, 2011) it has 
been suggested that the lower-level visuomotor processes in imitation are 
unimpaired in autism (Hamilton, 2008; 2009; 2013; 2015). Therefore, it has been 
advocated that problematic imitation abilities in individuals with autism may be due 
to failure of top-down control mechanisms (Southgate & Hamilton, 2008). These 
mechanisms involve the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and TPJ (Hamilton, 2013, 
2015), which are suggested to control the lower-level visuomotor processes by 
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selecting and controlling the imitative (or non-imitative) actions to represent. More 
specifically, the social top-down response modulation (STORM) model (Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012) suggests top-down control is based on the evaluation of a social 
context and situation, and that impairments of these top-down control mechanisms 
may result in atypicalities in imitation and mirror neuron system activity in autism. 
Initial research exploring social context and imitation in autism is consistent with 
this model and indicates that imitation in typically developing children and adults 
can be modulated by social cues such as eye contact (Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 
2011) and pro-social sentences (Cook & Bird, 2011). However, this is not the case 
for individuals with autism. For example, nineteen adults with autism and matched 
adults without autism were primed with either a pro-social (e.g., friend) or non-social 
(e.g., secluded) attitudes prior to mimicry of finger movements. Priming was 
achieved using a four or five word grammatically correct sentences (see Leighton et 
al., 2008). Consistent with their earlier work (Cook & Bird, 2011), Cook and Bird 
(2012) observed that neurotypical adults exhibited higher levels of automatic 
imitation following pro-social compared to non-social priming. In contrast, 
automatic imitation levels were not modulated following pro-social or non-social 
priming in autistic adults. These findings indicate that the human mirror system is 
operating during automatic imitation, yet is not regulated appropriately during social 
contexts (Cook & Bird, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
 
1.6.3 Visual Attention Processes 
It has recently been suggested that differences in visual attention may 
attribute towards impaired imitation of biological motion in autism (Gowen, 2012). 
In this case, it is not implied that there is general attention away from the imitation 
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task itself but more of a bias away from the kinematic features (e.g., velocity) of the 
observed action. A study by Vivanti et al. (2008) was one of the first to measure 
visual attention patterns in children with autism and matched (age and IQ) typically 
developing controls during imitation of meaningful and non-meaningful actions. 
Participants observed and imitated actions with objects such as striking a xylophone 
(i.e., meaningful) and gestures such as bending the arm at the elbow (i.e., non-
meaningful), while eye movements were recorded. Behavioural data (sum of 
precision scores similar to Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999) revealed that 
children with autism were less accurate than controls when imitating meaningful 
actions with objects and non-meaningful actions. Eye movement data revealed that 
although autistic children had similar movement patterns as controls, they spent half 
as much time observing the models face (Vivanti et al., 2008). Wild et al. (2012) 
examined kinematic data and eye movements during the motor-execution phase of 
imitation. The results showed that the lack of modulation of movement speed 
exhibited by adults with autism was associated with less time tracking (i.e., smooth 
pursuit) the hand, and more time shifting gaze (i.e., saccade) and fixating on the 
action end-point. From these results, it was suggested that shifts in gaze, and thus 
attention away from the model was a compensatory mechanism, which consequently 
influenced the amount sensorimotor information processed from the hand trajectory 
resulting in low-fidelity imitation of movement kinematics (Wild et al., 2012). One 
way to influence visual attention is by proving explicit instructions. This has 
previously been shown to increase levels of contagious yawning (Senju, Kikuchi, 
Akechi, Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 2009), which is a response that facilitates joint 
attention during interpersonal contexts, and is underpinned by similar lower-level 
sensorimotor processes as those engaged during imitation (Senju, 2013). Though 
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children with autism were originally found to execute fewer yawns whilst observing 
a model than a control group (Senju, Maeda, Kikuchi, Hasegawa, Tojo, & Osanai, 
2007), this behaviour was reversed following explicit instructions that directed overt 
visual attention to the eye region of the model (Senju et al., 2009). This is a point 
that will be discussed further in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
1.6.4 Processing Biological Kinematics 
It is well accepted that perception of biological motion plays an important 
role in imitation (Press, 2011) and it has been suggested that possible difficulties in 
biological motion perception may underlie the documented impairments in imitation 
in individuals with autism (Freitag et al., 2008). There is evidence that individuals 
with autism have difficulties perceiving biological motion (Nackaerts, Wagemans, 
Helsen, Swinnen, Wenderoth, & Alaerts, 2012). For example, Blake and colleagues 
(Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol, & Stone, 2003) required children with autism and 
matched (chronological age) children without autism to complete two visual tasks. 
One involved grouping small line elements into a global figure, and the other 
involved perceiving human motion portrayed by point light displays. Results showed 
that although children with autism perform similarly to children without autism on 
the figure task, they performed with less accuracy when perceiving biological 
motion task. Moreover, in a more recent study, autistic and matched (age, gender and 
IQ) neurotypical participants were required to observe and recognise biological 
motion and emotions from point light displays. Results indicated that neurotypicals 
were significantly more accurate at recognising biological motion compared to the 
autistic participants. The reduction in accuracy of emotional recognition was 
associated with altered eye movements (Nackaerts et al., 2012). 
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Though studies have shown difficulties in perceiving biological motion in 
autism, recent data show that individuals with autism exhibit intact abilities to 
perceive biological motion (Moore, Hobson, & Lee, 1997; Wild et al., 2012; Cook, 
Blakemore, & Press, 2013; Cusack, Williams & Neri, 2015). Adults with autism and 
matched (age, gender, and IQ) neurotypical adults were required to determine the 
direction of movement of point light displays (walking person, translating rectangle 
or translating unfamiliar shape) embedded within noise dots that moved similarly. 
Results verified no differences in perceptual thresholds between autistic and 
neurotypical adults across all three conditions, with close to duplicate results 
(Saygin, Blakemore, & Press, 2013). Moreover, Cusack et al. (2015) examined 
action perception in adolescents with autism and controls (matched for age, IQ and 
Social Responsiveness Scale) using point light displays. During action-perception, 
participants were required to do the following: (1) biological motion detection 
(differentiate between biological and non-biological motion); (2) action 
discrimination (discrimination between robotic and natural motion); (3) limb 
fragments (discrimination of one form of action from another); (4) agent synchrony 
(integration of libs into full-body agents); (5) attention (discrimination of two agents 
that are temporally synchronous or not); (6) animate motion (attention to biological 
motion signals). Results indicated that across all six experiments autistic adolescents 
performed to the same level as neurotypicals signifying intact biological motion 
perception. To summarise, there is a sufficient body of evidence that suggests 
autistic individuals can process biological motion (Wild et al., 2012; Cook et al., 
2013; Saygin et al., 2013; Cusack et al., 2015). Important to the present thesis is that 
many of the studies reporting difficulties in perceiving biological motion are linked 
to processing emotion (e.g., Nackaerts et al., 2012). To factor for this and ensure that 
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all participants with autism could successfully perceive differences in biological 
motion, an action-perception task was included and will be discussed further in 
Chapter Three. 
 
1.7 Sensorimotor Control Processes in Autism 
 
Though not classified as a core characteristic, individuals with autism often display 
sensorimotor impairments, which range from motor apraxia (Ming, Brimacombe & 
Wager, 2007) to differences in balance (Weimer, Schatz, Lincoln, Ballantyne & 
Trauner, 2001). Consequently, it is important to address the sensorimotor control 
processes in autism as this provides the potential to isolate areas that may influence 
any observed differences in imitation in autism. A previous review took a 
computational approach to sensorimotor control processes in autism (Gowen & 
Hamilton, 2013). In the review of the sensorimotor control process below, similar 
phases (1-4) have been sub-sectioned based on the imitation learning work of 
Buccino et al. (2004): 
 
1. During action observation attention is directed towards the biological motion 
kinematics of the observed model such that sensorimotor information is attended 
to, and processed leading to the generation of a sensorimotor representation 
containing the goal (i.e., touch the ear) and the form (i.e., limb; limb velocity) to 
achieve the goal. 
2. The representation forms the motor plan for execution by containing 
sensorimotor information about the motor components required to achieve the 
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goal, which are then mapped onto the motor system along with the expected 
sensory consequences (e.g., vision; proprioception).  
3. During motor-execution the efferent sensory signals (from the motor plan), and 
afferent sensory (vision; proprioception) feedback are compared to the expected 
sensory consequences (efference copy; inverse model). Any discrepancy will be 
minimised by through online motor control processes and feedback from vision.  
4. During the inter-trial delay between two trials (i.e., offline), the efferent, afferent, 
and sensorimotor feedback are continued to be processed and integrated such that 
the sensorimotor representation is refined. The updated sensorimotor 
representation can be used for the upcoming trial (i.e., trial n+1). 
 
1.7.1 Action-Observation 
Precise imitation of biological motion requires accurate sensory inputs, as 
this provides information about the task (i.e., kinematics). During observation of a 
novel human action (e.g., guitar chords played by a guitarist), visual information 
from eye movements is encoded into a representation which encompasses the goal(s) 
(e.g., touching the target on the table) and the form (e.g., velocity of the limb) to 
achieve the goal(s), and acts as an internal model (Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998). 
Current data from eye movement studies in autism point towards abnormalities in 
basic processes associated with saccadic (Schmitt, Cook, Sweeney, & Mosconi, 
2014) and smooth pursuit (Takarae, Minshew, Luna, Krisky, & Sweeney, 2004) eye 
movements. Furthermore, previous studies have shown that individuals with autism 
showed variability in patterns towards social visual engagement (Rice, Moriuchi, 
Jones, & Klin, 2012), the actions of others (Barbaro & Dissanayake, 2013), as well 
as visual attention to non-social information (Sasson, Elison, Turner-Brown, Dichter, 
  
46 
& Bodfish, 2011; Elison, Sasson, Turner-Brown, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2012). For 
example, in comparison with matched typically developing children which 
orientated attention towards the eyes of the demonstrator during observation, 
children with autism exhibited altered patters of eye movements away from the 
demonstrator’s eyes (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, Ramsay, & Jones, 2009). Differences in 
eye movements have also been observed during imitation in autism, with 
dissimilarities in visual attention to observed stimuli (Vivanti et al, 2008, 2011; Wild 
et al., 2012; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014). This led to the suggestion that impaired 
imitation in autism may be a consequence of anomalous visual attention towards the 
model. This hypothesis has been previously discussed (1.6.3) and will be addressed 
further in Chapter Three. These studies demonstrate a clear difference in visual 
sensory inputs in autism, which may impact the calculation of expected sensory 
consequences and thus the ability to plan and adjust executed movements. 
 
1.7.2 Motor-Planning 
In order to successfully plan the observed action, an individual must process 
the desired goal (i.e., touching the ear) into a sequence of motor commands. One of 
the simplest and mostly used methods to examine planning is reaction times, which 
represents the time taken to formulate the motor plan. Compared to neurotypicals, 
autistic individuals frequently exhibit longer reaction times (Rinehart, Bellgrove, 
Tonge, Brereton, Howells-Rankin, & Bradshaw, 2006; Glazebrook, Elliott, & 
Szatma, 2008; Nazarali, Glazebrook & Elliott, 2009; Dowd, McGinley, Taffe, & 
Rinehart, 2012). For example, twelve autistic children that were matched (age and 
midrange IQ) with twelve children diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, as well as 
eleven typically developing children, completed a serial-choice reaction task 
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(Rinehart, Bradshaw, Brereton, & Tonge, 2001). Results indicated that individuals 
with autism and Asperger’s disorder had an intact ability to execute the movement, 
with similar movement times to typically developing children. However, both groups 
had significantly slower reaction times during motor preparation than typically 
developing children (Rinehart et al., 2001). An alternate approach to examining 
planning is by using reach-to-grasp task, which again reveals autistic individuals 
create motor-plans differently (Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009; 
Forti, Valli, Perego, Nobile, Crippa, & Molteni, 2011; Gonzalez, Glazebrook, 
Studenka, & Lyons, 2013). In an early study by Hughes (1996), thirty-six autistic 
children and twenty-eight matched (age and verbal IQ) typically developing children 
completed a rod placing task. Performance was quantified as the final hand posture 
(i.e., whether the participants finished in a comfortable (thumb up) or uncomfortable 
(thumb down) position. It was observed that compared to typically developing 
children, autistic children had significantly higher uncomfortable final postures, 
indicating autistic children did not consider the end-point of the movement. In 
addition, children with autism also demonstrate a diminished ability to complete 
standard tests (i.e., Tower of Hanoi/London tasks) of planning (Ozonoff, Pennington, 
& Rogers; 1991; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994), indicating that on the whole, 
individuals with autism have difficulty planning their movements (Fournier, Hass, 
Naik, Lodha, & Cauraugh, 2010). 
 
1.7.3 Motor-Execution 
During execution, particularly in the early stages of imitation, errors in the 
movement execution may arise due to planning difficulties and/or noise within the 
motor system (Gowen & Hamilton, 2013). To reduce these movement errors a 
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forward model is used which uses the outgoing signals (i.e., efference copy) and 
creates a prediction of the expected sensory input. This expected sensory input is 
compared to the actual sensory input (i.e., afference) and any resulting discrepancy 
between the expected and actual sensory consequences are minimised by online 
adjustments (Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998; Wolpert & 
Flanagan, 2001). Atypicalities in motor-execution in autism have been repeatedly 
observed, and involve accurate execution of a movement (i.e., upper-limb pointing) 
but increased variability of movement kinematics (Gowen & Miall, 2005; 
Glazebrook, Gonzalez, Hansen, & Elliott, 2009; Papadopoulos, McGinley, Tonge, 
Bradshaw, Saunders, & Rinehart, 2012; Mosconi, Mohanty, Greene, Cook, 
Vaillancourt, Sweeney, 2015; Cook et al., 2013). For example, Mari and colleagues 
(2003) found that average (IQ 80-89) and high (IQ > 90) ability autistic children 
completed a reach to grasp task more rapidly than control participants. Also, low-
ability (IQ < 80) autistic participants reached with longer movement duration, lower 
deceleration and peak velocity, and delayed maximum grip apertures for grasping 
(Mari, Castiello, Marks, Marraffa, & Prior, 2003). A later follow-up study 
investigated how adults with autism execute and control goal-directed movements 
(Glazebrook, Elliott, & Lyons, 2006). Nine adults with autism were matched 
(chronological age) with nine neurotypical adults and completed pointing 
movements. All participants placed their index finger on a ‘home’ position and then 
moved as quickly and as accurately as possible to targets that were manipulated by 
length (short; long) and target size (small; large). Kinematic analysis indicated that 
although movement accuracy was similar to matched controls, adults with autism 
exhibited greater temporal and spatial variability over the initial phase of the 
movement, along with lower peak velocities. The authors suggested that the varying 
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results were due to a problem in the timing of muscular forces. In sum, the evidence 
above provides a strong indication that increased motor noise and timing deficits 
may lead to increased variability in temporal and spatial aspects of execution during 
imitation in autism. 
 
1.7.4 Sensorimotor Integration and Consolidation 
Sensorimotor adaptation is essential for successfully imitating novel actions. 
Recently, the ability of individuals with autism to successfully form and refine 
sensorimotor representations has come under close scrutiny. This area has been 
examined at length by Mostofsky and colleagues through adaptations in motor-
execution in response to a change within the environment (Mostofsky, Dubey, 
Jerath, Jansiewicz, Goldberg, & Denckla, 2006; Fuentes, Mostofsky, & Bastian, 
2011). For instance, hand displacement was measured during a ball-catching task in 
eight boys with high-functioning autism and eights boys without autism (matched 
for age). During baseline, when a light ball was used followed by a heavier ball, 
greater initial hand displacement was evident which gradually reduced to a steady-
state displacement. When returning to a light ball, less hand displacement was 
evident compared to the baseline light ball. Notably, these adaptation effects were 
observed regardless of disorder (Mostofsky, Bunoski, Morton, Goldberg, & Bastian, 
2004). In a later study, during two tasks (ball catching; moving a novel tool) where 
the environment had been changed (prism goggles; perturbed forces), results showed 
that children with autism developed and transformed a representation akin to 
children without autism. This was verified through after effects (updating of the 
representation through processing motor reafference on a trial-by-trial basis), which 
resulted in adaptation of motor-
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Shadmehr, & Mostofsky 2008). In both studies, it was concluded that successful 
adaptation was underpinned by normal cerebellar function. fMRI findings support 
cerebellar contribution to motor adaption and motor sequence learning (Mier & 
Peteresen, 2002) and was previously suggested to be altered in individuals with 
autism (Courchesne, Townsend, & Saitoh, 1994). 
Though the above findings demonstrate successful motor adaptation in those 
with autism, there is also increasing evidence that they have difficulty integrating 
sensorimotor information (Mostofsky & Ewen, 2011; Whyatt & Craig, 2013a, 
2013b; Marko, Crocetti, Hulst, Donchin, Shadmehr, & Mostofsky, 2015). For 
example, children with autism and matched children with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), as well as typically developing children completed 
the Movement Assessment Battery for Children. Comparable with previous studies 
also employing this battery of tests (Whyatt & Craig, 2012), children with autism 
had difficulties in the ball-catching task. Notably, these difficulties were not only 
dissimilar to typically developing controls but also children with ADHD (Ament et 
al., 2015). These findings, as well as studies showing a bias towards reliance on 
visual over proprioceptive feedback when learning a novel movement (Haswell, 
Izawa, Dowell, Mostofsky, & Shadmehr, 2009; Izawa, Pekny, Marko, Haswell, 
Shadmehr, & Mostofsky, 2012), points towards imitation difficulties in autism being 
specific to perception-action coupling, and associated sensorimotor integration. 
 
1.8 Summary of Research and Current Thesis 
 
The aim of the above introductory sections was to provide an overview of imitation 
of biological motion kinematics in individuals with autism, and some of the motor 
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control processes that influence imitation. After doing so it is clear that children and 
adults with autism can successfully imitate meaningful (i.e., known) actions 
(Sowden et al., 2016) and goal-directed actions (Hamilton et al., 2007), but have 
difficulties imitating the form (i.e., producing a gentle or harsh sound) to achieve the 
goal (Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999). To date, studies examining 
imitation of kinematic measures that isolate lower-level processing is limited. Work 
thus far has indicated that individuals with autism have difficulties imitating 
movement speed (Wild et al., 2012) and amplitude (Stewart et al., 2013). Based on 
these findings several attempts have been made to account for impaired imitation in 
autism, such as differences in the lower-level visuomotor processes that map the 
visual information onto the motor system (Williams et al., 2001, 2004) or top-down 
control of these lower-level visuomotor processes associated with social interaction 
(Wang & Hamilton, 2012) and/or differences in visual attention (Vivanti et al., 
2008). Furthermore, observed problems in sensorimotor processes associated with 
motor-planning (Glazebrook et al., 2008), motor-execution (Glazebrook et al., 2006) 
and sensorimotor consolidation (Ament et al., 2015) could also cause complications 
in imitation of biological motion kinematics in autism. 
 
1.8.1 Imitation Task 
At present, previous work has provided understanding of specific imitation 
deficits in autism by isolating the contribution of lower-level processes (Wild et al., 
2012; Stewart et al., 2013). This was achieved by manipulating the speed or 
amplitude of the modelled movement. In terms of biological kinematics, the 
aforementioned context requires an imitator to scale an existing motor pattern 
(upper-limb movement) to meet new task demands (e.g., faster movement), but does 
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not isolate whether the deficit is attributable to imitating specific lower-level 
properties (e.g., velocity) of biological motion kinematics. In the current programme 
of work, a different approach will be employed where imitation of biological motion 
in adults with autism was examined by using a novel protocol that required 
participants to imitate movements that had distinctly different, but still biologically 
plausible, movement kinematics (Hayes, Roberts, Elliott, & Bennett, 2014; Hayes et 
al., 2016; Andrew, Bennett, Elliott, & Hayes, 2016). Using a stylus on a digital 
graphics tablet, adults with autism and matched neurotypical controls will observe 
and subsequently imitate a model that displays a single horizontal trajectory that 
originates from the left-hand side of the screen and ends at a right-hand side of the 
screen (Figure 1.2a). The experimental models display a movement that has exactly 
the same spatial and temporal outcomes as a control model, but with a velocity 
profile of either typical, atypical, or constant (Chapter Two only) kinematics (Figure 
1.2b). The atypical model ensures an observer must configure the sensorimotor 
system to represent the novel movement kinematics, as opposed to the typical model 
that can be achieved by rescaling an existing representation of a typical upper-limb 
aiming movement (Hayes, Timmis, & Bennett, 2009). It is well accepted that 
biological motion is coded via lower-level processes that is influenced by top-down 
attentional (end-state goals) and social (human form; eye contact) factors (Kilner et 
al., 2007; Stanley, Gowen & Miall, 2007). Therefore, to control for these potential 
modulatory affects the model reflects movement in an ‘unmodulated’ social context 
(Cook & Bird, 2011). To control for factors associated with social interaction 
(Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2012), the model of the to-be-
imitated movement will be displayed as a non-human agent model (a single white-





Figure 1.2 (a) A schematic representation of the laboratory/experimental set-up for 
the imitation task. The black outlined rectangle represents a graphics tablet. The 
white circle displayed on the CRT monitor represents the model. The single-segment 
movement is depicted by the arrow. (b) Typical (dashed-black trace), atypical (solid-
black trace) and constant (solid-dark-grey trace) velocity models presented as a 
function of time.  
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target goal-directed features of the task (Wild et al., 2010), in Chapter Two target 
goals will only be displayed in half the trials to encourage attention towards the 
trajectory of the model. Furthermore, by displaying target goals in half of the trials 
will allow a direct comparison between target and no-target conditions, examining 
visual attention towards the goal directed features of the movement, and whether 
imitation of biological motion in autism is influenced by goals consistent with 
previous studies (Wild et al., 2012). Given the lack of top-down effects of target 
goals in Chapter Two, in Chapters Three and Four, the target goals will be removed 
in all trials. 
 
1.9 Aims of Thesis 
 
The overall aim of the present thesis is to examine imitation of biological motion 
kinematics in adults with autism. The main question is whether adults with autism 
can adapt imitation and represent biological motion kinematics following specific 
manipulations to the learning context (e.g., attentional instructions; practice 
structure). In the following subsections, specific hypotheses will be presented in 
relation to each individual chapter. 
 
1.9.1 Chapter Two 
The aim is to examine whether adults with autism have difficulty imitating 
atypical biological kinematics. Imitation, and imitation adaption (i.e., performance 
change from the early-phase to late-phase of imitation), of biological motion 
kinematics will be examined using a novel behavioural protocol that requires adults 
with autism and neurotypical controls to observe a model that displays distinctly 
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different but biologically plausible kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014; 2016). Based on 
the findings, two possible accounts for processes associated with imitation of 
biological motion in autism will be presented. Firstly, it is possible that visual 
attention away from the kinematic features of the model could lead to differences in 
sensorimotor information extracted (Vivanti et al., 2008; Wild et al., 2012; Gowen, 
2012; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014). Secondly, it is possible that individuals with 
autism might have difficulty integrating sensorimotor information across trials that 
do not promote an opportunity for consolidation (Nebel et al., 2015; Sharer, 
Mostofsky, Pascual-Leone, & Oberman, 2015). 
 
1.9.2 Chapter Three 
In the second experimental chapter, the first of the two possible accounts for 
processes associated with imitation of biological motion will be investigated by 
examining overt visual attention when imitating biological motion kinematics. Using 
the same general protocol as Chapter Two, adults with and without autism will be 
provided with selective-attention instructions (Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007; 
Hayes et al., 2014) prior to imitation that to direct visual attention towards the 
kinematics of the to-be-imitated model(s). Furthermore, in order to examine whether 
imitation deficits in autism are related to processes associated with visual attention, 
eye movements will be recorded during the action-observation phase. 
 
1.9.3 Chapter Four 
In this chapter, the second of the two possible accounts for processes 
associated with imitation of biological motion will be investigated across three 
independent studies. In the first study, the same protocol as previous chapters will be 
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used, but now with the to-be-imitated model will be presented in a fixed (i.e., 
blocked) rather than random trial order. The aim is to determine if adults with autism 
can learn to adapt and represent biological motion following specific manipulations 
to trial order in which imitation is occurring. The aim of the second study will be to 
investigate the possible underlying processes of the above adaptation. To examine 
where these processes are occurring, participants will complete a similar protocol 
with a fixed trial order but now a secondary motor task (drawing circles on the 
tablet) will be completed in the inter-trial delay (i.e., in between motor-execution of 
trial n and action-observation on trial n+1). The aim of the third study will be to 
determine if functional imitation of biological motion kinematics in individuals in 
autism is associated with the opportunity to consolidate and integrate sensorimotor 
information. Here, participants will complete an identical protocol as Chapter Two, 
yet rather than being naïve to the protocol, they will be familiar (i.e., they will have 
completed the previous experiments) with the aim to replicate the kinematics data 
from this chapter using a random trial order. 
 
1.9.4 Chapter Five 
The aim of the final chapter is to provide a clear and concise summary of the 
findings of this entire programme of work, and to critically analyse these findings 
with reference to current literature in the area of imitation of in autism. Implications 
will then be drawn for both recent theoretical accounts of impaired imitation in 
autism, as well as sensorimotor control processes in autism. Lastly, implications for 
future translational research on imitation in autism will be discussed, with the 














2 Low-Fidelity Imitation of Biological Kinematics in Autism is Modulated by 






The aim of the present study was to further examine imitation of biological motion 
in individuals with and without autism. A novel protocol was employed that required 
participants to imitate movements that had distinctly different, but still biologically 
plausible, movement kinematics. To reduce the impact that higher-order processes 
have on imitation a non-human agent model was used to control social attention, and 
removed end-state target goals in half of the trials to minimise goal-directed 
attention. Findings showed that only neurotypical adults imitated atypical biological 
kinematics. Adults with autism did, however, become significantly more accurate at 
imitating movement time. This confirmed they engaged in the task, and that 
sensorimotor adaptation was self-regulated. The attentional bias to movement time 
suggests the attenuation in imitating kinematics might be a compensatory strategy 
due to deficits in lower-level visuomotor processes associated with self-other 













Imitation is a powerful mechanism for learning new sensorimotor behaviours (e.g., 
throwing a Frisbee) as well as for developing socio-cognitive skills (e.g., rapport; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and affiliation (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). One way 
humans acquire these behaviours is by copying a novel movement displayed by 
another person. This process is defined as true imitation because an observer is 
required to copy the properties of human movement (biological motion) after 
observing a model, rather than being able to merely reproduce the movement using 
an already learned movement pattern based on previous experience (Byrne & 
Russon, 1998). In the context of human movement, biological motion is the visual-
sensory information contained in a movement that describes a particular action 
(Johansson, 1973; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977). For example, a person can be judged 
to be walking based on how the arms and legs move in relation to each other. 
Therefore, during true imitation (henceforth imitation) attention is directed to the 
biological motion kinematics (joint configurations; limb velocity) of the observed 
person/model. Over repeated observations and physical attempts at imitating the 
model, a new sensorimotor pattern is represented and refined based on the available 
afferent and efferent sensorimotor feedback (Carroll & Bandura, 1982; Wolpert et 
al., 2011). 
The mechanism underpinning imitation combines higher-order 
cognitive/attention and lower-level visuomotor processes (Bandura, 1977; Byrne & 
Russon, 1998; Heyes, 2001) embedded within a system linking perception with 
action (Prinz, 1997). Although not fully understood, individuals with autism exhibit 
different neuropsychological processes and behaviour during imitation compared to 
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typically developed individuals (Williams et al., 2004; Hamilton, 2013; Edwards, 
2014; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014). That is, people with autism often imitate the end-
state goal (to reach a target) of an action (Hamilton et al., 2007; Bird et al., 2007; 
Wild et al., 2012), but show difficulties imitating the form (i.e., a gentle or harsh 
hand action) in which the movement goal is achieved (Rogers & Pennington, 1991; 
Smith & Bryson, 1994; Rogers et al., 1996; Rogers, 1999; Perra et al., 2008; 
Salowitz et al., 2013). 
Extending upon original work that used descriptive measures (Rogers et al., 
1996; Bernier et al., 2007; Vivanti et al., 2008), kinematic analysis has been used to 
determine what, if any, aspects of movement form (e.g., velocity; timing of peak 
velocity) are imitated (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2013). Specifically, 
participants in the study of Wild et al. (2012) observed a human model performing 
an upper-limb pointing movement that differed in speed, while context was 
manipulated so the model aimed to targets (dots on a table), or to end space (dots 
removed). The notion is that, when targets are removed from the environment, the 
imitator focuses their attention on imitating the model’s movement (kinematics; 
velocity) as opposed to merely reaching the target (dot) goal. The imitation of the 
model’s movement is thought to occur via direct lower-level visuomotor mapping 
(Heyes, 2001; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008) and is suggested to be compromised in 
autism (Williams et al., 2004; Stewart et al., 2013; Edwards 2014). When targets are 
present, the goal is to aim at a target (an action goal), which occurs via goal-directed 
processes, and are less affected in autism (Hamilton et al., 2007). The results from 
Wild et al. (2012) showed only control participants imitated the different speeds 
when targets were removed. The lack of scaling of movement speed exhibited in 
participants with autism was accompanied by less time spent smoothly pursuing the 
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hand (with the eyes) and thus more shifts of gaze between the targets. It was 
suggested the shift in gaze, and thus attention away from the hand, may have 
modulated the amount of action-based biological motion information extracted from 
the model (Vivanti et al., 2008; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014), which thereby 
influenced the imitation of movement speed. 
Notwithstanding an attentional contribution, reduced imitation of kinematics 
in individuals with autism has been linked to lower-level visuomotor processes 
(Stewart et al., 2013). For instance, imitation in a neurotypical control group was 
similar after observing a human or non-human model, thus indicating that top-down 
processes associated with social modulation (Spengler et al., 2010; Cook & Bird, 
2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012) did not exert an influence on behaviour. However, 
the autism group exhibited greater path length error and action duration in both 
observation conditions, which was attributed to impaired lower-level visuomotor 
processes that compromised self-other mapping in the mirror system (Nishitani, 
Avikainen, & Hari, 2004; Williams et al., 2004; 2006; Bernier et al. 2007). These 
lower-level processes link action-observation to action-execution, and sub-serve 
imitation by mapping observed biological motion onto the motor system (Iacoboni et 
al., 1999; 2001; Buccino et al., 2004; Di Dio et al., 2013). 
Although previous work has provided novel contributions to understanding 
specific imitation deficits in autism by isolating the contribution of lower-level 
processes (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2013), the examination of biological 
motion kinematics was undertaken by manipulating only the speed or amplitude of 
the modelled movement and by evaluating performance based on data from the 
whole imitation session. In terms of biological kinematics, the aforementioned 
context requires an imitator to scale an existing motor pattern (upper-limb 
  
62 
movement) to meet new task demands (e.g., faster movement), but does not isolate 
whether the deficit is attributable to imitating specific lower-level properties (e.g., 
velocity) of biological motion kinematics. To this end, to further examine imitation 
of biological motion in individuals with and without autism a novel protocol was 
employed that required participants to imitate movements that had distinctly 
different, but still biologically plausible, movement kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014). 
The experimental models displayed movement that had exactly the same spatial and 
temporal outcomes as a control model, but with a velocity profile of either typical or 
atypical kinematics. The atypical model ensured that an observer had to configure 
the sensorimotor system to represent the novel movement kinematics, as opposed to 
the typical model that could be achieved by rescaling an existing representation of a 
typical upper-limb aiming movement (Vivanti et al. 2008; Hayes et al., 2009). To 
control for top-down influences a protocol was used that minimised social attention 
(Cook & Bird, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012) by presenting a non-human agent 
model (white-dot) with limited social context. To control for visual attention towards 
end-state target goal-directed features of the task environment (Vivanti et al., 2008; 
Wild et al., 2012), target goals were only displayed in half of the imitation trials in 
order to encourage attention towards the trajectory of the model. Consistent with 
previous work examining imitation of biological motion kinematics (Wild et al., 
2012; Stewart et al., 2013) it can be expected that the findings of Chapter Two will 
demonstrate that compared to the neurotypical control group, the autism group will 
demonstrate similar imitation fidelity of the typical biological kinematics, yet will 
demonstrate low-fidelity imitation of atypical biological kinematics. 
Furthermore, because imitation is an active process whereby a novel 
representation is developed and refined over repeated observations, it might be the 
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case that important information about imitation adaptation is masked by collapsing 
the analysis over all trials. An alternative approach that can reveal more about 
adaptation is to evaluate performance in the early and late stages of imitation, which 
is a typical in observation learning studies (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Bird & Heyes, 
2005; Hayes, Ashford, & Bennett, 2008). Previous work has demonstrated 
successful motor adaptation in those with autism. For example, when required to 
catch a ball that varied in weight (i.e., light or heavy), children with autism showed 
similar rates of adaptation in hand displacement across practice as their typically 
developing counterparts (Mostofsky et al., 2004). This successful adaptation 
exhibited by children with autism was attributed towards a normal or compensatory 
cerebellum (Mostofsky et al., 2006; Gidley Larson et al., 2008; Fuentes et al., 2011). 
Therefore, to examine adaption performance, the early-phase and late-phase of 
imitation will be examined. Based on this abovementioned work (see also Haswell et 
al., 2009; Izawa et al., 2012) it can also be hypothesised that individuals with autism 





Fifteen typical control participants (14 male; 1 female) and 15 participants 
with autism (14 male; 1 female) volunteered for the study. The volunteers with 
autism were recruited from an autistic society in North West of England, the 
University of Manchester, UK, and Liverpool John Moores University, UK. The 
volunteers were provided with a participant information sheet and selected if they 
consented to be part of the study. The control participants were recruited from 
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Table 2.1 Participant characteristics of the autism and control groups. 
 
 
Autism (n= 15) Control (n = 15)  
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P Value 
Chronological Age 26 (8) years 18 - 44 26 (9) years 18 - 45 0.835 
IQ: 
Full Scale 106 (10) 89 - 119 109 (7) 98 - 119 0.333 
Verbal 104 (11) 88 - 127 108 (8) 95 - 122 0.218 
Performance 105 (10) 90 - 128 106 (11) 90 - 124 0.771 
ADOS: 
Total 10 (2) 8 - 16    
Communication 4 (1) 2 - 16    
Social Interaction 6 (2) 5 - 10    





Liverpool John Moores University, UK. All participants were right-hand dominant 
(evaluated using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory) (Oldfield, 1971), had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and were screened via self-report for the following 
exclusion criteria: dyspraxia, dyslexia, epilepsy and other neurological or psychiatric 
conditions. The participants with autism had a diagnosis of autism, Asperger’s 
syndrome or autism spectrum disorder by an independent clinician. Diagnosis was 
confirmed by a researcher trained (with research-reliability status) in the 
administration of module 4 of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 
(ADOS-2) (Lord et al., 2000). All participants with autism met the threshold for 
autism spectrum disorder on the ADOS-2 total classification score, and on the 
communication and reciprocal social interaction subscales. Groups were equated for 
age, and matched for full-scale IQ, and the verbal and performance subscales using 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence-2 (WASI-II) (Wechsler, 1999) which 
was confirmed by an independent samples t-test. Sample characteristics are 
presented in Table 2.1. The experiment was designed in accordance with the 1964 
deceleration of Helsinki and approved by the local research ethics committee. 
 
2.3.2 Apparatus 
Participants sat facing a 21-inch CRT monitor (Iiyama Vision Master 505) 
operating with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 85 Hz, located 
on a table at a viewing distance of approximately 555 mm. The monitor was 
connected to a desktop PC (Dell Optiplex GX280), which received input from a 
graphics tablet and hand-held stylus (Wacom Intuos Pro XL) (Figure 2.1a). 
Experimental stimuli were generated on the desktop PC using the COGENT toolbox 
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(developed by John Romaya at the Laboratory of Neurobiology at the Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.). 
 
2.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were provided with general instructions to “watch and then copy 
the movement displayed by a white dot on the computer monitor”. The models (i.e., a 
non-human agent) displayed a single horizontal trajectory that originated from a 
home-target (diameter = 12.50 mm) or home-position (i.e., no target) on the left-
hand side of the screen and terminated at an end-target (diameter = 12.50 mm) or 
end-position on the right-hand side of the screen (Figure 2.1a). The movement 
amplitude was 200 mm and total duration was 1700 ms. To examine imitation of 
biological motion, three models were created that displayed either typical, atypical 
or constant velocity profiles. The typical model was created by a human volunteer 
who practiced the task of typical goal-directed aiming movements using a hand-held 
stylus on a graphics tablet until a white-dot (diameter = 6.25 mm), which represented 
the stylus cursor, moved from the home-target to end-target in exactly 1700 ms. The 
model displayed a typical (Flash & Hogan, 1985; Elliott et al., 2010) bell-shaped 
velocity profile (displacement time-series is displayed as the dashed-black trace in 
Figure 2.1b) that had a magnitude of peak velocity equal to 0.200 mm/ms that 
occurred at 44 % of the movement duration. The atypical biological motion (solid-
black trace in Figure 2.1b) was created by the same volunteer, but instead an 
atypical movement was practiced over the same amplitude and duration. The 
atypical biological motion had a magnitude of peak velocity equal to 0.410 mm/ms 
that occurred at 18 % of the movement duration. The method of using a human 





Figure 2.1. (a) A schematic representation of the laboratory/experimental set-up for 
the imitation task. The black outlined rectangle represents a graphics tablet. The 
white circle displayed on the CRT monitor represents the model. The single-segment 
movement is depicted by the arrow in the target (red target) and no-target conditions. 
(b) Typical (dashed-black trace), atypical (solid-black trace) and constant (solid-
dark-grey trace) velocity models presented as a function of time.  
  
68 
were biological in origin and could be reproduced by the participants. The model 
displaying constant velocity was created according to the amplitude (200 mm) and 
time (1700 ms) constraints associated with the task. The model displayed the exact 
movement time and moved at constant velocity in the horizontal axis (0.118 
mm/ms), with no deviations in the perpendicular axis (Figure 2.1b). 
Volunteers performed 14 blocks of 6 trials (84 trials). A block contained the 
typical, atypical and constant velocity models, each performed in the target and no-
target conditions. Trial order within a block, as well as block order, was randomised 
across volunteers. Prior to the experimental phases, all volunteers completed a 
familiarisation period that replicated the conditions of the imitation task. Volunteers 
performed four trials, 2 trials representing the target condition, and 2 trials 
representing the no-target condition. Each trial commenced with the model cursor 
positioned in the home-position after which it moved to the end-position with a 
constant velocity. The use of this model ensured construct validity by preventing 
volunteers experiencing biological motion before the imitation trials. Participants 
were not informed about the time duration of the movement, the different types of 
stimulus, or the end-state target manipulation. Therefore, after observing a model, 
participants were only provided with a general instruction to copy the model (not a 
specific instruction to copy a certain aspect of the model; e.g., the kinematics) by 
moving the stylus on the tablet so that the cursor moved to the end-target (i.e., target 
condition), or end-position (i.e., no-target condition), as per the movement of the 
model. All volunteers confirmed they understood the model, the instruction to 
imitate the model, and the sensorimotor association between the stylus on the 




2.3.4 Data Reduction 
To quantify imitation of timing error and variability, movement duration was 
extracted from each trial, after which an error score was calculated (timing error) 
that reflected the signed (+ or -) difference between a participant’s movement 
duration and model (e.g., 1900 ms – 1700 ms = 200 ms), and a variability score 
(timing variability) that represented the within-participant standard deviation of 
movement time within an attention condition. The start of the participant’s 
movement was defined as the moment the centre of the cursor moved beyond the 
perimeter of the home-target (i.e., target condition) or home-position (i.e., no-target 
condition), whereas movement end equated to the moment the participant clicked the 
lower-button on the stylus. Intra-participant means were calculated from the first and 
last six trials associated with each model and target conditions. 
To quantify imitation of movement kinematics the focus of the analysis was 
on x-axis data only (Hayes et al., 2016; Andrew et al., 2016). Within the x-axis 
position data, the start and end of the movement (as defined above) was identified. 
For each imitation trial, the resulting position data were filtered using a low pass 4th 
order autoregressive filter with an 8 Hz cut-off. The filtered data were then 
differentiated using a central difference algorithm to obtain velocity. A MATLAB 
routine extracted peak velocity and time-to-peak-velocity from each trial. Intra-
participant means were calculated from the first and last six trials associated with 
each model and target conditions. These kinematic dependent variables were chosen 
as they provide discrete measures that accurately reflect whether participants imitate 
the magnitude and timing characteristics of the observed biological motion 




2.3.5 Data Analysis 
Descriptive analyses of data from the dependent variables using box-plots 
illustrated that no individual point(s) sat outside the upper- and lower-quartiles. 
Normality was quantified using Shapiro-Wilk tests that indicated data were normally 
distributed and did not violate the assumption of parametric analysis (all ps > 0.050). 
Data from all dependent variables were submitted to separate 2 group (autism; 
control) x 3 model (atypical; typical; constant) x 2 phase (early-phase; late-phase) 
repeated measures ANOVA. Significant main and/or interactions effects involving 
more than two means were analysed using Tukey HSD post-hoc procedure. Alpha 
was set at p < 0.050, and partial eta squared (!"#) expressed the size of the effect. To 
further express modulation across comparisons of interest (e.g., early-phase to late-
phase) in the kinematic variables a percent change score was calculated using group 
mean data separately from the two phases in the following equation: ((late-phase – 
early-phase)/ early-phase)*100. Additional correlation analysis on relevant 
significant comparisons indicated by ANOVA were then completed to assess 





2.4.1 Timing Data 
 
2.4.1.1 Timing Error 
A main effect [F(2, 56) = 51.267, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.647] of model indicated 





Figure 2.2 (a) Timing error and (b) timing variability for the imitation task (error 
bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group, model 
and phase.  
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283 ms; SD = 286 ms) compared to typical (M = 350 ms; SD = 282 ms) and 
constant (M = 568 ms; SD = 337 ms) velocity models, and when imitating typical 
compared to constant velocity models (Figure 2.2a). A group x phase interaction 
[F(1, 28) = 9.480, p = 0.005, !"# = 0.253] indicated that timing error significantly 
decreased by 175 ms (35 % change) from the early-phase to the late-phase for the 
autism group. Out of the fifteen participants in the autism group, eight decreased 
motor timing error by 421 ms (65 % change), the remaining seven participants in the 
autism group slightly increased motor timing error by 106 ms (32 % change). 
Timing error significantly increased by 139 ms (44 % change) from the early-phase 
to the late-phase for the control group (Figure 2.2a). Correlation analysis revealed 
no relationship between motor timing error in the early-phase and ADOS total score 
(Pearson’s r(15) = 0.118, p = 0.338) or late-phase and ADOS total score (Pearson’s 
r(15) = -0.022, p = 0.470). There was no significant main effect of target [F(1, 28) = 
3.476, p = 0.073, !"# = 0.110] which indicated that both group had similar motor 
timing error when visual targets were present (M = 429 ms; SD = 287 ms) or 
removed (M = 372 ms; SD = 317 ms). 
 
2.4.1.2 Timing Variability 
A main effect [F(2, 56) = 4.679, p = 0.013, !"# = 0.143] of model indicated 
participants timing was significantly less variable when imitating atypical (M = 286 
ms; SD = 182 ms) and typical (M = 282 ms; SD = 176 ms) compared to constant (M 
= 337 ms; SD = 196 ms) velocity models (Figure 2.2b). Although a group main 
effect [F(1, 28) = 11.610, p = 0.002, !"# = 0.293] indicated timing variability was 
significantly lower for the control (M = 241 ms; SD = 120 ms) than autism (M = 363 
ms; SD = 217 ms) group (Figure 2.2b), a group x phase interaction [F(1, 28) = 
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4.770, p = 0.037, !"# = 0.146] indicated that timing variability significantly decreased 
by 99 ms (24 % change) from the early-phase to the late-phase for the autism group. 
Out of the fifteen participants in the autism group, twelve decreased motor timing 
variability by 145 ms (65 % change), the remaining three participants in the autism 
group slightly increased motor timing variability by 106 ms (21 % change). There 
was a non-significant decrease of 27 ms (11 % change) in timing variability from the 
early-phase to the late-phase for the control group (Figure 2.2b). Correlation 
analysis revealed no relationship between motor timing variability in the early-phase 
and ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(15) = 0.261, p = 0.174) or late-phase and ADOS 
total score (Pearson’s r(15) = -0.060, p = 0.415). There was no significant main 
effect of target [F(1, 28) = 2.293, p = 0.141, !"# = 0.076] which indicated that both 
group had similar motor timing variability when visual targets were present (M = 
287 ms; SD = 167 ms) or removed (M = 317 ms; SD = 203 ms). 
 
2.4.2 Kinematic Data 
 
2.4.2.1 Peak Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(2, 56) = 74.405, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.727] for peak 
velocity indicated magnitude was higher when imitating atypical (M = 0.238 
mm/ms; SD = 0.037 mm/ms), compared to typical (M = 0.192 mm/ms; SD = 0.045 
mm/ms) and constant (M = 162 mm/ms; SD = 0.030 mm/ms) velocity models 
(Figure 2.3a). A group x phase interaction [F(1, 28) = 5.999, p = 0.033, !"# = 0.152] 
indicated that magnitude of peak velocity increased by 0.024 mm/ms (12 % change) 
from the early-phase to the late-phase for the autism group. Out of the fifteen 





Figure 2.3 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the imitation task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group, 
model and phase. The dashed-red lines in a represent the magnitude of peak velocity 
for the typical (i.e., 0.410 mm/ms), atypical (i.e., 0.200 mm/ms) and constant (i.e., 
0.118 mm/ms) models. In b, they represent the time-to-peak-velocity for the typical 





Figure 2.4 Velocity traces displaying exemplar kinematic data for the (a) autism and 
(b) control groups during imitation of the typical (dashed-black trace), atypical 
(solid-black trace) and constant (dashed-dark-grey trace) velocity models presented 
as a function of time.  
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% change), the remaining four participants in the autism group slightly decreased 
peak velocity by 0.012 mm/ms (7 % change). There was a non-significant decrease 
of 0.009 mm/ms (4 % change) in magnitude of peak velocity from the early-phase to 
the late-phase for the control group (Figure 2.3a). Correlation analysis revealed no 
relationship between peak velocity in the early-phase and ADOS total score 
(Pearson’s r(15) = 0.028, p = 0.461) or late-phase and ADOS total score (Pearson’s 
r(15) = -0.055, p = 0.423). There was no significant main effect of target [F(1, 28) = 
2.513, p = 0.124, !"# = 0.082] which indicated that both group had similar magnitude 
of peak velocity when visual targets were present (M = 0.194 mm/ms; SD = 0.065 
mm/ms) or removed (M = 0.200 mm/ms; SD = 0.074 mm/ms). 
 
2.4.2.2 Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(2, 56) = 41.536, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.597], where 
peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when imitating atypical (M = 28 %; SD 
= 9 %) compared to typical (M = 35 %; SD = 10 %) and constant (M = 38 %; SD = 
12 %) velocity models (Figure 2.3b). This was superseded by a group x model 
interaction [F(1, 28) = 8.569, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.234], which indicated peak velocity 
occurred significantly earlier when imitating atypical velocity model (Figure 2.3b) 
for the control (M = 24 %; SD = 8 %) than autism group (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %). 
The early occurrence of peak velocity in the control group was more reflective of 
atypical biological motion (18 %; dashed-red line), than typical biological motion 
(44 %; dashed-red line). There was no significant difference (p > 0.050) between the 
groups when imitating typical (autism: M = 37 %; SD = 9 %, control: M = 33 %; SD 
= 10 %) and constant (autism: M = 38 %; SD = 11 %, control: M = 38 %; SD = 13 
%) velocity models. Correlation analysis revealed no relationship between  
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Table 2.2 Mean (standard deviation) timing and kinematic data presented as a function of group, model and phase. 
 
 Autism Control 
Timing Data Early Late Early Late 
Timing Error (ms) 
Atypical 407 258 153 314 
Typical 513 280 212 397 
Constant 587 444 585 658 
Timing Variability 
(ms) 
Atypical 390 307 250 199 
Typical 416 274 212 227 
Constant 433 360 301 256 
Kinematic Data Early Late Early Late 
Peak Velocity 
(mm/ms) 
Atypical 0.212 (0.045) 0.246 (0.045) 0.250 (0.049) 0.242 (0.043) 
Typical 0.189 (0.044) 0.212 (0.039) 0.188 (0.036) 0.178 (0.033) 
Constant 0.177 (0.039) 0.192 (0.038) 0.143 (0.025) 0.135 (0.019) 
Time-to-Peak-
Velocity (%) 
Atypical 33 (11) 33 (9) 23 (8) 24 (7) 
Typical 36 (10) 38 (9) 32 (10) 33 (9) 
Constant 39 (11) 38 (11) 38 (13) 38 (12) 
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time-to-peak-velocity when imitating the atypical velocity model and ADOS total 
score (Pearson’s r(15) = 0.401, p = 0.069), typical velocity model and ADOS total 
score (Pearson’s r(15) = 0.375, p = 0.084) or constant velocity model and ADOS 
total score (Pearson’s r(15) = 0.214, p = 0.222). There was no significant main effect 
of target [F(1, 28) = 1.358, p = 0.254, !"# = 0.046] which indicated that both groups 
had similar timing of peak velocity when visual targets were present (M = 33 %; SD 
= 10 %) or removed (M = 34 %; SD = 10 %). 
These above effects can be seen in the exemplar velocity traces illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. When imitating the atypical velocity model, peak velocity occurred 
significantly earlier in the movement for the control group (Figure 2.4b) than the 
autism group (Figure 2.4a). When imitating the typical velocity model, peak 
velocity occurred toward the midpoint of the movement for both groups (dashed-
black trace; Figure 2.4). When imitating the constant velocity model, peak velocity 
occurred toward the midpoint of the movement for both groups (solid-dark-grey 




Imitation, and imitation adaption (i.e., performance change from the early- to late-
phase of imitation), of biological motion kinematics was examined using a novel 
behavioural protocol that required adults with and without autism to observe a model 
that displayed distinctly different but biologically plausible kinematics. Importantly, 
the atypical biological motion would not have been represented in the sensorimotor 
repertoire of observers, and thus could not be imitated by rescaling a typical upper-
limb aiming movement. After observing an atypical model, participants in the 
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control group exhibited movements with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 24 
% of the movement trajectory. This early occurrence of peak velocity was similar to 
that displayed by the atypical model (time-to-peak-velocity = 18 %), and 
significantly different to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited after observing typical 
(M = 34 %) and constant (M = 39 %) velocity control models. The presence of 
temporal correspondence between control participants’ movements and the atypical 
model indicates high-fidelity imitation of biological motion kinematics based on 
lower-level sensorimotor processes (Brass et al., 2001; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2001; Heyes 2001; Hayes et al., 2014; 2016). 
Equivalent high-fidelity imitation of biological motion kinematics was not 
found for adults with autism. Although the magnitude of peak velocity was similar to 
control adults, there was a lack of temporal correspondence to the atypical model. 
The kinematic data showed time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 33 % of the movement 
trajectory, which was significantly different from the control group, but statistically 
similar to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited when imitating the typical (M = 38 %) 
and constant velocity (M = 39 %) control models. In this respect, this data is 
consistent with other work that demonstrated differences between those with and 
without autism in imitating the form (e.g., a gentle or harsh hand action) of a 
movement (Smith & Bryson, 1994; Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999) or 
movement speed (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2013). Importantly, however, the 
present findings extend understanding by showing differences in imitation are 
directly related to attenuation in representing the temporal occurrence of peak 
velocity associated with the observed biological motion kinematics. 
Before interpreting this effect, it is important to highlight that the 
examination of biological kinematics was isolated using a protocol that controlled 
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higher order factors known to constrain imitation. First, an atypical model was 
displayed to ensure imitation was associated with representing novel biological 
kinematics, as opposed to presenting a movement that could be imitated using a pre-
existing motor pattern recalled via higher-order semantic (Rumiati et al., 2005) or 
action-goal (Bekkering et al., 2000; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008) processes. Second, 
because imitation is modulated by social top-down factors (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Spengler et al., 2010; Cook & Bird, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012), a non-
human agent model was used that reduced the influence of emotional (Grèzes et al., 
2009) and/or Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) constraints that are inherent 
in realistic human models. Third, the influence of end-state target goal attainment 
(Bekkering et al., 2000) was controlled for by displaying a movement trajectory that 
had no visual targets in half of the trials. In combination, the use of these control 
measures minimises the likelihood that the deficit in imitating biological motion 
kinematics in adults with autism is attributable to higher-order processes associated 
with reaching a target, or social imitation. 
One explanation for the attenuation in imitating biological motion kinematics 
could be associated with lower-level processes that integrate visuomotor information 
(Théoret et al., 2005; Oberman et al., 2005; Dapretto et al., 2006; Williams et al., 
2006; Stewart et al., 2013). For example, visuomotor integration of biological 
motion occurs through specialised visual areas (posterior superior temporal sulcus) 
(Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman, Battelli, & Pascual-Leone, 2005) and lower-level 
sensorimotor processes linked to the mirror system (Iacoboni, 2005; Southgate & 
Hamilton, 2008). These processes are part of a functional network that represents an 
observed movement by mapping the biological motion characteristics directly onto 
the motor system (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). However, 
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while lower-level processing deficits associated with visuomotor integration during 
self-other mapping (Williams et al., 2004; 2006; Stewart et al., 2013) could attenuate 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics, it is notable that adults with autism show 
intact mapping of biological motion during automatic imitation (Bird et al., 2007), 
which is a behavioural protocol that isolates processing to the lower-level mirror 
system. Moreover, results from neuropsychological work is mixed on whether such a 
fundamental impairment is present in autism (Hamilton, 2013). 
The data revealed an adaptation effect whereby adults with autism became 
significantly more accurate at representing movement time (eight out of fifteen), 
reducing movement time variability (twelve out of fifteen), and increasing the 
magnitude of peak velocity (eleven out of fifteen) over trials during imitation, 
compared to the control group that showed no significant change. This adaptation 
must have been self-regulated, as opposed to augmented, because external feedback 
regarding movement time performance was not provided. This change in behaviour 
can be ascribed to active and functional true imitation, with sensorimotor adaptation 
most likely a result of attending to, and comparing against, the observed stimulus 
using feedforward and feedback processes (Carroll & Bandura, 1982; Byrne & 
Russon 1998; Kilner et al., 2007). Moreover, within the group of high-functioning 
autism participants recruited in the current study, it would seem this adaptation is a 
general process that is not related to autism severity as determined by correlations 
with ADOS total score. In addition to modulating the magnitude of peak velocity, 
the decrease in movement timing error also reduced the influence of end-state-target-
goals such that timing and kinematics changed similarly for target and no-target 
conditions. Moreover, there was also no evidence found that the adult control group 
prioritised the attainment of an end-state-target-goal, over the imitation of atypical 
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biological kinematics, when present during observation. Although goal-directed 
imitation effects have been reported in complex movement sequences (Wild et al., 
2010; 2012) or a full body point-light model (Hayes, Hodges, Huys, & Williams, 
2007), it seems the target was less constraining when individuals observed a point-
light non-human agent model performing a single segment movement. 
The fact that adults with autism became significantly more accurate at 
imitating movement time, and exhibited a magnitude of peak velocity that was 
similar to the control group, suggests visual attention was orientated to the 
information displayed by the non-human agent model. This effect is consistent with 
data showing visual attention to action features of a model (Vivanti et al., 2008), and 
non-human stimuli (Swettenham et al., 1998), is typical in autism, whereas attention 
to facial features differs from controls (Boucher & Lewis 1992; Bird, Catmur, Silani, 
Frith, & Frith, 2006; Vivanti et al. 2008). Moreover, because no other attention-
distracting stimuli were present in the display, it is unlikely that reduced imitation of 
atypical biological kinematics was associated with visual attention being drawn 
away from the non-human agent model (Wild et al., 2012). A more parsimonious 
explanation is that the selective attention bias to movement time during imitation 
was controlled via alternative (and efficient) higher-order processes (Hamilton et al., 
2007; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008; Wild et al., 2012). A possibility is the 
movement time goal was imitated using processes associated with action 
comprehension, which are functional in autism (Dinstein et al., 2010), and as such 
goal attainment was secured using an efficient pre-existing motor pattern. This 
interpretation is consistent with the kinematic data, which showed individuals with 
autism executed movements that exhibited typical (peak velocity occurred towards 
the mid-point of the trajectory; Elliott et al., 2010) motor control trajectories when 
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imitating both the atypical and typical models. 
In addition to a goal-directed and action comprehension interpretation, the 
selective-attention bias to movement time may have modulated input to the lower-
level mirror system. Input modulation is suggested to impact the activation, or 
development, of sensorimotor representations via the intentionally mediated 
orientation of visual attention (Heyes & Bird, 2007; Longo, Kosobud, & Bertenthal, 
2008; Liepelt & Brass 2010; Heyes, 2011). Therefore, because it was not specified 
within the task instructions what aspect of the model to imitate, the self-selected 
focus on movement time may have regulated the lower-level processes such that this 
temporal variable was placed higher on the embedded hierarchy of imitation goals 
(Wöhlschlager et al., 2003; Hamilton & Grafton 2007; Hayes et al., 2014) than 
atypical kinematics. Although it is unclear if such input modulation is operational in 
autism (Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014), it has previously been shown that imitation of 
atypical biological kinematics and movement time in neurotypical volunteers can be 
differentially modulated using pre-specified verbal instructions (Hayes et al., 2014). 
For example, the imitation of atypical biological kinematics can be modulated if 
volunteers are instructed to focus attention on imitating the movement time goal. 
Likewise, imitation accuracy can be enhanced if selective-attention is directed to the 
kinematics. Therefore, it cannot be said for certain if the focus on motor timing in 
individuals with autism is causally related to deficits in lower-level self-other 
mapping processes and/or motor ability, or whether the attentional effect is a 
compensatory strategy. One way to determine if the attenuation in imitating atypical 
biological kinematics is associated with top-down attentional modulation is to 
present a similar non-human agent model and employ a selective-attention protocol 
that uses explicit instructions to guide observers to attend and imitate the atypical 
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biological kinematics (Stewart et al., 2013), as opposed to the observers self-
selecting which action-based information to imitate. 
When considering the findings in respect to the broader context of imitation 
in autism, it is important to highlight the study was designed to examine true 
imitation. True imitation is a fundamental developmental process as it underpins the 
acquisition of novel social, and important sensorimotor skills that facilitate everyday 
life such as, tying shoe laces or riding a bicycle, or playing ice hockey. Although the 
data showed an attenuation in the imitation of biological motion kinematics, it was 
shown that movement time error and variability was significantly improved. The 
implication is that sensorimotor adaption and representation (Gidley Larson et al., 
2008) of movement time is intact in high-functioning adults with autism. These are 
first data to show this adaptation in a true imitation context and indicates adults with 
autism do imitate, but they seem to do so with a selective-attention bias to movement 
time over kinematics which was controlled via alternative higher-order processes 
(Southgate & Hamilton, 2008; Wild et al., 2012). Therefore, the challenge is to 
examine the possibility that adults with autism can learn to imitate and represent 
biological motion kinematics following specific manipulations to the learning 
context (e.g., practice type, instructions, feedback). If the results are positive, then 
social and environmental procedures can be implemented by clinicians and 




To conclude, the aim of this chapter was to examine whether adults with autism have 
difficulty imitating atypical biological motion. Data presented in Chapter Two 
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demonstrate for the first time experimentally, that adults with autism have 
difficulties imitating the velocity characteristics associated with atypical biological 
motion kinematics. A further aim of the chapter was to examine adaption 
performance. Analysis of the early and late phases of imitation specified that 
compared to control participants, adults with autism became significantly more 
accurate at imitating movement time across trials. The positive change in behaviour 
confirmed they actively engaged in the task, and that sensorimotor adaptation during 
imitation is self-regulated in autism. The bias to movement time suggests the 
attenuation in imitating biological motion kinematics in autism is perhaps a 
compensatory strategy due to deficits in lower-level visuomotor processes associated 
with self-other mapping and/or motor ability, or that selective-attention input to the 
processes that represent atypical biological motion kinematics. The latter suggestion 














3 Low-Fidelity Imitation of Biological Kinematics in Autism is Not Associated 






A deficit in imitating biological kinematics is a feature of autism spectrum disorders, 
and could be underpinned by altered visual attention. Here, selective-attention and 
eye movements in autism and controls were examined when imitating atypical and 
typical biological kinematics. To manipulate selective-attention, general-attention 
instructions not specifying what aspects of the model to imitate were provided in the 
control phase. In the experimental phase, selective-attention instructions directed 
visual attention towards biological kinematics. In the general-attention condition, 
both groups performed similarly at imitating typical biological kinematics (autism: 
M = 36 %, control: M = 36 %), but the control group (M = 28 %) was more accurate 
than the autism group (M = 32 %) at imitating the atypical biological kinematics. 
Data showed the autism group had similar timing (autism: M = 39 %, control: M = 
41 %) and peak (autism: M = 11.22 deg/s, control: M = 11.47 deg/s) smooth pursuit 
eye velocity, as well as a similar number (autism: M = 4.84 saccades, control: M = 
4.34 saccades), and amplitude (autism: M = 1.82 deg, control: M = 1.49 deg), of 
saccades, during action-observation of both models as the control group. With 
selective-attention instructions, imitation of atypical biological kinematics remained 
unchanged, with the control group (M = 25 %) more accurate than the autism group 
(M = 31 %). Only the control group became more accurate when imitating the 
typical biological kinematics (11 % change). Eye movements were again similar 
between the groups, and modulated to become closer to the model after receiving 
selective-attention instructions. Low-fidelity imitation of atypical biological 
kinematics is unlikely to be underpinned by difficulties tracking the model with the 





Imitation is a complex multimodal mechanism (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Subiaul, 
2010) associated with copying familiar and unfamiliar action forms, or goals. It is 
important in social settings for facilitating interpersonal behaviour, and acquisition 
of language and movements. When observing unfamiliar actions that are not 
represented in a movement repertoire, the resulting motor imitation (Subiaul, 2010) 
has the primary objective to copy biological motion properties, rather than imitating 
an end-goal (e.g., touching the ear), and has minimal input from processes associated 
with social cognition (empathy). During motor imitation attention is directed to 
biological motion, and across repeated exposures combined with physical attempts at 
imitating the model, a new sensorimotor pattern is represented (Wolpert et al., 2011). 
Although it is unclear whether imitation deficits are universally present in 
autism (Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014), people with this condition typically have 
problems imitating the form (e.g., gentle movement) of a movement (Rogers & 
Pennington, 1991; Smith & Bryson, 1994). Kinematic analysis (Wild et al., 2012; 
Stewart et al., 2013) has isolated low-fidelity motor imitation to specific 
characteristics (Chapter Two) of observed biological kinematics (e.g., velocity). 
Moreover, having controlled the modulatory effects of social-affective processes 
using a non-human agent model (Stewart et al., 2013), difficulties imitating 
biological kinematics have been linked to compromised self-other mapping 
associated with lower-level visuomotor processes (Williams et al., 2006; Dapretto et 
al., 2006) operating in an action-observation matching system (Iacoboni et al., 2001). 
Motor imitation is an active and volitional process that engages higher-order 
social, cognitive, and attentional processes that differentially modulate lower-level 
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sensorimotor processing (Bandura, 1977; Heyes, 2011; Hamilton, 2013). For 
example, instructing neurotypical observers to direct overt visual attention to 
movement kinematics, as opposed to temporal parameters (e.g., movement time), 
results in enhanced imitation of biological motion stimuli (Hayes et al., 2014). Such 
an attentional influence is referred to as ‘input’ modulation because instructions 
modulate lower-level sensorimotor processing of the observed stimulus (Heyes & 
Bird, 2007; Heyes, 2011). In people with autism, input modulation has been found 
during contagious yawning (Senju et al., 2009), which is a response that facilitates 
joint attention during interpersonal contexts, and is underpinned by similar lower-
level sensorimotor processes as those engaged during imitation (Senju, 2013). 
Indeed, although children with autism were originally found to execute fewer yawns 
whilst observing a model than a control group (Senju et al., 2007), this behaviour 
was reversed following explicit instructions that directed overt visual attention to the 
eye region of the model (Senju et al., 2009). 
Differences in attentional focus during imitation in people with autism can 
also be found in their eye movement behaviour (Vivanti et al., 2008). For example, 
as well as showing low-fidelity imitation of biological kinematics compared to a 
neurotypical control group, adults with autism spend less time tracking the hand of a 
model and more time shifting gaze between an action end-point target and end-space 
(Wild et al., 2012). People with autism also typically orientate overt visual attention 
away from the eyes of a model (Hobson & Hobson, 2007; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 
2014), which attenuates the processing of social information that describes 
communicative signals and relevance from the model (Klin et al., 2009). The 
implication is that rather than poor imitation of biological motion in autism being 
underpinned by a basic dysfunction in lower-level sensorimotor processes associated 
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with self-other mapping, there could be a modulatory effect of attention (Vivanti & 
Dissanayake, 2014), especially in the absence of explicit instructions. Indeed, it is 
notable that previous work on imitation of biological motion in autistic adults (Wild 
et al., 2012) and children (Vivanti et al., 2008) involved general instructions to “copy 
what you saw”, and thus did not provide adequate explicit direction in terms of 
where to focus attention and what aspect of the movement to copy (Chapter Two; 
Stewart et al., 2013). 
To this end, a two-phase study was conducted that examined the influence of 
attentional instructions (general or selective) on eye movements during action-
observation and the subsequent motor imitation of biological kinematics. With the 
provision of general-attention instructions, it is expected that the findings of Chapter 
Two will be replicated that compared to a neurotypical control group, an autism 
group will demonstrate low-fidelity imitation of biological kinematics (Chapter 
Two). Then, if low-fidelity imitation in autism is associated with processes 
underpinning selective-attention, it is expected that the autism group to demonstrate 
high-fidelity imitation when instructed to explicitly pay attention, and intend to 
imitate biological kinematics. By quantifying eye movements, it can be determined if 
any differences in movement kinematics during imitation is associated with how 
participants pursued the model during action-observation. Finally, in order to 
examine whether imitation of biological kinematics in autism is based at a perceptual 
level (Freitag et al., 2008; Saygin et al., 2010). Participants will complete a judgment 
task whereby they will observe two models and judge whether they have similar or 
dissimilar movement trajectories. It is expected that consistent with previous work 
(Wild et al., 2012; Cook et al., 2013) adults with autism will show intact biological 






Twenty typical control participants (19 male; 1 female) and 20 participants 
with autism (19 male; 1 female) volunteered for the study. The volunteers with 
autism were recruited from an autistic society in North West of England, and 
Liverpool John Moores University, UK. The volunteers were provided with a 
participant information sheet and selected if they consented to be part of the study. 
The control participants were recruited from Liverpool John Moores University, UK. 
None of the volunteers participated in Chapters Two and thus were naïve to the 
experiment. Sample characteristics are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.2 Apparatus 
The apparatus used was identical to that in Chapter Two. Movement of the 
left eye was recorded at 250 Hz using an EyeLink eye tracker (SR Research) with 
remote optics, which were located just below the lower edge of the monitor. The 




3.3.3.1 Imitation Task 
The imitation task consisted of a general-attention phase, followed by a 
selective-attention phase. In the general-attention phase, participants were provided 
with instructions to “watch and copy the dot as it moves across the monitor”. In the 
selective-attention phase, participants observed and imitated exactly the same 
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Table 3.1 Participant characteristics of the autism and control groups. 
 
 
Autism (n= 20) Control (n = 20)  
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P Value 
Chronological Age 22 (3) years 18 - 28 21 (2) years 18 - 26 0.226 
IQ: 
Full Scale 100 (10) 82 - 116 105 (9) 92 - 123 0.122 
Verbal 102 (12) 87 - 127 106 (10) 89 - 126 0.225 
Performance 98 (12) 75 - 116 101 (9) 82 - 115 0.385 
ADOS: 
Total 9 (2) 7 - 14    
Communication 3 (1) 2 - 5    
Social Interaction 6 (2) 3 - 9    






Figure 3.1 (a) A schematic representation of the laboratory/experimental set-up for 
the imitation task. The black outlined rectangle represents a graphics tablet. The 
white circle displayed on the CRT monitor represents the model. The single-segment 
movement is depicted by the arrow. (b) Typical (dashed-black trace) and atypical 
(solid-black trace) velocity models presented as a function of time.  
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stimuli, which ensured task complexity of imitating the two models was controlled. 
Although the presentation of the same stimuli may introduce practice effects given 
the increased exposure and imitation of the models, this procedure was deemed 
preferable in order to minimize potential carryover and use of the specific 
instructions from the first-phase to second-phase of the study. The specific nature of 
instructions provided in the selective-attention phase explicitly instructed 
participants to “watch and pay attention to the dot’s trajectory, with the intention to 
then copy the trajectory”. The latter instruction is characterised by: attention, 
intention and trajectory (Hayes et al., 2014). The models and procedure were 
identical to that Chapter Two, except the constant velocity model was removed. 
Volunteers performed 5 blocks of 6 trials in each phase (60 trials). A block 
contained 3 typical or 3 atypical velocity models. Trial order within a block, as well 
as block order, was randomised across volunteers. Recording of the eye was 
performed for all observation trials and was obtained from seventeen volunteers with 
autism and eighteen control participants. Eye tracking was attempted on all 
participants but data were lost (3 autism; 2 control) due to recording difficulties. 
 
3.3.3.2 Judgement Task 
Volunteers completed a biological motion judgment task to determine ability 
at perceiving differences in biological kinematics. This was a same/different 
movement-pairs protocol that displayed two pre-recorded models, presented as a 
white dot (diameter = 6.25 mm) as per the imitation task. Models displayed either 
typical, atypical or constant velocity kinematics. The typical and atypical velocity 
models were identical to the motor imitation task. The constant velocity model was 
identical to that used during familiarisation. The movement-pairs protocol 
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commenced by displaying a model on trial n. Following observation of model n, 
participants observed model n+1 and were instructed to judge whether the model 
(e.g., typical) on trial n was the same (e.g., typical) or different (e.g., atypical) to the 
model presented on trial n+1. Participants pressed the ‘S’ key (for same) and ‘D’ (for 
different) on a QWERTY keyboard (Dell KB212) (Figure 3.10a). Following the 
first pair of models, this procedure continued for a total of 45 same/different 
movement-pairs. The 45 pairs were structured into 5 blocks, which contained 9 
different combinations that were randomised to control for order effects. There was a 
33 % chance that the models presented in the movement-pairs were the same. 
 
3.3.3.3 Post-Experimental Debrief 
Participants completed a debriefing session that was audio recorded. The 
session determined whether participants had engaged in the experiment and 
understood the task instructions. The questions posed were as follows: Did you 
notice anything about the movements you observed? How did you try to copy the 
dot? Did you understand what we meant by “watch and pay attention to the dot’s 
trajectory, with the intention to then copy the trajectory”? Do you feel you changed 
how you imitated after receiving these task instructions? 
 
3.3.4 Data Reduction 
 
3.3.4.1 Imitation Task 
To quantify imitation of timing accuracy, variability, and movement 
kinematics was identical to Chapter Two. Intra-participant means were calculated 
from 15 trials associated with each model and instruction condition. 
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3.3.4.2 Eye Movements 
Analysis of eye behaviour was based on the x-axis data recorded from the 
left-eye during observation of the model stimuli. Saccades were identified using the 
proprietary algorithm in the EyeLink software, and then removed and replaced from 
the corresponding eye velocity using a linear interpolation routine (Bennett & 
Barnes, 2003). Desaccaded smooth eye velocity was low-pass filtered using a 
moving average zero-phase filter (40 ms window). To quantify how well the eyes 
pursued the observed model during each trial, we extracted the peak and time-to-
peak smooth eye velocity, and the number of saccades and saccade amplitude. Intra-
participant means were calculated from 15 trials associated with each model and 
instruction condition. These discrete measures of smooth and saccadic eye 
movements provide a means to quantify pursuit of the observed model (Orban de 
Xivry, Bennett, Lefevre, & Barnes, 2006), whereby it can be expected that overt 
visual attention coincides with the moving stimulus (Lovejoy, Fowler, & Krauzlis, 
2009), albeit sometimes with a slight lead (Van Donkelaar & Drew, 2002). Covertly 
attending to other areas or locations would be possible, although effortful and 
unlikely given that there were no other relevant cues within the stimulus 
presentation. 
 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
Data from all dependent variables were submitted to separate 2 group 
(autism; control) x 2 model (atypical; typical) x 2 instruction (general-attention; 
selective-attention) repeated measures ANOVA. To further express modulation 
across comparisons of interest (e.g., general-attention to selective-attention) in the 
kinematic variables a percent change score was calculated using group mean data 
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separately from the two attention conditions in the following equation: ((selective-
attention – general-attention)/ general-attention)*100. 
To quantify the accuracy of judging different motion kinematics, the total 
number of correct responses made by the autism and control groups was examined 




3.4.1 Imitation Task 
 
3.4.1.1 Timing Data 
 
3.4.1.1.1 Timing Error 
A main effect [F(1, 38) = 25.837, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.405] of model indicated 
participants timing was significantly more accurate when imitating atypical (M = 
178 ms; SD = 296 ms) compared to typical (M = 295 ms; SD = 305 ms) velocity 
models (Figure 3.2a). A model x instruction interaction [F(1, 38) = 25.837, p = 
0.034, !"# = 0.405] indicated timing accuracy decreased by 77 ms (30 % change) 
from the general-attention to selective-attention condition when imitating typical 
velocity models (p < 0.050). There was a non-significant increase of 14 ms (8 % 
change) in timing accuracy from general-attention to selective-attention condition 
when imitating atypical velocity models (p > 0.050). There was no significant 
interaction for group x model [F(1, 38) = 0.027, p = 0.871, !"# = 0.001], group x 
instruction [F(1, 38) = 0.690, p = 0.411, !"# = 0.018], or group x model x instruction 





Figure 3.2 (a) Timing error and (b) timing variability for the imitation task (error 
bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group, model 
and instruction.  
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3.4.1.1.2 Timing Variability 
A group main effect [F(1, 38) = 7.907, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.349] indicated 
timing variability was significantly lower for the control (M = 234 ms; SD = 70 ms) 
than autism (M = 367 ms; SD = 144 ms) group (Figure 3.2b). There was no 
significant interaction for group x model [F(1, 38) = 0.063, p = 0.803, !"# = 0.002], 
group x instruction [F(1, 38) = 1.045, p = 0.313, !"# = 0.027], or group x model x 
instruction [F(1, 38) = 0.001, p = 0.977, !"# = 0.001].  
 
3.4.1.2 Kinematic Data 
 
3.4.1.2.1 Peak Velocity 
A group main effect [F(1, 38) = 7.907, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.172] indicated peak 
velocity was higher for the control (M = 0.220 mm/ms; SD = 0.040) than autism (M 
= 0.192 mm/ms; SD = 0.046) group (Figure 3.3a). A main effect of model [F(1, 38) 
= 85.177, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.691] for peak velocity indicated magnitude was higher 
when imitating atypical (M = 0.235 mm/ms; SD = 0.049), compared to typical 
velocity models (M = 0.178 mm/ms; SD = 0.037) (Figure 3.3a). A model x group 
interaction neared significance [F(1, 38) = 4.4076, p = 0.051, !"# = 0.097] and 
indicated peak velocity was higher when imitating the atypical velocity models 
(Figure 3.3a) for the control (0.255 mm/ms; SD = 0.046) than autism group (0.215 
mm/ms; SD = 0.051). There was no significant difference (p > 0.050) between the 
groups when imitating typical velocity models (autism: M = 0.170 mm/ms; SD = 
0.040, control: M = 0.186 mm/ms; SD = 0.034). Correlation analysis revealed no 
relationship between peak velocity when imitating the atypical velocity models and 





Figure 3.3 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the imitation task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group, 
model and instruction. The dashed-red lines in a represent the magnitude of peak 
velocity for the typical (i.e., 0.410 mm/ms) and atypical (i.e., 0.200 mm/ms) models. 
In b, they represent the time-to-peak-velocity for the typical (i.e.,44 %) and 
atypical (i.e., 18 %) models. 
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and ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(20) = 0.360, p > 0.119). A model x instruction 
interaction [F(1, 38) = 9.908, p = 0.001, !"# = 0.207] indicated magnitude of peak 
velocity decreased by 0.016 mm/ms (autism = 12 % change, control = 6 % change) 
from the general-attention to selective-attention condition when imitating typical 
velocity models (p < 0.050). There was a non-significant increase of 0.001 mm/ms 
(autism = 2 % change, control = 1 % change) in peak velocity from general-attention 
to selective-attention condition when imitating atypical velocity models (p > 0.050). 
There was no significant interaction for group x instruction [F(1, 38) = 1.044, p > 




There was no main effect of group [F(1, 38) = 0.405, p > 0.528, !"# = 0.011]. 
There was a main effect of model [F(1, 38) = 53.496, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.585], where 
peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when imitating atypical (M = 29 %; SD 
= 9 %), compared to the typical velocity models (M = 37 %; SD = 11 %) (Figure 
3.3b). This was superseded by a model x group interaction [F(1, 38) = 12.492, p = 
0.001, !"# = 0.247], which indicated peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when 
imitating atypical velocity models (Figure 3.3b) for the control (M = 27 %; SD = 8 
%) than autism group (M = 31 %; SD = 10 %). The early occurrence of peak 
velocity in the control group was more reflective of atypical velocity models (18 %; 
dashed-red line), than typical velocity models (44 %; dashed-red line). There was no 
significant difference (p > 0.050) between the groups when imitating typical velocity 
models (autism: M = 35 %; SD = 10 %, control: M = 38 %; SD = 11 %). Correlation 





Figure 3.4 Velocity traces displaying exemplar kinematic data for the autism group 
during imitation of the (a) typical and (b) atypical velocity models in the general-
attention (solid-black trace) and selective-attention (dashed-black trace) instructions 





Figure 3.5 Velocity traces displaying exemplar kinematic data for the control group 
during imitation of the (a) typical and (b) atypical velocity models in the general-
attention (solid-black trace) and selective-attention (dashed-black trace) instructions 
presented as a function of time.  
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Table 3.2 Mean (standard deviation) timing and kinematic data for the imitation task presented as a function of group, model and instruction. 
 
 Autism Control 
Timing Data General Selective General Selective 
Timing Error (ms) 
Atypical 271 296 71 74 
Typical 342 468 172 201 
Timing Variability 
(ms) 
Atypical 355 372 232 223 
Typical 370 369 254 225 
Kinematic Data General Selective General Selective 
Peak Velocity 
(mm/ms) 
Atypical 0.217 (0.051) 0.212 (0.052) 0.254 (0.047) 0.257 (0.045) 
Typical 0.180 (0.040) 0.159 (0.040) 0.191 (0.037) 0.180 (0.031) 
Time-to-Peak-
Velocity (%) 
Atypical 32 (9) 31 (10) 28 (8) 25 (8) 




atypical velocity models and ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(20) = 0.307, p = 0.187) 
or typical velocity models and ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(20) = 0.191, p = 
0.421). A group x model x instruction interaction [F(1, 38) = 8.976, p = 0.002, !"# = 
0.191] indicated selective-attention had a specific modulatory effect on the timing of 
peak velocity. As illustrated in Figure 3.3b, imitation of atypical velocity models in 
both groups (autism: p = 0.075, control: p = 0.108) did not differ between general-
attention and selective-attention instructions (autism = 5 % change, control = 8 % 
change). However, peak velocity in the control group occurred significantly (p = 
0.001) later following selective-attention compared to general-attention instructions 
when imitating the typical velocity model. The 11 % change indicated the control 
group imitated with a time-to-peak velocity that was closer to the typical model (44 
%; dashed-red line on Figure 3.1b). There was no significant (p = 0.148) change (6 
%) for the autism group. Correlation analysis revealed no relationship between time-
to-peak-velocity for general-attention condition and ADOS total score (atypical, 
Pearson’s r(20) = 0.296, p = 0.206; typical, Pearson’s r(20) = 0.211, p = 0.373) or 
selective-attention and ADOS total score (atypical, Pearson’s r (20) = 0.318, p = 
0.172; typical, Pearson’s r (20) = 0.111, p = 0.640). 
These above effects can be seen in the exemplar velocity traces illustrated in 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5. When imitating the atypical velocity models, peak velocity 
occurred significantly earlier in the movement for the control group (Figure 3.5a) 
than the autism group (Figure 3.4a). When imitating the typical velocity models, 
peak velocity occurred toward the midpoint of the movement for both groups during 
the general-attention condition (solid-black trace), yet peak velocity occurred 
significantly later in the movement for the control group (Figure 3.5b) than the 
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autism group (Figure 3.4b) during the selective-attention condition (dashed-black 
trace). For a full breakdown of each dependent variable see Table 3.2. 
 
3.4.2 Eye Movements 
 
3.4.2.1 Smooth Pursuit Data 
 
3.4.2.1.1 Peak Velocity 
The exemplar traces show similar magnitude, and timing, of smooth eye 
velocity for both groups when observing atypical (autism: Figure 3.6a, control: 
Figure 3.7a) and typical (autism: Figure 3.6b, control: Figure 3.7b) velocity 
models. After an expected delay in onset of eye motion relative to the stimulus 
(Barnes & Asselman, 1991). Smooth eye velocity was well matched to stimulus 
velocity and resulted in no significant main effects for group [F(1, 33) = 0.055, p > 
0.050, !"# = 0.002] or model [F(1, 33) = 0.155, p = 0.697, !"# = 0.005]. An instruction 
main effect [F(1, 33) = 5.018, p = 0.033, !"# = 0.143] indicated participants 
significantly increased peak velocity by 7 % (0.795 deg/s) from the general-attention 
to the selective-attention conditions. There were no interactions involving group x 
model [F(1, 33) = 2.628, p = 0.115, !"# = 0.081], group x instruction [F(1, 33) = 
4.086, p = 0.052, !"# = 0.120], or group x model x instruction [F(1, 33) = 3.740, p = 
0.063, !"# = 0.111] (Figure 3.8a). 
 
3.4.2.1.2 Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
There was no main effect of group [F(1, 33) = 0.115, p = 0.697, !"# = 0.005]. 





Figure 3.6 Smooth velocity traces displaying exemplar eye movement data for the 
autism group during observation of the (a) typical and (b) atypical velocity models 
in the general-attention (solid-black trace) and selective-attention (dashed-black 





Figure 3.7 Smooth velocity traces displaying exemplar eye movement data for the 
control group during observation of the (a) typical and (b) atypical velocity models 
in the general-attention (solid-black trace) and selective-attention (dashed-black 






Figure 3.8 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the eye movements 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group, 





peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when observing atypical (M = 36 %; SD 
= 12 %), compared to the typical (M = 43 %; SD = 12 %) velocity models (p < 
0.001). There was an instruction main effect [F(1, 33) = 13.917, p = 0.001, !"# = 
0.317] that indicated peak eye velocity occurred significantly later by 18 % (8 units) 
in the general-attention compared to selective-attention conditions (ps = 0.001) 
(Figure 3.8b). There were no interactions involving group x model [F(1, 33) = 
1.454, p = 0.237, !"# = 0.046], group x instruction [F(1, 33) = 0.929, p > 0.343, !"# = 
0.030], or group x model x instruction [F(1, 33) = 2.752, p = 0.108, !"# = 0.084]. 
 
3.4.2.2 Saccade Data 
 
3.4.2.2.1 Number of Saccades 
A main effect [F(1, 33) = 4.538, p = 0.040, !"# = 0.128] of model indicated 
participants exhibited a greater number of saccades when observing typical (M = 
4.761 saccades; SD = 2.119 saccades) compared to atypical (M = 4.415 saccades; 
SD = 1.845 saccades) velocity models (Figure 3.9a). 
 
3.4.2.2.2 Saccade Amplitude 
A main effect of model for saccade amplitude [F(1, 33) = 5.190, p = 0.030, !"# = 0.143], which indicated participants generally exhibited larger saccade 
amplitudes when observing atypical (M = 1.755 deg; SD = 0.785 deg) compared to 
typical (M = 1.552 deg; SD = 0.705 deg) velocity models (Figure 3.9b). An 
instruction main effect [F(1, 33) = 6.022, p = 0.020, !"# = 0.163] indicated an 18 % 





Figure 3.9 (a) Number of saccades and(b) saccade amplitude for the eye 
movements (error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function 




Table 3.3 Mean (standard deviation) smooth and saccade data for the eye movements presented as a function of group, model and instruction. 
 
 Autism Control 
Smooth Data General Selective General Selective 
Peak Velocity 
(deg/s) 
Atypical 10.36 (2.26) 12.96 (5.08) 11.08 (2.13) 11.48 (2.14) 
Typical 10.59 (3.12) 10.97 (2.07) 11.76 (4.43) 11.55 (2.11) 
Time-to-Peak-
Velocity (%) 
Atypical 40 (12) 33 (13) 38 (9) 32 (8) 
Typical 46 (14) 36 (12) 50 (11) 42 (11) 
Saccade Data General Selective General Selective 
Number of Saccades 
Atypical 4.31 (1.69) 4.68 (1.74) 4.07 (1.54) 4.61 (1.46) 
Typical 5.02 (2.42) 5.33 (2.40) 4.10 (1.42) 4.59 (1.54) 
Saccade Amplitude 
(deg) 
Atypical 1.65 (1.12) 2.23 (1.33) 1.51 (0.69) 1.63 (0.62) 





Figure 3.10 (a) A schematic representation of the laboratory/experimental set-up for 
the judgment task. The white circle displayed on the CRT monitor represents the 
model. The single-segment movement is depicted by the arrow. (b) Number of 
correct responses for the judgement task (error bars represent standard error of the 
mean) presented as a function of group. The dashed-red line represents the maximum 
possible number of correct responses.  
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attention condition (Figure 3.9b). For a full breakdown of each dependent variable 
see Table 3.3. 
 
3.4.3 Judgement Task 
From a possible total of 45 correct responses, the autism group made 30 (SD 
= 9) correct responses and the control group made 27 (SD = 7) correct responses. 
Both groups were equally successful [t(28) = 1.051, p = 0.300] at judging whether 
model n was the same or different to model n+1 (autism: M = 66 %; SD = 19 %, 
control: M = 60 %; SD = 16 %) (Figure 3.10b). Using single-sample t-tests with a 
critical value set at 50 % (i.e., 22.5 correct response), the results showed recognition 
performance for both groups was significantly greater than chance (autism: t(19) = 




The influence of instructions on selective-attention, inferred from eye movements 
during action-observation, and imitation behaviour in autism was examined using a 
behavioural protocol that presented a non-human agent model displaying distinctly 
different (i.e., atypical and typical), but biologically plausible kinematics (Hayes et 
al., 2014). When provided with general-attention instructions, the control group 
imitated an atypical movement such that time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 27 % of 
the movement trajectory. The early occurrence of peak velocity was similar to the 
atypical model (18 %), but significantly different to the timing of peak velocity 
imitated (38 %) after observing the typical (44 %) model (see Figure 3.3b). This 
finding indicates the control group demonstrated high-fidelity imitation by 
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representing an atypical biological movement that was not part of an existing 
sensorimotor repertoire (Hayes et al., 2009). This supports previous work showing 
biological motion (Brass et al., 2001; Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2006), and 
atypical biological kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014; 2016), is processed and 
represented during imitation. Although the autism group imitated magnitude of peak 
velocity to a similar level of accuracy as the control group (Figure 3.3a), time-to-
peak-velocity occurred significantly later in the movement trajectory (atypical = 31 
%; typical = 35 %) irrespective of model observed. These kinematic data indicate 
the autism group exhibited low-fidelity imitation of atypical biological kinematics, 
which is consistent with Chapter Two that used the same imitation protocol in a 
group of high-functioning adults with autism. 
Extending this work in the current study, the examination of eye movements 
during action-observation indicated both groups exhibited similar peak and time-to-
peak smooth pursuit eye velocity (Figure 3.8), combined with fewer saccades of 
greater amplitude, when observing atypical compared to typical biological motion 
(Figure 3.9). The change in eye movements whilst observing different biological 
motion kinematics is consistent with visual attention being maintained on the 
observed model(s). This pattern of pursuit eye movements was similar in both 
groups, thus providing comparable retinal and extra-retinal input for the 
configuration of the upper limb motor response required in imitation. 
In the second-phase of the study the control group imitated with a time-to-
peak-velocity that occurred early in the movement after observing the atypical 
model, and significantly different to the timing of peak velocity imitated after 
observing the typical model. There was no significant change in the accuracy of 
imitating atypical biological kinematics in the autism group following selective-
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attention instructions. As before, time-to-peak velocity occurred significantly later in 
the movement trajectory. The eye movement data replicated the effects from the first 
phase of the study, but importantly in a context where selective-attention was 
controlled by instructing groups to explicitly pay attention to, and intend to imitate 
the trajectory displayed by the model(s). However, even though the eye data 
indicated the autism group allocated overt visual attention to motion trajectory 
information, imitation was still attenuated. Furthermore, debriefing data (Questions 1 
- 4) provided context as the autism group reported they understood the instruction to 
pay more attention, and intend, to imitate the trajectory following selective-attention 
instructions. For example, Participant #5 responded to Question 3 “Yes I think that 
you meant to watch the dot more closely, to notice the dot a bit more. I think that I 
noticed the dot more, like the way that it (the dot) moved and where the dot sped up 
and slowed down, and I tried to copy it (the dot) the same way”. Moreover, 
Participant #11 reported their imitation strategy changed after receiving selective-
attention instructions (Question 4) “Yes I think so, I think I was better than the time 
before, I think I was faster, I think I sped up and slowed down like the fast then slow 
video that I watched”. Finally, the group reported they could differentiate the two 
models as Participant #4 responded to Question 1 “yes, one of the movements was 
fast and jagged then slowed right down, and the other one (the dot) was kind of like 
a similar speed all the way through”. This ability to differentiate biological 
kinematics was confirmed experimentally with the judgement data indicating the 
autism group accurately, and at a level significantly greater than chance (66 %), 
perceived differences between atypical, typical, and constant velocity kinematics 
(Figure 3.10b). It is therefore unlikely the impairment in imitating biological 
kinematics is based at a perceptual level given the autism group perceived 
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differences in biological motion; for further evidence of intact perception of 
biological motion in autism see (Freitag et al., 2008; Saygin et al., 2010). More 
importantly, the impairment in imitating atypical biological motion is not based on 
differences in eye movements, visual attention to motion trajectory, or the explicit 
intention to imitate the kinematic trajectory, as these processes were similar to the 
control group. 
The method of using a human volunteer to generate both models was critical 
because it ensured the kinematics were biological in origin and could be reproduced 
by the participants. It is also important to acknowledge that by using this non-human 
agent in the study controlled the influence of social attention (e.g., facial features; 
eyes; human form) during imitation (Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014). Although this 
control was important for isolating any modulatory effects to the manipulation of 
instructions on selective-attention in imitation, it does limit the generality of the 
results to other forms of imitation that occur in human social settings. Indeed, unlike 
these effects, imitation of body orientation (Hobson & Hobson, 2007) and goal-
directed actions (Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014) was enhanced in autistic children 
that allocated more visual attention (e.g., increase number or fixations) to the face of 
a human model, compared to those that paid less attention to this region. These 
effects suggest that altered visual attention to important social factors attributable to 
eye gaze may modulate, or inhibit, processing of relevant biological information 
from a model (Vivanti et al., 2011). Although the use of a non-human agent limited 
the influence of social modulation during imitation, the fact that adults with autism 
orientated visual attention to the non-human model, and imitation was still 
attenuated, provides evidence that other sensorimotor processes contribute to a 
reduction in imitation efficacy in autism. 
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Sensorimotor processing of biological motion also occurs in the inter-trial 
delay of true imitation (Bandura, 1977; Byrne & Russon, 1998; Heyes, 2013). For 
example, during the imitation of a novel upper-limb motor skill, sensorimotor 
regions (inferior parietal, pre-motor cortex, inferior frontal gyrus) are active during: 
(1) action-observation; (2) motor-preparation; (3) and motor-execution (Buccino et 
al., 2004). Accordingly, combined sensorimotor activity across several imitation 
phases plays an integral part in the generation of a sensorimotor representation, and 
the efficacy of an imitated movement. Here, it is important to note that the atypical 
and typical models were presented in a randomised order resulting in a stimulus on 
trial n+1 being unpredictable. This influences planning and execution by limiting the 
opportunity for consolidation of a representation because sensorimotor information 
from trial n (e.g., atypical model) will most likely be different to trial n+1 (e.g., 
typical model). In this context, rather than a representation being refined by updating 
error using expected (e.g., what was imitated on trial n (i.e. atypical), and 
information from action-observation on trial n+1 (i.e., atypical)) and actual 
(reafferent) sensorimotor consequences from trial n (e.g., atypical) over similar trial 
types (Elliott, Helsen, & Chua, 2001; Wolpert et al., 2011), the random order would 
lead to the representation being repeatedly constructed and reconstructed such that 
the sensorimotor system receives sensorimotor interference (Shea & Morgan, 1979). 
It is therefore possible that low-fidelity imitation of atypical biological kinematics in 
autism is associated with difficulties in integrating sensorimotor information across 
trials that do not promote an opportunity for consolidation, or planning and 
execution difficulties that arise due to random nature of the presentation order. 
Although no data is presented to support these specific suggestions, they are 
consistent with previously reported findings that individuals with autism have 
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neurological difficulties with sensorimotor integration (Marko, Crocetti, Hulst, 
Donchin, Shadmehr, & Mostofsky, 2015; Ament, Meja, Buhlman, Erklin, Caffo, 
Mostofsky, & Wodka, 2015; Nebel et al., 2015) and execution (Hughes, 1996; 




In conclusion, it has been shown that adults with autism have specific difficulties 
imitating the velocity characteristics associated with atypical biological kinematics. 
However, the autism group had similar smooth pursuit and saccadic eye movements 
during action-observation as the control group. Moreover, the autism group modified 
pursuit eye movements in a similar manner as the control group following selective-
attention instructions. It is therefore unlikely that impaired imitation of atypical 
biological motion kinematics is related to poor tracking of the model trajectory, and 
thereby the focus of overt attention. Importantly, although eye movement behaviour 
changed following selective-attention instructions in both groups, imitation 
behaviour only changed in the control group. This suggests that altered imitation 
could be associated with differences in ‘input’ modulation, where lower-level 
sensorimotor processes do not effectively encode biological motion, or integrate 
sensorimotor information across trials during true imitation. The latter suggestion 





















Adults with autism often show impairments in imitating biological motion which has 
been associated with differences in integrating and consolidating sensorimotor 
information. Here imitation of atypical biological kinematics was examined by 
manipulating practice that facilitates and attenuates integration of sensorimotor 
information. To reduce the influence of top-down factors on imitation a non-human 
agent model was used to control social attention, and end-state target goals were 
removed in to minimise goal-directed attention. In a Fixed Experiment adults with 
autism imitated atypical biological kinematics to the same extent as matched 
neurotypicals when the to-be-imitated models were presented in a known structure, 
which facilitates greater integration and consolidation of sensorimotor information. 
In an Interference Experiment where participants were required to complete a 
secondary motor task during the inter-trial delay, adults with autism exhibited 
difficulties imitating the atypical biological kinematics. The implication is that adults 
with autism were influenced by disruption to greater sensorimotor integration 
occurring offline during the inter-trial delay. Similar to Chapter Two when the 
presentation structure was randomised adults with autism exhibited differences in 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics. For the first time experimentally it has 
been demonstrated that adults with autism can imitate biological motion, and that 
previously reported impairments are associated with processes that integrate and 






To acquire gestures and actions that are not present within their motor repertoire the 
observer must imitate (i.e., copy) the novel action exemplified by another. This 
process is ‘true’ imitation since the observer is required to imitate the observed 
action following observation rather than reproducing the action before observation 
(Byrne & Russon, 1998). Along with acquiring novel sensorimotor behaviours 
(Hayes et al., 2007) imitation underpins the development of social-cognition (Rogers 
et al., 2010) such as feelings of interpersonal closeness (i.e., the desire to be like 
others) and rapport (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). A 
neurodevelopmental disorder which is primary categorised by atypicalities in social-
cognition, verbal and non-verbal commutation, as well as a restricted repertoire of 
interest and activities is autism (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Given the 
intricate link between imitation and social-cognition, imitation abilities in those with 
autism have been examined at length (Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Rogers & 
Williams, 2006; Hamilton, 2013; Edwards, 2014; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014) and 
have consistently showed that individuals with autism have difficulties imitating the 
actions of others (Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Smith & Bryson, 1994; Rogers et al., 
1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999; Stewart et al., 2013) which were reviewed elsewhere 
(Hamilton, 2013; Edwards, 2014; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014) as well as the 
introductory chapter of this thesis (Chapter One). For instance, in a study by Wild et 
al. (2012) adults with and without autism were required to observe and imitate a 
human model perform a series of hand actions that were differentiated by amplitude 
(short; long) and duration (fast; slow). Behavioural data showed that there were no 
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differences when imitating the amplitude of the hand, but only adults without autism 
successfully imitated the hand speeds. 
An essential aspect to the previous chapters and other work demonstrating 
differences in representing biological motion in autism (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et 
al., 2013) is that the to-be imitated stimulus was presented in a random structure, 
thus causing the stimulus on trial n+1 to be ambiguous. This particular presentation 
structure influences planning and execution, both of which have previously been 
reported to be difficulties in autism (Hughes, 1996; Rinehart et al., 2001; Mari et al., 
2003; Glazebrook et al., 2006, 2008). Moreover, it may limit the opportunity to 
integrate and consolidate the sensorimotor representation and as a result, it could be 
posited that low-fidelity imitation of atypical biological motion in autism is 
attributed to complications in integrating sensorimotor information on a trial-by-trial 
basis where there is opportunity for consolidation, or the previously reported 
problems in planning and execution occur due to the unknown presentation structure. 
 
4.3 Fixed Experiment 
 
The aim of the initial experiment in this chapter was to further examine imitation of 
atypical biological kinematics in adults with autism, where the to-be-imitated models 
will be presented in a fixed order, which provides opportunity for the sensorimotor 
representation to be refined by updating error using expected (e.g., imitation from 
atypical model on trial n and information from observation of atypical model on trial 
n+1) and actual sensory consequences from trial n over similar trial types (Elliott et 
al., 2001; Wolpert et al., 2011). If the structure of how the to-be-imitated models 
were presented influences imitation by providing an increased opportunity for 
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sensorimotor integration and consolidation across repeated trials of the same model, 
then it can be predicted that adults with autism would imitate the atypical biological 
kinematics more similarly compared to adults without autism. If, however, 
presentation structure does not influence imitation, then it should follow that 
consistent with Chapters Two and Three where the presentation structure is 
randomised, individuals with autism will exhibit differences in imitation of atypical 
velocity model. In this situation, the control group will exhibit movements with a 
time-to-peak-velocity that will occur earlier in the movement, similar to that 
displayed by the atypical model and significantly different to the time-to-peak-
velocity exhibited after observing velocity control models. Contrary the autism 
group would show a time-to-peak-velocity which was significantly different from 
the control group, but statistically similar to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited 





Fifteen typical control participants (12 male; 3 female) and 15 participants 
with autism (12 male; 3 female) volunteered for the study. The volunteers with 
autism were recruited from an autistic society in North West of England, and 
Liverpool John Moores University, UK. The volunteers were provided with a 
participant information sheet and selected if they consented to be part of the study. 
The control participants were recruited from Liverpool John Moores University, UK. 
None of the volunteers participated in Chapters Two and Three and thus were naïve 
to the experiment. Sample characteristics are presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Participant characteristics of the autism and control groups in the Fixed experiment. 
 
 
Autism (n= 15) Control (n = 15)  
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P Value 
Chronological Age 22 (2) years 18 - 26 20 (2) years 18 - 26 0.217 
IQ: 
Full Scale 101 (11) 82 - 118 103 (9) 84 - 123 0.574 
Verbal 101 (12) 87 - 127 105 (9) 89 - 126 0.366 
Performance 101 (13) 79 - 119 101 (11) 82 - 117 0.988 
ADOS: 
Total 8 (1)     
Communication 3 (1)     
Social Interaction 5 (1)     




4.4.2 Apparatus and Procedure 
The apparatus used and the procedure was identical to that in Chapters Two 
and Three. Volunteers performed 2 blocks of 40 trials in each phase (80 trials). A 
block contained only either typical or atypical biological motion. In order to provide 
increased sensorimotor integration and consolidation over similar trial types, trial 
order within a block, as well as block order, was fixed across volunteers.  
 
4.4.3 Data Reduction 
Quantifying imitation of timing and kinematic data was identical to Chapters 
Two and Three. Intra-participant means were calculated from 40 trials associated 
with each model. 
 
4.4.4 Data Analysis 
Data from all dependent variables were submitted to separate 2 group 




4.5.1 Timing Data 
 
4.5.1.1 Timing Error 
A main effect [F(1, 28) = 9.645, p = 0.004, !"# = 0.256] of model indicated 
participants timing was significantly more accurate when imitating atypical (M = -83 
ms; SD = 284 ms) compared to typical (M = 121 ms; SD = 309 ms) velocity models 





Figure 4.1 (a) Timing error and (b) timing variability for the imitation task (error 
bars represent standard error of the mean) in the Fixed experiment presented as a 
function of group and model.  
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0.065, p = 0.800, !"# = 0.002], overall the autism group (M = 7 ms; SD = 310 ms) 
performed to the same extent as the control group (M = 31 ms; SD = 339 ms). 
 
4.5.1.2 Timing Variability 
For timing variability a group main effect [F(1, 28) = 6.835, p = 0.014, !"# = 
0.196] indicated timing variability was significantly lower for the control (M = 270 
ms; SD = 99 ms) than autism (M = 385 ms; SD = 133 ms) group (Figure 4.1b). 
 
4.5.2 Kinematic Data 
 
4.5.2.1 Peak Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(1, 28) = 70.616, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.716] for peak 
velocity indicated magnitude was higher when imitating atypical (M = 0.274 
mm/ms; SD = 0.046 mm/ms), compared to typical velocity models (M = 0.186 
mm/ms; SD = 0.033 mm/ms) (Figure 4.2a). 
 
4.5.2.2 Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
There was a main effect of model [F(1, 28) = 65.117, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.699], 
where peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when imitating atypical (M = 26 
%; SD = 8 %), compared to the typical biological motion (M = 38 %; SD = 11 %) 
(Figure 4.2b). Importantly there was no group x model interaction [F(1, 28) = 1.839, 
p = 0.186, !"# = 0.062]. 
These above effects can be seen in the exemplar velocity traces illustrated in 
Figure 4.3. When imitating the atypical velocity model, peak velocity occurred 





Figure 4.2 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the imitation task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) in the Fixed experiment presented 
as a function of group and model. The dashed-red lines in a represent the magnitude 
of peak velocity for the typical (i.e., 0.410 mm/ms) and atypical (i.e., 0.200 mm/ms) 
models. In b, they represent the time-to-peak-velocity for the typical (i.e.,44 %) and 





Figure 4.3 Velocity traces displaying exemplar kinematic data for the (a) autism and 
(b) control groups during imitation of the typical (dashed-black trace) and atypical 
(solid-black trace) velocity models in the Fixed experiment presented as a function 
of time.  
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Table 4.2 Mean (standard deviation) timing and kinematic data for the imitation task in the Fixed experiment presented as a function of group 
and model. 
 
 Autism Control 
Timing Data 
Timing Error (ms) 
Atypical -127 -60 
Typical 95 68 
Timing Variability 
(ms) 
Atypical 358 274 




Atypical 0.259 (0.056) 0.289 (0.058) 
Typical 0.176 (0.033) 0.196 (0.034) 
Time-to-Peak-
Velocity (%) 
Atypical 27 (9) 25 (7) 




imitating the typical velocity model, peak velocity occurred toward the midpoint of 
the movement for both groups (dashed-black trace; Figure 4.3). For a full 




Imitation of biological kinematics was examined using a behavioural protocol that 
required adults with and without autism to observe and subsequently imitate models 
that displayed distinctly different but biologically plausible kinematics (Hayes et al., 
2014). After observing an atypical velocity model, participants in the control group 
exhibited movements with a peak velocity that occurred at 25 % of the movement 
trajectory. This early occurrence of peak velocity was similar to that displayed by the 
atypical model (time-to-peak-velocity = 18 %), and significantly different to the 
time-to-peak-velocity exhibited after observing typical (M = 39 %) velocity model. 
Importantly, participants in the autism group also exhibited movements with a peak 
velocity that occurred at 27 % of the movement trajectory, and thus similar to that 
displayed by the atypical model, as well as being statistically different to that 
exhibited after observing the typical (M = 37 %) model (Figure 4.2b). This showed 
a relationship between the motor output (i.e., imitation) and the observed  
atypical biological motion signifies reasonably high-fidelity imitation of biological 
motion (Brass et al., 2001; Gangitano et al., 2001). Notably, these findings 
demonstrate that adults with autism can successfully represent velocity and are 
inconsistent with work indicating complications in imitating the form (Rogers et al., 
1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999) or action speed (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2013) 
in autism. The main difference between the current experiment and previous studies 
  
133 
illustrating problems in imitation of biological kinematics in autism (Wild et al., 
2012; Stewart et al., 2013) is the presentation structure of the to-be-imitated 
model(s). Therefore, these findings are consistent with the proposal that low-fidelity 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics in autism can be attributed to 
complications in integrating sensorimotor information on a trial-by-trial basis where 
there is opportunity for consolidation, or the previously reported problems in 
planning and execution occur due to the unknown presentation structure. 
  
4.7 Interference Experiment 
  
The first experiment demonstrated that adults with autism can successfully imitate 
atypical biological kinematics when provided with the opportunity to integrate and 
consolidate sensorimotor information using expected and actual sensory signals over 
similar trial types (Elliott et al., 2001; Wolpert et al., 2011). These adjustments for 
error occur online (Kilner et al, 2007; Burke et al., 2010) during motor-execution as 
well as offline (Wolpert et al., 1995, 2011) during the inter-trial delay. However, it is 
currently unclear where in the imitation process this increased sensorimotor 
integration is occurring? One way to examine this is by providing a secondary motor 
task during the inter-trial delay which interferes with offline consolidation of the 
sensorimotor representation. This interference effect during the consolidation period 
has previously been reported from an observational learning study (Brown, Wilson, 
& Gribble, 2009) that induced motor interference using repeated transmagnetic 
stimulation (rTMS). In this study, participants observed naïve learners perform 
reaching movements using a robotic arm. The robot was programmed to perturb the 
upper-limb dynamics by applying force fields to the learner’s arm in a clockwise or 
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counter-clockwise direction. To examine whether integration occurs during the 
consolidation period repeated transmagnetic stimulation was applied to the primary 
motor cortex with the expectation that learning would be attenuated. Consistent with 
previous work (Mattar & Gribble, 2005), reaching performance was facilitated by 
observational learning, however learning was significantly reduced in participants 
that received rTMS to the primary motor cortex during the consolidation period. This 
finding demonstrates sensorimotor information is consolidated in primary motor 
cortex, which is also known to be active during imitation learning (Nishitani et al., 
2004). 
With the above mentioned in mind, the aim of the second experiment is to 
further examine imitation of atypical biological motion in adults with autism, and 
whether the suggested increase in sensorimotor integration and consolidation 
facilitated by presenting a fixed structure occurs offline, during the inter-trial delay 
(i.e., in-between motor-execution on trial n and action-observation on trial n+1). 
Adults with and without autism observed and imitated biological kinematic models 
in a known structure that were undistinguishable from the Fixed Experiment 
however during the inter-trial delay they were required to create circular motions 
using the stylus on the digital graphics tablet. If the increase in sensorimotor 
integration and consolidation resulting in increased imitation fidelity of atypical 
biological kinematics occurs offline during the inter-trial delay, then it can be 
expected that the secondary motor task will cause an interference effect, whereby 
adults with autism will demonstrate differences in imitation of atypical biological 
kinematics, similar to those observed in Chapters Two (Figure 2.3b) and Three 
(Figure 3.3b) where the trial order was randomised. If the increase in sensorimotor 
integration and consolidation does not occur offline and rather may occur during 
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action-observation or motor-execution on trial n, then it can be expected that adults 
with autism will imitate the atypical velocity model to the same extent as control 






Fifteen typical control participants (13 male; 2 female) and 15 participants 
with autism (13 male; 3 female) volunteered for the study. Nine participants with 
autism (8 male; 1 female), and nine typical control participants (8 male; 1 female), 
were recruited from the Fixed experiment (in order to reduce any retention effects 
associated with imitation learning, participants completed the Interference 
experiment three months following the Fixed experiment). Six new autism (4 male; 2 
female) and six new typical control (4 male; 2 female) participants were recruited. 
The volunteers were provided with a participant information sheet and selected if 
they consented to be part of the study. The control participants were recruited from 
Liverpool John Moores University, UK. Sample characteristics are presented in 
Table 4.3. 
 
4.8.2 Apparatus, Procedure and Data Reduction 
The apparatus, procedure and data reduction were identical to that in the Fixed 
Experiment except all volunteers completed a secondary motor task offline during 
the inter-trial delay. Following motor-execution on trial n and before action- 
observation on trial n+1, a circular ‘track’ (i.e., small circle of diameter 15.78 cm  
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Table 4.3 Participant characteristics of the autism and control groups in the Interference experiment. 
 
 
Autism (n= 15) Control (n = 15)  
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P Value 
Chronological Age 21 (2) years 18 - 25 20 (2) years 18 - 24 0.136 
IQ: 
Full Scale 103 (14) 82 - 126 105 (11) 92 - 124 0.486 
Verbal 102 (15) 84 - 130 109 (11) 95 - 130 0.298 
Performance 102 (14) 79 - 121 102 (8) 89 - 115 0.910 
ADOS: 
Total 8 (1)     
Communication 3 (1)     
Social Interaction 5 (1)     







Figure 4.4 (a) A schematic representation of the laboratory/experimental set-up for 
the imitation task in the Interference experiment. The black outlined rectangle 
represents a graphics tablet. The white circle displayed on the CRT monitor 
represents the model. The single-segment movement is depicted by the arrow. The 
secondary task is depicted by the dashed-line. (b) Typical (dashed-black trace) and 
atypical (solid-black trace) velocity models presented as a function of time. 
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inside a large circle of diameter = 18.93 cm) appeared on the monitor along with a 
white cursor (diameter = 6.25 mm) that represented the position of the stylus (Figure 
4.4a). Participants were instructed to move the stylus on the tablet so that the cursor 
moved from a start/finish position located on the right-hand side of the circle. 
Having clicked the lower-button on the stylus, participants moved the white cursor 
around the track in a clockwise direction, as many times as possible in 4000 ms. 
Participants were instructed to avoid moving outside of the circuit (they were not 
penalised if they did). 
 
4.8.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis were identical to that in the Fixed experiment except to account 
for accrued prior experience in the participants that completed the Fixed experiment, 
a co-variate (i.e., experience) was included in the repeated measures ANOVA. This 




4.9.1 Timing Data 
 
4.9.1.1 Timing Error 
A main effect [F(1, 28) = 6.966, p = 0.014, !"# = 0.199] of model indicated 
participants timing was significantly more accurate when imitating atypical (M = -35 
ms; SD = 250 ms) compared to typical (M = 153 ms; SD = 272 ms) velocity model 






Figure 4.5 (a) Timing error and (b) timing variability for the imitation task (error 
bars represent standard error of the mean) in the Interference experiment presented 
as a function of group and model.  
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0.370, p = 0.548, !"# = 0.013], overall the autism group (M = 118 ms; SD = 701 ms) 
performed to the same extent as the control group (M = 0 ms; SD = 377 ms). 
 
4.9.1.1 Timing Variability 
A group main effect [F(1, 28) = 5.627, p = 0.024, !"# = 0.167] indicated 
timing variability was significantly lower for the control (M = 211 ms; SD = 61 ms) 
than autism (M = 309 ms; SD = 181 ms) group (Figure 4.5b). 
 
4.9.2 Kinematic Data 
 
4.9.2.1 Peak Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(1, 28) = 31.586, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.530] for peak 
velocity indicated magnitude was higher when imitating atypical (M = 0.269 
mm/ms; SD = 0.043 mm/ms), compared to typical velocity model (M = 0.189 
mm/ms; SD = 0.030 mm/ms) (Figure 4.6a). 
 
4.9.2.2 Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
There was a main effect of model [F(1, 28) = 24.668, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.468], 
where peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when imitating atypical (M = 31 
%; SD = 7 %), compared to the typical velocity models (M = 42 %; SD = 10 %) 
(Figure 4.6b). This was superseded by a model x group interaction [F(1, 38) = 
7.969, p = 0.009, !"# = 0.222], which indicated peak velocity occurred significantly 
earlier when imitating atypical velocity model (Figure 4.6b) for the control (M = 28 
%; SD = 5%) than autism group (M = 35 %; SD = 9 %). The early occurrence of 





Figure 4.6 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the imitation task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) in the Interference experiment 
presented as a function of group and model. The dashed-red lines in a represent the 
magnitude of peak velocity for the typical (i.e., 0.410 mm/ms) and atypical (i.e., 
0.200 mm/ms) models. In b, they represent the time-to-peak-velocity for the typical 





Figure 4.7 Velocity traces displaying exemplar kinematic data for the (a) autism and 
(b) control groups during imitation of the typical (dashed-black trace), atypical 
(solid-black trace) velocity models in the Interference experiment presented as a 
function of time.  
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Table 4.4 Mean (standard deviation) timing and kinematic data for the imitation task in the Interference experiment presented as a function of 
group and model. 
 
 Autism Control 
Timing Data 
Timing Error (ms) 
Atypical 10 -71 
Typical 206 47 
Timing Variability 
(ms) 
Atypical 286 207 




Atypical 0.251 (0.046) 0.286 (0.040) 
Typical 0.193 (0.033) 0.185 (0.027) 
Time-to-Peak-
Velocity (%) 
Atypical 35 (9) 28 (5) 




model (18 %; dashed-red line), than the typical velocity model (44 %; dashed-red 
line). There was no significant difference (p > 0.050) between the groups when 
imitating typical velocity model (autism: M = 39 %; SD = 10 %, control: M = 45 %; 
SD = 10 %). Correlation analysis revealed no relationship between time-to-peak-
velocity when imitating the atypical velocity model and ADOS total score 
(Pearson’s r(15) = -0.112, p = 0.690) or typical velocity model and ADOS total score 
(Pearson’s r(15) = -0.310, p = 0.261). 
These above effects can be seen in the exemplar velocity traces illustrated in 
Figure 4.7. When imitating the atypical velocity model, peak velocity occurred 
significantly earlier in the movement for the control group (Figure 4.7b) than the 
autism group (Figure 4.7a). When imitating the typical velocity model, peak 
velocity occurred toward the midpoint of the movement for both groups (dashed-





To further examine the suggestion that the increase in imitation fidelity of atypical 
biological kinematics observed in the Fixed experiment was facilitated by integrating 
sensorimotor information during the inter-trial delay, a secondary motor task (Mattar 
& Gribble, 2005; Brown et al., 2009) was included during the inter-trial delay. The 
secondary visuomotor task was implemented to experimentally interfere with the 
processing of sensorimotor information from trial n. As expected, and in line with 
the findings from Chapters Two (autism: M = 33 %; control: M = 24 %) and Three 
(autism: M = 31 %, control: M = 27 %) the control group were significantly more 
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accurate (M = 28 %) than participants in the autism (M = 35 %) group at imitating 
atypical biological motion (18 %). In effect, imitation performance in the autism 
group when imitating the atypical model was statistically similar to imitating the 
typical model (M = 39 %). Moreover, imitation performance was qualitatively 
different to the autism group from the Fixed experiment (M = 27 %) where the 
opportunity for sensorimotor consolidation during the inter-trial delay was not 
perturbed (Bandura, 1977; Byrne & Russon, 1998; Wolpert et al., 2011). 
 
4.11 Random Experiment 
  
One of the most important findings from the Fixed experiment is that through 
presenting the to-be-imitated stimulus in a fixed order, adults with autism imitated 
biological motion kinematics to a similar level as matched neurotypical controls 
(Figure 4.2b). Through repeated attempts at imitating the atypical model in a fixed 
condition it is likely the refinement of the sensorimotor representation was facilitated 
by increasing the opportunity across similar trial types to process error through 
comparisons between the expected and actuals sensory signals during the inter-trial 
delay. The suggestion that imitation fidelity was facilitated by integrating 
sensorimotor information during the inter-trial delay was supported by the findings 
from the Interference experiment (Figure 4.6b) where participants performed a 
secondary motor task in the inter-trial delay. The secondary visuomotor task was 
implemented to experimentally interfere with the processing of sensorimotor 
information from trial n. As expected, imitation performance in the autism group was 
statistically similar to imitating the typical model and importantly significantly 
different to the neurotypical control group. 
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Considering the aforementioned it could be suggested that previous 
difficulties in imitation of kinematics in autism may be attributed to the random 
structure which does not allow the opportunity for integration and consolidation of 
sensorimotor information on a trial-by-trial basis. Instead during the random 
condition different sensorimotor representations (e.g., Task 1, followed by Task 2) 
are required to be constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed across trials leading 
to an increase in sensorimotor interference within the inter trial delay during the 
learning process (Shea & Morgan, 1979). In Chapter Two adults that were naïve to 
the protocol showed poor imitation of atypical biological motion. Therefore, the aim 
of the third study it to expand upon this finding and confirm the suggestion that 
imitation impairments are associated with processes that integrate and consolidate 
sensorimotor information adults with and without autism that were familiar to the 
protocol (i.e., they took part in the Fixed and Interference experiment) took part. The 
to-be-imitated model(s) were the same as previous, yet was be presented in a 
randomised structure, where the information from trial n (e.g., atypical biological 
motion) is expected to be different to trial n+1 (e.g., typical biological motion). 
It can be predicted that if the previous difficulties in imitation of kinematics 
in autism may be attributed to the random structure, then adults with autism would 
show low-fidelity imitation of atypical velocity model, exhibiting kinematics 
significantly different to the control group, yet similar to those reported in Chapters 
Two, Three and the Interference experiment in this chapter. On the contrary, if 
impaired imitation is not associated with the random structure, then it can be 
expected that adults with autism will who high-fidelity imitation of atypical velocity 
model, exhibiting kinematics similar to the control group and those reported in the 






Volunteers were identical to that in the Interference experiment (in order to 
reduce any retention effects associated with imitation learning, participants 
completed the Random experiment three months following the Interference 
experiment). Sample characteristics are presented in Table 4.5.  
 
4.12.2 Apparatus, Procedure, Data Reduction and Data Analysis 
The apparatus, procedure and data reduction and data analysis were identical 
to that in the Fixed experiment except trial order within a block, as well as block 




4.13.1 Timing Data 
 
4.13.1.1 Timing Error 
The ANOVA did not reveal any significant main effects of group or model or 
any interactions for timing error (ps > 0.050) (Figure 4.8a). 
 
4.13.1.2 Timing Variability 
A group main effect [F(1, 28) = 6.248, p = 0.019, !"# = 0.182] indicated 
timing variability was significantly lower for the control (M = 234 ms; SD = 89 ms) 
than autism (M = 322 ms; SD = 152 ms) group (Figure 4.8b).
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Table 4.5 Participant characteristics of the autism and control groups in the Random experiment. 
 
 
Autism (n= 15) Control (n = 15)  
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P Value 
Chronological Age 22 (2) years 18 - 26 21 (2) years 18 - 27 0.068 
IQ: 
Full Scale 101 (11) 82 - 118 108 (11) 92 - 124 0.516 
Verbal 101 (12) 87 - 127 110 (11) 95 - 130 0.154 
Performance 101 (13) 79 - 119 103 (11) 82 - 127 0.922 
ADOS: 
Total 8 (1)     
Communication 3 (1)     
Social Interaction 5 (1)     







Figure 4.8 (a) Timing error and (b) timing variability for the imitation task (error 
bars represent standard error of the mean) in the Random experiment presented as a 
function of group and model.  
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4.13.2 Kinematic Data 
 
4.13.2.1 Peak Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(1, 28) = 39.937, p < 0.001, !"# = 0.588] indicated 
magnitude was higher when imitating atypical (M = 0.247 mm/ms; SD = 0.043 
mm/ms), compared to typical velocity model (M = 0.196 mm/ms; SD = 0.030 
mm/ms) (Figure 4.9a). This was superseded by a model x group interaction [F(1, 
38) = 4.324, p = 0.047, !"# = 0.134], which indicated peak velocity was higher when 
imitating the atypical velocity model (Figure 4.9a) for the control (M = 0.262 
mm/ms; SD = 0.040 mm/ms) than autism group (M = 0.233 mm/ms; SD = 0.046 
mm/ms). There was no significant difference (p > 0.050) between the groups when 
imitating typical velocity model (autism: M = 0.199 mm/ms; SD = 0.033 mm/ms, 
control: M = 0.186 mm/ms; SD = 0.027 mm/ms). Correlation analysis revealed no 
relationship between peak velocity when imitating the atypical velocity model and 
ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(15) = 0.318, p = 0.248) or typical velocity model and 
ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(15) = 0.371, p = 0.173). 
 
4.13.2.2 Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
There was a main effect of model [F(1, 28) = 30.021, p < 0.001, !"# =  0.517], 
where peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when imitating atypical (M = 29 
%; SD = 8 %), compared to the typical velocity model (M = 38 %; SD = 10 %) 
(Figure 4.9b). This was superseded by a model x group interaction [F(1, 38) = 
4.263, p = 0.048, !"# = 0.132], which indicated peak velocity occurred significantly 
earlier when imitating atypical velocity model (Figure 4.9b) for the control (M = 26 





Figure 4.9 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the imitation task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) in the Random experiment 
presented as a function of group and model. The dashed-red lines in a represent the 
magnitude of peak velocity for the typical (i.e., 0.410 mm/ms) and atypical (i.e., 
0.200 mm/ms) models. In b, they represent the time-to-peak-velocity for the typical 





Figure 4.10 Velocity traces displaying exemplar kinematic data for the (a) autism 
and (b) control groups during imitation of the typical (dashed-black trace), atypical 
(solid-black trace) velocity models in the Random experiment presented as a 
function of time.  
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Table 4.6 Mean (standard deviation) timing and kinematic data for the imitation task in the Random experiment presented as a function of group 
and model. 
 
 Autism Control 
Timing Data 
Timing Error (ms) 
Atypical -49 17 
Typical -41 67 
Timing Variability 
(ms) 
Atypical 320 207 




Atypical 0.233 (0.044) 0.262 (0.047) 
Typical 0.199 (0.036) 0.191 (0.038) 
Time-to-Peak-
Velocity (%) 
Atypical 30 (10) 27 (7) 




of peak velocity in the control group was more reflective of atypical velocity model 
(18 %; dashed-red line), than typical biological motion (44 %; dashed-red line). 
There was no significant difference (p > 0.050) between the groups when imitating 
typical velocity model (autism: M = 37 %; SD = 11 %, control: M = 39 %; SD = 10 
%). Correlation analysis revealed no relationship between time-to-peak-velocity 
when imitating the atypical biological motion and ADOS total score (Pearson’s r(15) 
= 0.132, p = 0.639) or typical biological motion and ADOS total score (Pearson’s 
r(15) = -0.057, p = 0.841). 
These above effects can be seen in the exemplar velocity traces illustrated in 
Figure 4.10. When imitating the atypical velocity model, peak velocity occurred 
significantly earlier in the movement for the control group (Figure 4.10b) than the 
autism group (Figure 4.10a). When imitating the typical velocity model, peak 
velocity occurred toward the midpoint of the movement for both groups (dashed-





In this Random experiment, participants that were not naïve to the task (i.e., they 
took part in the Fixed or Interference experiment) observed and subsequently 
imitated the two models that were presented in an unknown structure (i.e., analogous 
to Chapter Two). As expected, and consistent with the findings from Chapter Two 
(autism: M = 33 %; control: M = 24 %) when the trial order was also randomised, 
imitation performance in the autism group was statistically similar to imitating the 
typical model (M = 39 %), and importantly significantly different to the neurotypical 
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control group. This finding supports the suggestion in the Fixed experiment low-
fidelity imitation of atypical biological kinematics in autism is attributed to 
complications in integrating sensorimotor information on a trial-by-trial basis where 
there is opportunity for consolidation occur due to the unknown presentation 
structure. Furthermore, these results not only replicate those reported in Chapter Two 
but are also consistent with previous work that has indicated differences in imitating 
style (Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & Lee, 1999) and action speeds (Wild et al., 2012; 
Stewart et al., 2013). 
  
4.15 General Discussion 
  
The primary aim of the current study was to examine imitation of atypical biological 
kinematics in adults with autism. A behavioural protocol was used that required 
participants to observe and subsequently imitate models that displayed distinctly 
different but biologically plausible kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014; Andrew et al., 
2016). One of the most important findings from these studies is that through 
presenting the to-be-imitated stimulus in a fixed order, adults with autism imitated 
biological motion kinematics to a similar level as matched neurotypical controls. 
Here then, after observing the atypical model, participants in the autism group 
imitated movements with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 27 % of the 
movement trajectory (Figure 4.2b). The early occurrence of peak velocity was 
reasonably similar to that displayed by the atypical model (18 %), and importantly 
similar to the control group (M = 25 %), and significantly different to the time-to-
peak-velocity exhibited after imitating the typical model (M = 37 %). The increase in 
imitation fidelity suggests that imitation of atypical biological kinematics occurred 
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as a function of an increased opportunity for sensorimotor integration and 
consolidation across repeated trials of the same model. Over repeated attempts at 
imitating the atypical model in a fixed condition it is likely the refinement of the 
sensorimotor representation was facilitated by increasing the opportunity across 
similar trial types to process error through comparisons. 
The suggestion that imitation fidelity was facilitated by integrating 
sensorimotor information during the inter-trial delay was supported by the findings 
from the Random experiment (Figure 4.9b) when the presentation structure was 
randomised and the Interference experiment (Figure 4.6b) where participants 
performed a secondary visuomotor task in the inter-trial delay. The secondary 
visuomotor task was implemented to experimentally interfere with the processing of 
sensorimotor information from trial n. As expected, and in line with previous 
chapters where the trial order was randomised, imitation performance in the autism 
group (M = 35 %) was statistically similar to imitating the typical model (M = 39 
%), and importantly significantly different to the neurotypical control group (M = 28 
%). Moreover, imitation performance was qualitatively different to the autism group 
from the Fixed experiment (M = 27 %) where the opportunity for sensorimotor 
consolidation during the inter-trial delay was not perturbed (Bandura, 1977; Byrne & 
Russon, 1998; Wolpert et al., 2011; Heyes, 2013). Further, similar findings were also 
reported in the Random experiment as again imitation performance in the autism 
group (M = 31 %) was statistically similar to imitating the typical model (M = 37 
%), and importantly significantly different to the neurotypical control group (M = 26 
%). Similar motor performance decrements have been reported from learning studies 
that examined contextual interference (for a review see Magill & Hall, 1990). For 
example, Shea and Morgan (1979) instructed participants to learn a three-segment 
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movement sequence under blocked (low contextual interference) or random (high 
contextual interference) practice conditions. Data indicated that motor performance 
was more accurate in the blocked condition, compared to random condition. During 
the random condition different sensorimotor representations (e.g., Task 1, followed 
by Task 2) are required to be constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed across 
trials leading to an increase in sensorimotor interference within the inter-trial delay 
during the learning process (Li & Wright, 2000; Cross, Schmitt, & Grafton, 2007). 
While this may lead to benefits in long term retention (e.g., performance after 10 
days) the interference effect was suggested to have an immediate influence on motor 
variability (Lee & Magill, 1983) and motor consolidation. The interference effect 
found from the secondary task in the Interference experiment is similar to data 
reported from an observational learning study (Brown et al., 2009) that induced 
motor interference using rTMS. Consistent with previous work (Mattar & Gribble, 
2005), reaching performance was facilitated by observational learning. However, 
during the consolidation period repeated transmagnetic stimulation was applied to 
the primary motor cortex, learning was significantly reduced. This finding 
demonstrates sensorimotor information is consolidated in primary motor cortex, 
which is also known to be active during imitation learning (Nishitani et al., 2004). 
This interpretation of sensorimotor integration being associated with 
impaired imitation of biological motion kinematics in autism is consistent with a 
recent collection of work that has shown that individuals with autism process and 
integrate visual and proprioceptive information differently (Sharer et al., 2015; 
Nebel et al., 2015; Hayes, Andrew, Foster, Elliott, Gowen, & Bennett, under 
review). When learning novel movements children with autism show a bias in the 
integration of sensorimotor feedback, favouring proprioception over visual (Haswell 
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et al., 2009: Marko et al., 2015). Furthermore, the finding of children with ADHD 
demonstrating a learning pattern indistinct from typically developing children points 
towards this being autism specific (Izawa et al., 2012). This bias towards 
proprioceptive feedback signals has also been evidenced in a ball catching task as 
part of the movement assessment battery for children (Brown & Lalor, 2009). The 
ball catching task requires a demand for the integration of temporal and spatial 
characteristics of the movement that requires online adjustments for successful task 
completion. Work employing the ball catching task (Whyatt & Craig, 2012) showed 
children with autism had difficulties in performing the task when compared to 
matched (age) typically developing children. Notably, these difficulties were not 
only dissimilar to typically developing controls, but also children with ADHD 
(Ament et al., 2015) indicating the adaptation of motor skills that require the 
coupling of visual and temporal feedback operate differently in autism. It was 
concluded that rather than general motor abilities (Green, Brennan, & Fein, 2002), 
motor skill deficits in autism are suggested to be allied with the ability to integrate 
visual spatial and temporal characteristics of an action (Ament et al., 2015). 
In addition to the behavioural level differences in sensorimotor integration in 
autism, neurophysiological work has also shown that brain activity underpinning the 
development of sensorimotor representations differ compared to neurotypical 
controls (Müller, Pierce, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Müller, Kleinhans, 
Kemmotsu, Pierce, & Courchesne, 2003; Marko et al., 2015). For instance, using an 
fMRI paradigm fifty children with autism, and fifty matched (age, IQ and handiness) 
typically developing children were scanned during three gesture imitation tasks: (1) 
gesture imitation; (2) gestures to verbal command; (3) gesture involving tool use. 
Results showed that children with autism had increased intrinsic asynchrony in 
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neural activation between visual (lateral occipital cortex) and motor (pre- and post-
central gyrus) regions which correlated with more severe traits of autism (measured 
via ADOS). Furthermore, children that exhibited greater intrinsic synchrony showed 
greater imitation accuracy. This altered synchrony could influence the integration of 
visuomotor information (Nebel et al., 2015). Based on these findings given that 
sensorimotor representations form part of a mechanism that facilitates the processing 
of biological motion for action-understanding and motor-execution (Blakemore & 
Decety, 2001), it may be that neural specificity of sensorimotor representations 
regulate how subsequent observed visual information is processed in social 
visuomotor contexts (Nebel et al., 2015). In the context of the current thesis, it could 
be proposed that during the Fixed experiment these brain mechanisms (lateral 
occipital cortex; pre- and post-central gyrus) occurring during imitation are operating 
effectively due to the consistent structure of the models leading to the sensorimotor 
representation being refined on a trial-by-trial basis (Wolpert et al., 2011). However, 
in the Interference experiment these neural processes are being interfered with, 
resulting in asynchronic brain activity which would be similar to those reported in 
the autism participants (Nebel et al., 2015). Finally, though the main emphasis of the 
study was self-other mapping, Williams et al. (2006) also suggested that problems 




To conclude, adults with autism can imitate atypical biological motion kinematics to 
the same extent as matched neurotypicals by presenting the to-be-imitated models in 
a fixed structure which facilitates greater integration and consolidation of 
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sensorimotor information during the inter-trial delay. This was supported by the 
findings from the Interference experiment where the processing of sensorimotor 
information from trial n was experimentally interfered with. Imitation performance 
in the autism group was attenuated when required to perform a secondary motor task 
in the inter-trial delay. In a Random experiment similar to Chapter Two adults with 
autism exemplified differences in imitation of atypical biological kinematics when 


















5.1 Aim of the Chapter 
 
The epilogue will summarise and synthesise the key findings observed across the 
program of work. There will be a critical evaluation with respect to current literature 
on imitation in autism, as well as implications for theoretical accounts of impaired 
imitation in autism and sensorimotor control processes in imitation. Future 
considerations and translational research will be discussed, with the intention of 
offering prospective social rehabilitation protocols in autism. 
 
5.2 Aims of Thesis 
 
The main aim of the present thesis was to examine imitation of biological motion in 
adults with autism, and to investigate whether adults with autism can adapt and learn 
to imitate and represent biological motion following specific manipulations to the 
imitation context (e.g., instructions, feedback, practice type). Across the three 
experimental chapters, a novel behavioural protocol was adopted that required adults 
with autism and matched (age, gender, handiness, IQ) adults without autism to 
observe and subsequently imitate models that displayed movements that had 
identical spatial and temporal outcomes, but with a typical, atypical, or constant 
(Chapter Two only) velocity profiles. The atypical model ensured the observer 
configured the sensorimotor system to represent the novel movement kinematics, as 
opposed to the typical model that could be achieved by rescaling an existing 
representation of a typical upper-limb aiming movement (Vivanti et al., 2008; Hayes 
et al, 2009; 2012). To control for specific top-down influences of coding biological 
motion (Kilner et al., 2007), and thereby minimised processes known to regulate 
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social modulation (Cook & Bird, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2012; Stewart et al., 
2013) a non-human agent model (white-dot) was presented that had limited social 
context. To control for visual attention towards the goal-directed features of the task 
environment (Vivanti et al., 2008; Wild et al., 2012), target goals were only 
displayed in half of the imitation trials in Chapter Two. Targets were removed in 
Chapters Three and Four to encourage attention towards the trajectory of the model. 
The aim of Chapter Two was to examine whether adults with autism can 
imitate atypical biological motion kinematics. Furthermore, to examine adaptation 
during imitation, performance was evaluated across the early-phase and late-phase of 
imitation. Based on the findings, there were two possible processes that could 
account for the underlying differences in imitating biological motion in autism. 
Firstly, it was suggested that visual attention away from the kinematic features of the 
model (i.e., movement trajectory) could lead to differences in sensorimotor 
information extracted for imitation (Vivanti et al., 2008; Wild et al., 2012; Gowen, 
2012; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014). Secondly, individuals with autism may have 
had difficulties integrating sensorimotor information across trials that do not 
promote an opportunity for consolidation and representation development (Williams 
et al., 2006; Marko et al., 2015; Ament et al., 2015; Nebel et al., 2015). 
In Chapter Three, the aim was to explore the first possible processing 
account of impaired imitation in autism by examining the effects of manipulating 
overt visual attention and intention during imitation of atypical biological motion 
kinematics in autism. Here, using a similar protocol as Chapter Two, adults with and 
without autism were provided with selective-attention verbal instructions prior to 
imitation, (Bach et al., 2007; Hayes et al., 2014) that directed visual attention 
towards the trajectory profile (i.e., kinematics) of the model(s). To determine if 
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visual attention was directed to the model stimuli during action-observation phase of 
imitation, and whether visual there were any differences in visual attention following 
selective-attention instructions, eye movements in all participants were recorded in 
both across both instruction conditions. 
In Chapter Four, the aim was to explore the second possible processing 
account of impaired imitation in autism by examining sensorimotor integration and 
consolidation during imitation of atypical biological motion kinematics across a 
series of three studies. In the first study, a similar protocol as previous chapters were 
used, but now the to-be-imitated model(s) were presented in a fixed trial (i.e., 
blocked) order, thus increasing the opportunity for sensorimotor integration and 
consolidation during the inter-trial delay. In a second study, the same participants 
(autism: n = 9, control: n = 9) in the Fixed experiment imitated atypical biological 
motion kinematics (in a fixed presentation structure) while completing a secondary 
visuomotor task (drawing circles on the tablet) during the inter-trial delay, with the 
intention of interfering with sensorimotor integration and consolidation processes. 
Finally, the third study used the same participants as the Interference experiment and 
imitated using a similar protocol the Fixed experiment (i.e., no secondary 
visuomotor task) yet reverted to a random trial order. This was important in order to 
replicate the findings of Chapter Two and thereby confirm that trial order, and not 
simply individual differences, compromises sensorimotor consolidation. 
 
5.3 Summary of Key Findings 
 
Figure 5.1 summarises the key findings from the timing and kinematic data for each 





Figure 5.1 Schematic representation of the key findings across the three 




5.3.1 Chapter Two 
As detailed in Table 2.2, examination of the kinematic data indicated that 
individuals in the autism group exhibited similar magnitudes of peak velocity as 
individuals in the control group, with both groups successfully modulating between 
velocity models. As after observing the atypical model, both groups imitated 
movements with a peak velocity (M = 0.238 mm/ms; SD = 0.037 mm/ms) that was 
significantly higher to the peak velocity when imitating the typical (M = 0.192 
mm/ms; SD = 0.045 mm/ms) and constant (M = 162 mm/ms; SD = 0.030 mm/ms) 
velocity models (Figure 2.3a). Though there were no variances in magnitude, there 
were differences when imitating the timing of peak velocity, as after observing the 
atypical model, participants in the control group imitated movements with a time-to-
peak-velocity that occurred at 24 % (SD = 8 %) of the movement trajectory. This 
early occurrence of peak velocity was similar to that displayed by the atypical model 
(18 %; Figure 2.3b), and significantly different to the time-to-peak-velocity 
exhibited after imitating the typical (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) and constant (M = 38 % 
SD = 13 %) velocity models. This high-fidelity imitation of biological motion in the 
control group was not found for participants in the autism group. As after observing 
the atypical model, time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 33 % (SD = 10 %) of the 
movement trajectory, which was significantly different from the control group, but 
statistically similar to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited when imitating the typical 
(M = 37 %; SD = 9 %) and constant (M = 38 %; SD = 11 %) velocity models. 
Importantly, when performance was evaluated across the early-phase and 
late-phase of imitation an adaptation effect was found where individuals with autism 
became significantly more accurate at representing movement time by 35 % (175 
ms), reducing movement time variability by 24 % (99 ms), and increasing the 
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magnitude of peak velocity by 12 % (0.024 mm/ms). This specific adaptation effect 
was not observed in the control group where neurotypical adults became 
significantly less accurate at representing movement time by 44 % (139 ms), and 
showed a non-significant change in movement variability (27 ms; 11 % change) and 
magnitude of peak velocity (0.009 mm/ms; 4 % change). The fact that adults with 
autism became significantly more accurate at imitating movement time, and 
exhibited a magnitude of peak velocity that was similar to the control group 
demonstrates that autistic participants are actively engaging true imitation (Carroll & 
Bandura, 1982; Byrne & Russon, 1998). Moreover, they also suggest that during 
action-observation visual attention may have been orientated towards the temporal 
properties of the movement (e.g., movement time) displayed by the non-human 
agent model (Vivanti et al., 2008; Wild et al., 2012; Gowen, 2012) at the expense of 
the kinematic properties. In contrast, reasonable high-fidelity imitation of the 
atypical biological kinematics in the control group may have been associated with 
visual attention towards the movement trajectory, which was examined in Chapter 
Three (black solid-line in Figure 3.1). 
 
5.3.2 Chapter Three 
As detailed in Table 3.2, examination of the kinematic data indicated when 
provided with general-attention instructions that guided observers to “watch and 
copy the dot as it moves across the monitor”, participants in the control group 
exhibited movements with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 29 % (SD = 8 %) 
of the movement trajectory. This early occurrence of peak velocity was significantly 
different to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited after imitating the typical biological 
kinematics (M = 37 %; SD = 10 %). Low-fidelity imitation, and thus poor 
  
168 
representation of atypical biological kinematics was found for participants in the 
autism group. Consistent with Chapter Two, while they imitated movement time 
error (autism: M = 271 ms; SD = 355 ms, control: M = 71 ms; SD = 232 ms) and 
magnitude of peak velocity (autism: M = 0.217 mm/ms; SD = 0.051 mm/ms, control: 
M = 0.254 mm/ms; SD = 0.047 mm/ms) to a similar level of accuracy as the control 
group, time-to-peak-velocity in the atypical condition occurred at 32 % (SD = 10 %) 
of the movement trajectory, which was significantly different from the control group. 
Moreover, this time-to-peak-velocity was similar to that exhibited when imitating the 
typical biological kinematics (M = 36 %; SD = 11 %). 
When provided with selective-attention instructions that explicitly guided 
participants to “watch and pay attention to the dot’s trajectory, with the intention to 
then copy the trajectory”, participants in the control group imitated with a time-to-
peak-velocity that occurred significantly early in the movement after observing the 
atypical biological motion compared to typical biological motion. Although 
imitation of atypical biological motion was not modulated by selective-attention 
instructions for either group, imitation of typical biological motion kinematics 
became significantly 11 % (4 units) more accurate, and closer to the model in the 
neurotypical control group. The modulation of biological motion via task 
instructions has been shown in previous work (Hayes et al., 2014) and is suggested 
to be underpinned by a top-down mechanism that regulates (input modulation; Heyes 
& Bird, 2007) the lower-level visuomotor processes that code biological motion. A 
modulatory effect was not found in the autism group that exhibited little change in 
time-to-peak-velocity (4 %; 1 unit). 
As detailed in Table 3.3, Examination of eye movements during action-
observation indicated that peak and timing of smooth pursuit eye velocity was 
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similar between groups and instruction conditions, as well as being influenced in as a 
similar way by the biological motion kinematics. Also, while saccade amplitude was 
generally greater in the autism group (M = 4.84 saccades; SD = 1.58 saccades) 
compared to the control (M = 4.34 saccades; SD = 1.37 saccades) group, there was 
no increase in saccade amplitude nor number of saccades as a function of biological 
motion kinematics. The eye movement data imply that adults with autism and 
neurotypical controls maintained overt visual attention on the observed model 
irrespective of attention instructions (e.g., the velocity profiles of the eye during 
action-observation was similar to the velocity profile exhibited by the models; 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Accordingly, it is possible that eye movements could provide 
extra-retinal input (Barnes & Asselman, 1991) that is involved in configuring the 
upper-limb motor response required in imitation (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Hayes et 
al., 2014). Importantly, however, even though the autism group allocated overt 
visual attention to motion trajectory information, imitation was still attenuated. 
Because gaze location does not necessarily coincide with the focus of 
attention, participants completed a series of debriefing questions designed to 
determine their thoughts and engagement with the studies. These data (Questions 1-
4) indicated the autism group understood the instruction to pay more attention, and 
intend to imitate the trajectory following selective-attention instructions. For 
example, Participant 5 responded to Question 3 with the answer: “Yes I think that 
you meant to watch the dot more closely, to notice the dot a bit more. I think that I 
noticed the dot more, like the way that it (the dot) moved and where the dot sped up 
and slowed down, and I tried to copy it (the dot) the same way”. In addition, 
Participant 11 reported their imitation strategy changed after receiving selective-
attention instructions (Question 4): “Yes I think so, I think I was better than the time 
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before, I think I was faster, I think I sped up and slowed down like the fast then slow 
video that I watched”. Finally, the group reported they could differentiate the two 
models, as exemplified by the response of Participant 4 to Question 1: “Yes, one of 
the movements was fast and jagged then slowed right down, and the other one (the 
dot) was kind of like a similar speed all the way through”. 
 
5.3.3 Chapter Four 
As detailed in Table 4.2, in the first of three studies the kinematic data 
indicated that individuals in the autism group exhibited similar magnitudes of peak 
velocity to individuals in the control group, with both groups successfully 
modulating between velocity models. As after observing the atypical model, both 
groups imitated movements with a peak velocity (M = 0.274 mm/ms; SD = 0.047 
mm/ms) that was significantly higher to the peak velocity when imitating the typical 
(M = 0.186 mm/ms; SD = 0.033 mm/ms) velocity model (Figure 4.2a). 
Furthermore, in line with Chapters Two and Three, examination of the timing of 
peak velocity showed the control group exhibited reasonably high-fidelity imitation 
of atypical biological kinematics. As after observing the atypical model, participants 
in the control group imitated movements with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred 
at 25 % (SD = 7 %) of the movement trajectory. The early occurrence of peak 
velocity was similar to that displayed by the atypical model (18 %; Figure 4.2b), 
and significantly different to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited after imitating the 
typical model (M = 39 %; SD = 9 %). One of the most significant findings across the 
present thesis is that participants in the autism group imitated movements with a 
time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 27 % (SD = 9 %) of the movement trajectory, 
which was significantly different to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited after 
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observing typical (M = 37 %; SD = 12 %) biological motion (Figure 4.2b). These 
timings of peak velocity were statistically similar to that of participates in the control 
group, hence individuals with autism also exhibited reasonably high-fidelity 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics. This effect was achieved by presenting 
the to-be-imitated models in a fixed trial order. which led to the suggestion that 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics occurred as a function of an increased 
opportunity for sensorimotor integration and consolidation across repeated trials of 
the same model. However, it was unclear whether this increased sensorimotor 
integration and consolidation occurred online during motor-execution (Burke et al., 
2010), and/or offline during the inter-trial delay (Wolpert et al., 2011). 
As detailed in Table 4.4, in the Interference experiment, the kinematic data 
indicated temporal correspondence between control participants and the atypical 
biological kinematics. As after observing the atypical model, participants in the 
control group imitated movements with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 28 
% (SD = 5 %) of the movement trajectory. The early occurrence of peak velocity 
was similar to that displayed by the atypical model (18 %; Figure 4.6b), and 
significantly different to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited after imitating the 
typical model (M = 45 %; SD = 10 %). Though they showed reasonable high-fidelity 
imitation of atypical biological motion, it is notable that neurotypical controls 
exhibited a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred later than those reported in the Fixed 
experiment, thus indicating that the secondary visuomotor task leads to an increase 
in sensorimotor interference that consequently impacts the fidelity of a movement 
representation. Notably, while participants in the autism group imitated the 
magnitude of peak velocity (autism: M = 0.222 mm/ms; SD = 0.083 mm/ms, control: 
M = 0.236 mm/ms; SD = 0.087 mm/ms) to a similar level as the controls. The 
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reasonably high-fidelity imitation of the timing of peak velocity in the Fixed 
experiment deteriorated, and instead consistent with Chapters Two and Three, they 
imitated movements with a time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 35 % (SD = 9 %) of 
the movement trajectory. This was significantly different from the control group, but 
statistically similar to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited when imitating the typical 
(M = 39 %; SD = 10 %) velocity model. This decline in imitation fidelity of the 
atypical biological kinematics through experimentally interfering with the 
processing (i.e., integration) of sensorimotor information indicates that this increased 
sensorimotor integration and consolidation in the Fixed experiment occurred offline 
during the inter-trial delay. 
As detailed in Table 4.6, in the Random experiment, the kinematic data 
indicated that in accordance with Chapter Two were the presentation structure of the 
models was also randomised, participants in the control group imitated movements 
with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 27 % (SD = 7 %) of the movement 
trajectory. The early occurrence of peak velocity was similar to that displayed by the 
atypical model (18 %; Figure 4.9b), and significantly different to the time-to-peak-
velocity exhibited after imitating the typical model (M = 39 %; SD = 10 %). 
Furthermore, the kinematic data further supported the notion that increased 
sensorimotor integration and consolidation in the autism group in the Fixed 
experiment occurred as a function presenting the model in a blocked presentation 
structure. As unlike the Fixed experiment and consistent with the Interference 
experiment, they imitated movements with a time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 30 % 
(SD = 10 %) of the movement trajectory. This was significantly different from the 
control group, but statistically similar to the time-to-peak-velocity exhibited when 
imitating the typical (M = 36 %; SD = 11 %) velocity model. 
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5.4 Implications for Processing Accounts of Imitation 
 
As evidenced through a review of the literature within the introductory chapter of the 
thesis, there is strong evidence of impaired imitation of biological motion in autistic 
children, adolescents and adults (Williams et al., 2001; Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De 
Weerdt, 2011; Hamilton, 2013; Edwards, 2014; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014). As a 
result, many researchers endeavoured to ascertain the mechanism(s) associated with 
these atypicalities in imitation in autism. Given the experimental manipulations and 
results observed across this programme of work, the subsequent sections discuss the 
implications for current theories of imitation in autism. 
 
5.4.1 Mirror Neuron System; Self-Other Mapping Processing 
One of the most central findings reported in Chapter Two was that although 
both groups performed similarly when imitating the typical (autism: M = 37 %; SD = 
9 %, control: M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) and constant (autism: M = 38 %; SD = 11 %, 
control: M = 38 %; SD = 13 %) velocity models that could achieved by rescaling and 
existing sensorimotor representation (Hayes et al., 2009). When required to imitate a 
model by configuring the sensorimotor system to represent the novel kinematics, 
adults with autism performed significantly worse (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) than 
matched neurotypical adults (M = 24 %; SD 8 %) (Figure 2.3b). These imitation 
findings observed where using an object-movement re-enactment protocol (OMR; 
Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004) that does not display the 
human model physically executing the action to achieve the end product and controls 
the influence of social-affective processes known to modulate imitation (Whiten et 
al., 2009). A comparable study by Stewart et al. (2013) that also used an OMR task 
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too found attenuation in imitating movement kinematics in adolescents with autism. 
Here then, when compared to neurotypical adolescents that showed no differences in 
imitating shapes using a stylus on a graphics tablet (i.e., similar to the present thesis) 
following action-observation of a human or non-human model, adolescents with 
autism showed significantly less imitation accuracy in action duration and path 
length in both conditions. It was suggested that impaired imitation in autism was 
underpinned by differences in the lower-level visuomotor system that maps the 
biological motion onto the motor system, also more commonly referred to as the 
mirror neuron system hypothesis (Williams et al., 2001; 2004; Ramachandran & 
Oberman, 2005). 
The mirror system hypothesis suggests that impaired imitation of biological 
motion kinematics in autism is associated with lower-level processes that integrate 
sensorimotor information (Oberman et al., 2005; Théoret et al., 2005; Dapretto et al., 
2006; Williams et al., 2006). These processes are part of a functional network that 
represents an observed movement by mapping the biological motion characteristics 
directly onto the motor system (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
Using various brain imaging techniques (e.g., PET; EEG; TMS; fMRI), there is a 
large body of research has shown differences in cortical activity in regions 
associated with the lower-level processes during imitation and action-observation in 
autism (Nishitani et al., 2004; Théoret et al., 2005; Oberman et al., 2005; Dapretto et 
al., 2006; Bernier et al., 2007; Oberman, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2008; Martineau, 
Cochin, Magne, & Barthelemy, 2008; Enticott et al., 2012). Importantly, Chapter 
Two isolated whether the imitation deficit in autism is attributable to imitating 
specific lower-level properties (e.g., velocity) of biological motion kinematics. This 
was achieved by employing a novel protocol that required participants to imitate 
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movements that had distinctly different, but still biologically plausible, movement 
kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014; Andrew et al., 2016). Albeit the findings in Chapter 
Two were behavioural and not neurophysiological, given the protocol isolated lower-
level processing as well as the resemblances in task (i.e., OMR; Stewart et al., 2013) 
and findings of the abovementioned study, the attenuated imitation of atypical 
biological kinematic in Chapter Two could also be impaired by differences in the 
lower-level visuomotor processes (Williams et al., 2006; Dapretto et al., 2006; 
Haswell et al., 2009; Izawa et al., 2012; Nebel et al., 2015). 
It is well accepted that lower-level processes associated that underpin 
imitation of biological motion kinematics are regulated by top-down attentional 
(end-state goals) and social (human form; eye contact) factors (Kilner et al., 2007; 
Stanley et al., 2007; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008). One way to regulate the lower-
level processes in by providing specific instructions to direct overt visual attention to 
the movement trajectory enhances imitation fidelity of atypical biological kinematics 
in neurotypicals (Hayes et al., 2014). Therefore, to examine whether low-fidelity 
imitation of biological kinematics in autism is due to reduced attention to the 
trajectory (Wild et al., 2012), or processes associated with visuomotor integration in 
Chapter Three, participants were provided selective-attention instructions directed 
towards the movement trajectory. As can be seen in Figure 2.3b, these top-down 
selective attention instructions did not modulate input to the lower-level system 
mirror system. Similar to the findings of Chapter Two (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %), 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics was still attenuated (M = 32 %; SD = 9 
%) compared to neurotypical adults (M = 28 %; SD = 8 %) and was not modulated 
by top-down selective-attention instructions (autism: 5 % change; 2 units, control, 8 
% change; 2 units). These findings are consistent with previous studies (Stewart et 
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al., 2013) and may suggest that rather than impaired imitation in autism being related 
to the focus of attention during action-observation (Wild et al., 2012; Gowen, 2012), 
it could be based on a basic dysfunction in lower-level sensorimotor processes that 
integrate sensorimotor information control self-other mapping (Williams et al., 2001; 
2004; Rogers & Williams, 2006). 
Similar dysfunction in lower-level processes were promoted to describe 
differences in brain activity in an imitation study that used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural mechanism of imitation (Williams 
et al., 2006). For instance, sixteen adolescents with and without autism (matched for 
age, gender and IQ) were scanned while ask to observe, execute or imitate index 
finger movements. While both groups exhibited similar imitation task performance, 
in line with previous studies (Iacoboni et al., 1999) the control participants showed 
activation within the right parietal lobe and the right temporo-parietal junction. In 
comparison, activity in this area was less extensive in individuals with autism. It was 
suggested that the altered brain activity patterns during motor imitation could stem 
from poor integration between brain areas serving sensorimotor integration that 
would impact the development of a representation (see also Dapretto et al., 2006). 
One way to increase sensorimotor integration is by providing blocked 
practice structures which allows for greater opportunity for response-produced error 
and variability to be reduced over similar trial types leading to a more refined 
sensorimotor representation (Wright & Shea, 2001). As can be seen from Figure 4.2, 
in contrast to kinematics observed in Chapters Two (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) and 
Three (M = 31 %; SD = 10 %), in the Fixed experiment of Chapter Four when in a 
context that presented the stimulus in a fixed trial order, participants in the imitated 
the atypical model with kinematics (M = 27 %; SD = 9 %) that were similar to the 
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neurotypical control group (M = 25 %; SD = 7 %) and importantly were significantly 
different from the typical model (M = 37 %; SD = 12 %). Based upon these findings 
observed, it seems the fixed trial order allowed the underlying lower-level 
visuomotor processes within the autism group to be effectively engaged in order to 
integrate and process sensorimotor information. Moreover, the findings also indicate 
that imitation of biological kinematics may not be fundamentally impaired in autism 
(Williams et al., 2001; 2004; Théoret et al., 2005; Oberman et al., 2005) but rather 
the processes underlying this mechanism need to be operationalised in a specific 
imitation learning context to overcome the sensorimotor integration problems that 
underpin imitation in autism (Williams et al., 2006; Haswell et al., 2009; Izawa et 
al., 2012; Marko et al., 2015; Ament et al., 2015; Nebel et al., 2015). The issue of 
sensorimotor integration and lower-level processes are directly discussed in a 
following section. 
 
5.4.2 Visual Attention Processes 
As discussed within Chapter One, overt visual attention during the action-
observation phase of imitation has previously been suggested to underpin imitation 
impairments in autism (Hobson & Hobson, 2007; Vivanti et al., 2008; Vivanti & 
Dissanayake, 2014). Although eye movements were not directly examined in 
Chapter Two, behavioural data could be interpreted to suggest that impaired 
imitation of atypical biological kinematics in adults with autism may have been 
accompanied by differences in overt visual attention. Here then, timing data (Figure 
2.3b) showed that adults with autism adapted movement time from the early- to late-
phase of imitation, becoming more accurate by 35 % (175 ms), compared to the 
control group increased timing error by 44 % (139 ms). Though adults with autism 
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accurately represented movement time, this may have been at the expense at 
imitating in the kinematics. As illusatred in Figure 2.3b only the neurotypical 
controls imitated with time-to-peak-velocity (M = 24 %; SD = 8 %) that was similar 
to that displayed by the atypical model (18 %; Figure 2.3b). In comparison, adults 
with autism exhibited a time-to-peak-velocity (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) that 
statistically similar to the typical (M = 37 %; SD = 9 %) model. These findings 
suggest low-fidelity imitation of atypical biological kinematics in adults with autism 
may have been associated with bias in orientation of visual attention towards 
movement time over the kinematics, whereas on the contrary neurotypical controls 
may have orientated visual attention towards movement kinematics over movement 
time. This interpretation of the data is consistent with differences in eye movements 
reported in a study by Wild et al. (2012) during imitation of hand actions. As 
compared to neurotypical controls that spent more time pursuing the hand of the 
model leading to successful imitation of action speeds, adults with autism spend 
more time shifting attention towards the action end-point. This focus away from the 
hand may have resulted in the movement kinematics not being perceived and 
processed (Wild et al., 2012; Gowen, 2012). 
While the findings form Chapter Two show partial support previous 
suggestions for differences in visual attention in autism. Chapter Three directly 
examined visual attention in autism by recording eye movements in the action-
observation phase of imitation. As illustrated by the solid-black trace in Figures 3.6 
and 3.7, in an initial phase where general-attention instructions were provided 
(“watch and copy the dot as it moves across the monitor”) that did not specify what 
aspects of the model to imitate (i.e., similar to Chapter Two), both groups exhibited 
similar magnitudes and time-to-peak smooth pursuit eye velocity (Figure 3.8), 
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combined with fewer saccades of greater amplitude, when observing atypical 
compared to typical velocity model (Figure 3.9). However, although the eye 
movements indicated that adults with autism successfully tracked the movement 
trajectory, this did not result in successful imitation of the atypical biological 
kinematics. As consistent with Chapter Two, only the neurotypical adults (M = 28 
%; SD = 8 %) exhibited a time-to-peak-velocity similar to the atypical model 
(Figure 3.3b), compared to adults with autism (M = 32 %; SD = 9 %) that exhibited 
timing of peak velocity similar to the typical (M = 36 %; SD = 10 %) model. These 
findings demonstrate not only that visual attention was maintained on the observed 
model during action-observation, but also that participants had comparable retinal 
and extra-retinal input for the configuration of the upper-limb motor response 
required in imitation. 
One way to experimentally manipulate the orientation of visual attention is 
by providing specific instructions that direct attention towards the movement 
trajectory and have previously been shown to enhance imitation accuracy kinematics 
in neurotypicals (Hayes et al., 2014). Therefore, in a second phase of Chapter Three, 
the same participants were provided with instructions that specifically instructed all 
participants to pay attention to, and intend to imitate the stimulus’ movement 
trajectory. As illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 the selective-attention instructions 
had a modulatory effect on eye movements. Compared to the solid-black trace which 
represents the general-attention instructions, the dashed-black trace which represents 
selective-attention instructions indicated that both groups eye movements became 
significantly closer to the observed model. Further analysis signified that for both 
group the magnitude of peak velocity increased by 7 % (0.795 deg/s; Figure 3.8a) 
and the timing of peak velocity occurred significantly earlier and closer to the model 
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in the selective-attention condition by 18 % (8 units; Figure 3.8b). Notably, while 
the selective-attention instructions modulated visual attention, there was no 
significant change in the accuracy of imitating atypical biological kinematics in the 
autism group following selective-attention instructions (Figure 3.3b). By using a 
non-human agent (white dot) to control for the influence of social attention (Vivanti 
& Hamilton, 2014), it is difficult to directly compare the eye movements reported in 
Chapter Three to previous work on imitation that used a human social setting (e.g., 
Hobson & Hobson, 2007; Vivanti et al., 2008; Wild et al., 2012; Vivanti & 
Dissanayake, 2014). However, because of adults with autism showing similar eye 
movement patterns as matched neurotypicals, it seems unlikely that impaired 
imitation in autism reported in Chapter Three is related to poor tracking of the 
models trajectory. In addition, while eye-movements were not recorded, given the 
similarities experimental protocol and finings in the general-attention phase in 
Chapter Three and other experimental chapters, it could also be suggested that the 
eye movements may have been similar across this thesis and hence are also unlikely 
to be attributed towards differences in visual attention (Gowen, 2012). From the 
findings reported in Chapter Three, as an alternative to visual attention it was 
concluded that rather than impaired imitation of atypical biological kinematics in 
autism being associated with visual attention, it could alternatively be attributed to 
altered ‘input modulation’ associated with how the lower-level sensorimotor 
processes are controlled during the encoding of biological kinematics (Southgate & 
Hamilton, 2008; Welsh, Ray, Weeks, Dewey, & Elliot, 2009), and/or the integration 
of sensorimotor information across imitation (Mostofsky & Ewen, 2011; Hannant, 




5.4.3 Processing Biological Kinematics 
Perception of biological motion is important for early development of social 
cognition and if an individual is unable to perceive differences between biological 
motion kinematics, then it can be expected that consequently they would also not 
exhibit differences when imitating the kinematics. In order to determine whether 
participants had engaged in the experiment and understood the task instructions a 
post-experimental debrief was developed. When participants were asked “Did you 
notice anything about the movements you observed?”, overall individuals in the 
autism group reported they could differentiate the two models, as exemplified by the 
response of Participant 4 to Question 1: “Yes, one of the movements was fast and 
jagged then slowed right down, and the other one (the dot) was kind of like a similar 
speed all the way through”. This suggestion from the participants in the autism 
group that they could differentiate between the biological models was supported by 
findings from the judgement task which was included as a control measure in 
Chapter Three. In this task, participants observed two models (identical to the 
action-observation phase of imitation) and were instructed to indicate whether the 
models had either similar (i.e., atypical; atypical) or diverse (i.e., atypical; typical) 
movement trajectories. As can be seen in Figure 3.10b, the autism group accurately 
perceived differences between atypical, typical, and constant velocity kinematics. As 
from a possible total of 45 correct responses, the autism group made 30 (SD = 9) 
correct responses which was similar to the control group (M = 27; SD = 7), and at a 
level significantly greater than chance (66 %). These above findings make it unlikely 
that impaired imitation of biological kinematics observed in the autism group in 
Chapter Three (Figure 3.3b) were due to an inability to perceive differences in 
biological motion.  
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Moreover, the intact biological perception effect found in the judgement task 
in Chapter Three is similar to data reported from a study that used point-light 
displays (Cusack et al., 2015). In this study, adolescents with autism and matched 
neurotypical adolescents completed a battery of action-perception tasks that 
involved: (1) differentiating between biological and non-biological motion; (2) 
discrimination between robotic and natural motion; (3) discrimination of one form of 
action from another; (4) integration of limbs into full-body agents; (5) discrimination 
of two agents that are temporally synchronous or not; (6) attending to biological 
motion signals. Results indicated that consistent with previous work signifying intact 
biological motion perception (Freitag et al., 2008; Saygin et al., 2010; Wild et al., 
2012; Cook et al., 2013), across all six experiments autistic adolescents exhibited 
similar performance scores as neurotypical controls. Though the findings from the 
judgement task show intact biological motion perception in autism, work also using 
point light displays have shown difficulties in perception of biological motion in 
autism (Blake et al., 2003; Freitag et al., 2008). For example, in a study by Nackaerts 
et al. (2012), typically developed controls were more accurate than individuals with 
autism in recognising emotions from point light displays. While these studies show 
differences, this occurred when examining emotion and social interaction. In 
comparison, in the present judgement task a single white dot (indistinguishable to the 
imitation task) that controlled for social interaction (Spengler et al., 2010; Cook & 
Bird, 2012) was utilised. Therefore, though the findings from the judgement task in 
Chapter Three cannot be directly compared to these studies, it can be suggested that 
participants with autism could successfully perceive differences between the typical, 
atypical, and constant models, and did not influence the imitation findings across 
this thesis. One limitation across this thesis is that the judgement task, as well as the 
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post-experimental debrief was only utilised in Chapter Three, for this reason future 
work examining imitation in autism should always look to control for perception of 
biological motion. 
 
5.5 Implications for Sensorimotor Control Processes 
 
In the introductory chapter of the present thesis a review of the sensorimotor control 
processes in imitation in an attempt to isolate possible impairments which may 
contribute to the difficulties in imitation observed in individuals with autism (Gowen 
& Hamilton, 2013). Given the experimental manipulations and results observed 
across this programme of work, there are several implications for the sensorimotor 
control processes discussed in Chapter One. These will be returned to in the 
proceeding subsections of the epilogue. Given that action-observation and visual 
attention have been discussed in detail previously, this will not be revisited. This will 




Previous studies examining how individuals with autism execute movements 
have shown a consistent finding that despite they can execute actions that show 
similar accuracy levels as neurotypical counterparts, their underlying movement 
kinematics seem to be far more variable (Mari et al., 2003; Rinehart et al., 2006; 
Glazebrook et al., 2006). Standard deviations reported from the kinematic data in 
Chapters Two and Three are in agreement with these studies. As can be seen in 
Tables 2.2 and 3.2, overall when imitating the atypical kinematics, though autism 
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group had similar variability in the magnitude of peak velocity (autism: Chapter Two 
= 0.045 mm/ms; Chapter Three = 0.051 mm/ms, control: Chapter Two = 0.046 
mm/ms; Chapter Three = 0.046 mm/ms), the timing of peak velocity (Chapter Two 
= 10 %; Chapter Three = 10 %) was more variable than controls (Chapter Two = 8 
%; Chapter Three = 8 %). Similar differences in variability in kinematics in motor-
execution in autism have also been shown in a study whether individuals with autism 
move with an unnatural kinematic profile (Cook et al., 2013). When performing 
sinusoidal arm movements, compared to controls adults with autism performed 
movements that were more ‘jerky’ with greater acceleration and velocity compared 
to matched neurotypical adults. These jerky movements positively correlated with 
autism severity (ADOS) suggesting that they may be autism specific. Furthermore, it 
was implied that these kinematic results may have due to individuals with autism 
having poor anticipation of the subsequent part of the action sequence (Fabbri-
Destro et al., 2009) thus leading to a compromised ability to predict when to change 
direction (i.e., from a left to right arm movement). 
Though the abovementioned suggestion seems plausible, in the context of the 
current thesis this seems unlikely. As compared to these studies that used actions that 
required multiple movements, as can be seen in Figure 1.2 the imitation task 
required a single movement which would not involve participants to anticipate a 
second action. An alternative and more probable proposition is that in Chapters Two 
and Three, participants in the autism group were not provided appropriate time to 
integrate sensorimotor information (Rinehart et al., 2001; Gowen et al., 2007; 
Nazarali et al., 2009). This suggestion that greater sensorimotor information is 
facilitated by providing more adequate time is supported by findings from 
performance evaluations in Chapter Two, as can be seen in Table 2.2 when imitating 
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the atypical model, participants in the autism group decreased variability in timing of 
peak velocity by 21 % (2 units). Furthermore, in addition to the kinematics as can 
also be illusatred in Figure 2.2b the autism group also significantly decreased timing 
variability by 24 % (99 ms), becoming closer in the late-phase of imitation (M = 314 
ms) as the control group (M = 227 ms). Similar sensorimotor integration 
explanations have been forwarded to explain differences in overall motor-execution 
times in manual aiming studies that examined vision. Glazebrook et al. (2009) had 
participants perform eye movements and/or manual aiming movements with or 
without vision. Results signified that in general individuals with autism used 
sensorimotor information to execute the movements, however they took significantly 
more time to execute movements that required greater sensorimotor integration. 
Importantly, variability in the movements kinematics in the Fixed experiment in 
Chapter Four support this suggestion that motor-execution variability is associated 
with sensorimotor integration. As can be seen in Table 4.2, although the autism 
group are overall more variable than neurotypical controls (SD = 8 %), the standard 
deviations when imitating the atypical model were similar to those in the late-phase 
of imitation of Chapter Two (SD = 9 %) and different from the early-phase (SD = 11 
%). Therefore, it could also be suggested that in addition to providing adequate 
opportunity, this decrease in motor-execution variability may be associated with the 
blocked practice structure which allows for increased sensorimotor integration. The 
influence of sensorimotor integration on imitation in autism is discussed in more 
information in the proceeding sections: 
 
5.5.2 Sensorimotor Consolidation 
Many of the previous studies examining imitation in autism have collapsed 
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analysis over all trials (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2013). While this is a 
suitable approach, this may mask important information about imitation adaptation. 
An alternative approach that was utilised in Chapter Two was to evaluate 
performance in the early-phase (i.e., first five trials) and late-phase (i.e., last five 
trials) of imitation, which is akin to that used in observational learning studies 
(Hayes et al., 2008; Andrew et al., 2016). As can be seen in Figure 2.2, this analysis 
revealed that adults with autism became significantly more accurate at imitating 
movement time by 35 % (175 ms), while also reducing movement time variability by 
24 % (99 ms) from early-phase to late-phase of imitation. Compared to the control 
group that became significantly less accurate at imitating movement time by 44 % 
(139 ms). Still the kinematic data revealed that imitation of biological kinematics 
was attenuated in individuals with autism (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) compared to 
controls (M = 24 %; SD = 8 %), which did not change from early-phase to late-phase 
of imitation (Figure 2.3b). Therefore, these findings, more specifically the timing 
data suggest that individuals with autism can successful refine and adapt a 
sensorimotor representation (Wolpert et al., 2011). Similar intact sensorimotor 
adaptation and consolidation has been reported in autism through motor adaptation 
studies that examined performance changes following perturbations in the 
environment (Mostofsky et al., 2004; Gidley Larson et al., 2008). In the latter study, 
autistic children were required to throw a ball at a target wall while wearing prism 
goggles that shifted vision. Compared to a baseline condition (no goggles), autistic 
children adapted their motor behaviour to meet the demands of the new environment 
to the same extent as neurotypical children. Moreover, when the goggles were worn 
during training, both autism and control groups adapted their movements across 
from early to late adaptation, again becoming closer to the baseline. 
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The adaptation of movement time reported in Chapter Two is also similar to 
data reported from a recent motor learning study (Hayes et al., under review). Here 
then, adults with autism and matched (age, gender, IQ) neurotypical control adults 
physically practiced a three-segment movement sequence in accordance with a 
timing goal (for more information see Andrew et al., 2016) by moving a using a 
stylus such that the cursor passed through the sequence to achieve a movement time 
goal. To facilitate learning, knowledge-of-results (Winstein & Schmidt, 1990) were 
provided following every trial. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, albeit motor 
performance in the autism group was generally less accurate than the control group 
(Ghaziuddin & Butler, 1998; Fournier et al., 2010). In line with findings from 
Chapter Two that evaluated performance form early- to late-phase (Figure 2.2) 
adults with autism significantly adapted timing accuracy (66 % change; 843 ms) and 
timing variability (66 %; 363 ms) similar to the controls (accuracy, 67 % change; 
532 ms, variability, 61 % change; 281 ms), becoming closer to the goal. These 
findings further demonstrate intact creation and refinement of a sensorimotor 
representation (Mostofsky et al., 2004; Gidley Larson et al., 2008) by integrating 
self-generated efferent sensorimotor commands, afferent sensorimotor information, 
and visual consequences of a performed action (Wolpert et al., 2011). 
Though this study as well the data from Chapter Two show successful motor 
adaptation in autism, this is only for timing and not kinematics which was examined 
in the present thesis. As can be seen in Figure 4.2b, adults with autism represented 
atypical biological kinematics (M = 27 %; SD = 9 %) to the same extent as 
neurotypical controls (M = 25 %; SD = 7 %). This high-fidelity in autism is different 
from those reported in Chapters Two (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) and Three (M = 31 %; 
SD = 10 %). This increase in imitation fidelity occurred by providing a blocked 
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practice structure, which provides an increased opportunity for response-produced 
error and variability to be reduced over similar trial types leading to a more refined 
sensorimotor representation (Wright & Shea, 2001). Thus, it could be suggested that 
some sensorimotor adaptation may have taken place across imitation during the 
Fixed experiment in Chapter Four. To examine motor adaptation of kinematics in 
the Fixed experiment, in a similar vein as Chapter Two, the data from the Fixed 
experiment was reanalysed by evaluating performance in the early-phase and late-
phase of imitation. As can be interpreted from Figure 5.3, when imitating the 
atypical model, adults with autism increased the magnitude of peak velocity by 21 % 
(0.047 mm/ms) and decreased timing of peak velocity by 19 % (6 units). This 
change in timing of peak velocity was comparable to the control group that 
decreased by 16 % (5 units), with both groups becoming closer to the atypical model 
(Figure 5.3b). It was concluded from the Fixed experiment that imitation of atypical 
biological kinematics occurred as a function of an increased opportunity for 
sensorimotor integration and consolidation. In addition to the fixed structure, it may 
also be suggested that this increased opportunity for sensorimotor integration was 
facilitated by an increase in the amount of practice (Hannant et al., 2016). In 
comparison with Chapters Two and Three where participants imitated the atypical 
model per condition for 14 in 15 trials respectively, in Chapter Four participants 
imitated the atypical model in 40 trials. This suggestion of providing increased 
amounts of practice have also been forwarded to explain performance increases in a 
texture discrimination task. Here then, in an initial assessment the autism group 
scored lower than controls, however, performance in the autism group improved 
when repeating the task two additional times (Vandenbroucke, Scholte, van 





Figure 5.2 (a) Timing error and (b) timing variability for the motor learning task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group 






Figure 5.3 (a) Peak velocity and(b) time-to-peak-velocity for the imitation task 
(error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of group, 
model and phase in the Fixed experiment. The dashed-red lines in a represent the 
magnitude of peak velocity for the typical (i.e., 0.410 mm/ms) and atypical (i.e., 
0.200 mm/ms) models. In b, they represent the time-to-peak-velocity for the typical 
(i.e.,44 %) and atypical (i.e., 18 %) models. 
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5.6 Sensorimotor Integration in Autism 
 
An important finding from Chapter Four was the fact that adults with autism 
imitated atypical biological motion kinematics to a similar level of accuracy as 
matched neurotypical controls. After observing the atypical model in a context that 
presented the stimulus in a fixed trial order, participants in the autism group imitated 
movements with a time-to-peak-velocity that occurred at 27 % (SD = 9 %) of the 
movement trajectory (see Figure 4.2b). The early occurrence of peak velocity was 
reasonably similar to that displayed by the atypical model (18 %), and that of the 
control group (M = 25 %; SD = 7 %). Importantly, time-to-peak-velocity was 
significantly different from that exhibited after imitating the typical model (M = 37 
%; SD = 12 %). The increase in imitation fidelity suggests that imitation of atypical 
biological kinematics occurred as a function of an increased opportunity for 
sensorimotor integration and consolidation across repeated trials of the same atypical 
model. Over repeated attempts at imitating the atypical model in a fixed condition it 
is likely the refinement of the sensorimotor representation was facilitated by 
increasing the opportunity to process error through comparisons between expected 
(e.g., a plan of the efferent and afferent visual and motor information on trial n) and 
actual (efferent and afferent visual and motor information experienced on trial n) 
sensorimotor information (Wolpert et al. 2003; Iacoboni, 2005). The reduction in 
error occurs online during the ongoing motor response (Elliott et al., 2001) and 
offline during the inter-trial delay (Schmidt, 1975; Carroll & Bandura, 1982; Kilner 
et al., 2007; Burke et al., 2010; Wolpert et al., 2011). 
The suggestion that imitation fidelity was facilitated by integrating 
sensorimotor information during the inter-trial delay was supported by the findings 
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from the Interference experiment where participants were instructed to perform a 
secondary visuomotor task. The secondary task was implemented in the inter-trial 
delay to experimentally interfere with the processing (i.e., integration) of 
sensorimotor information received from trial n. In line with findings from Chapter 
Two (M = 33 %; SD = 10 %) and Three (M = 31 %; SD = 10 %) when the trial order 
was randomised, imitation performance in the autism group was statistically similar 
to imitating the typical model (M = 39 %; SD = 10 %), and significantly different to 
the neurotypical control (M = 28 %; SD = 5 %) group. Moreover, and importantly, 
imitation performance was qualitatively different to the autism group from the Fixed 
condition (M = 27 %; SD = 9 %) where the opportunity for sensorimotor 
consolidation during the inter-trial delay was not perturbed (Bandura, 1977; Byrne & 
Russon, 1998; Heyes, 2013). Therefore, these findings, and specifically the 
interference effects induced by the secondary visuomotor task, suggest the inter-trial 
delay period during imitation is an important processing phase (Buccino et al., 2004) 
in autism where sensorimotor information following movement execution in a fixed 
context is integrated to develop and refine a sensorimotor representation that 
supports imitation. 
Similar inter-trial processing explanations have been forwarded to explain 
decrements in motor performance in learning studies that examined contextual 
interference (for a review see Magill & Hall, 1990) and motor interference during 
observational learning (Brown et al., 2009). For example, Shea and Morgan (1979) 
instructed participants to learn a three-segment movement sequence under blocked 
(low contextual interference) or random (high contextual interference) practice 
conditions. Data indicated that motor performance was more accurate in the blocked 
condition (similar to the trial order in Fixed experiment in Chapter Four), compared 
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to random (similar to the trial order used in Chapters Two and Three) condition. 
During random trial orders different sensorimotor representations (e.g., Timing Goal 
1, followed by Timing Goal 2) are suggested (Li & Wright, 2000; Cross e al., 2007) 
to be constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed across different trial types. The 
process of planning different movement action plans across inter-trial delay periods 
leads to an increase in sensorimotor interference that consequently impacts the 
fidelity of a movement representation. Therefore, although benefits in long term 
motor learning (see Magill & Hall, 1990) and imitation learning (Blandin, Proteau, 
& Alain, 1994) have been facilitated from these interference effects, it has been 
consistently shown that motor performance accuracy decreases, and variability 
increases, across random practice trials (Lee & Magill, 1983). 
Moreover, the interference effect found from the secondary task in Chapter 
Four is similar to data reported from an observational learning study (Brown et al., 
2009) that induced motor interference using repetitive TMS. In this study, 
participants observed naïve learners perform reaching movements using a robotic 
arm. Following observational learning, participants either received repetitive TMS to 
primary motor cortex, or allowed to consolidate the processing of the observed 
stimulus. Consistent with many studies (e.g., Vogt 1995, Hayes, Elliott, & Bennett, 
2010) participants that did not receive rTMS acquired the motor pattern via 
sensorimotor processes underlying observational learning. Importantly, and 
consistent with previous work (Mattar & Gribble, 2005), learning was significantly 
reduced in participants that received repetitive TMS to primary motor cortex during 
the consolidation period. This finding demonstrates sensorimotor information is 
integrated and consolidated across learning in primary motor cortex, which is also 
known to be active during imitation learning (Nishitani et al., 2004). 
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With the aforementioned in mind, the Fixed experiment in Chapter Four 
most likely offered similar motor performance and learning advantages as those 
consistently shown during blocked practice (Li & Wright, 2000; Wright & Shea, 
2001). Blocked practice structures provide an opportunity for response-produced 
error and variability to be reduced over similar trial types leading to a more refined 
sensorimotor representation (Wright & Shea, 2001). Therefore, it seems the fixed 
trial order allowed the underlying lower-level visuomotor processes within the 
autism group to be effectively engaged in order to integrate and process 
sensorimotor information. Specifically, creating ‘consolidation periods’ within the 
imitation learning context most likely facilitated the atypical sensorimotor 
representation to be transformed from a fragile to a relatively permanent state 
(Caithness et al., 2004; Wolpert et al., 2011). Moreover, because other important 
imitation processes associated with mentalising and social regulation were controlled 
through the presentation of a non-human agent model (Cook & Bird, 2011; Stewart 
et al., 2013) indicates that this form of motor imitation may not be fundamentally 
impaired in autism but rather the processes underlying this mechanism need to be 
operationalised in a specific imitation learning context to overcome the sensorimotor 
integration problems that underpin imitation in autism (Williams et al., 2006). 
The interpretation of sensorimotor integration being associated with impaired 
imitation of biological motion kinematics in autism is consistent with a recent 
collection of work that has shown that individuals with autism process and integrate 
visual and proprioceptive information differently (Sharer et al., 2015; Nebel et al., 
2015; Hayes et al., under review). When learning novel movements children with 
autism show a bias in the integration of sensorimotor feedback, favouring 
proprioception over visual feedback (Haswell et al., 2009: Marko et al., 2015). 
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Furthermore, the finding of children with ADHD demonstrating a learning pattern 
indistinct from typically developing children points towards this being autism 
specific (Izawa et al., 2012). This bias towards proprioceptive feedback signals has 
also been evidenced in a ball catching task as part of the movement assessment 
battery for children (Brown & Lalor, 2009). The ball catching task requires a 
demand for the integration of temporal and spatial characteristics of the movement 
that requires online adjustments for successful task completion. Work employing the 
ball catching task (Whyatt & Craig, 2012) showed autistic children had difficulties in 
performing the task when compared to matched (age) typically developing children. 
Notably, these difficulties were not only dissimilar to typically developing controls, 
but also children with ADHD (Ament et al., 2015) indicating the adaptation of motor 
skills that require the coupling of visual and temporal feedback operate differently in 
autism. It was concluded that rather than general motor abilities (Green et al., 2002), 
motor skill deficits in autism are suggested to be allied with the ability to integrate 
visual spatial and temporal characteristics of an action. 
In addition to the behavioural level differences in sensorimotor integration in 
autism, neurophysiological work has also shown that brain activity underpinning the 
development of sensorimotor representations differ compared to neurotypical 
controls (Müller et al., 2001; Müller et al., 2003; Marko et al., 2015). For instance, 
using an fMRI paradigm fifty autistic, and fifty matched (age, IQ and handiness) 
typically developing children were scanned during three gesture imitation tasks: (1) 
gesture imitation; (2) gestures to verbal command; (3) gesture involving tool use. 
Results showed that autistic children had increased intrinsic asynchrony in neural 
activation between visual (lateral occipital cortex) and motor (pre- and post-central 
gyrus) regions which correlated with more severe autistic traits (measured via 
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ADOS). Furthermore, children that exhibited greater intrinsic synchrony showed 
greater imitation accuracy. This altered synchrony could influence the integration of 
visuomotor information (Nebel et al., 2015). Based on these findings given that 
sensorimotor representations form part of a mechanism that facilitates the processing 
of biological motion for action-understanding and motor-execution (Blakemore & 
Decety, 2001), it may be that neural specificity of sensorimotor representations 
regulate how subsequent observed visual information is processed in social 
visuomotor contexts (Nebel et al., 2015). In the context of the current thesis, it could 
be proposed that during the Fixed experiment these brain mechanisms (lateral 
occipital cortex; pre- and post-central gyrus) occurring during imitation are operating 
effectively due to the consistent structure of the models leading to the sensorimotor 
representation being refined on a trial-by-trial basis (Wolpert et al., 2011). However, 
in the Interference experiment these neural processes are being interfered with, 
resulting in asynchronic brain activity which would be similar to those reported in 
the autism participants. 
Although the findings from the Fixed and secondary visuomotor experiments 
provide good evidence that sensorimotor information was integrated and 
consolidated in the inter-trial delay between trials, it is possible that repeated 
exposures to the model in the Fixed experiment also allowed an opportunity to 
enhance the fidelity of the sensorimotor representation by engaging learning 
processes during action-observation. For example, sensorimotor representations are 
developed and refined without receiving response-produced sensory feedback from 
an effector (Mattar & Gribble, 2005; Brown et al., 2009). This form of learning is 
referred to as observational practice, which requires a learner to watch a model 
across a consecutive number of demonstrations without engaging in overt physical 
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practice (Maslovat, Hayes, Horn, & Hodges, 2010). It is now well accepted that 
novel actions, and underlying kinematics (i.e., magnitude and timing of peak 
velocity), can be learned by observational practice to the same extent as physical 
practice (Vogt, 1995; Mattar & Gribble, 2005; Hayes et al., 2010; 2012; Hayes, 
Elliott, Andrew, Roberts, & Bennett, 2012; Hayes, Elliott, & Bennett, 2013; for a 
review of observational practice see Vogt & Thomaschke, 2007). For example, in a 
study by Hayes, Timmis and Bennett (2009), participants either physically practised 
or observed a three-segment movement sequence to achieve one of three movement 
time goals. The data indicated the experimental groups learned the timing goals by 
increasing accuracy, and reducing variability, across practice. These findings suggest 
that in Fixed experiment increased imitation fidelity exhibited by the autism group 
may have been facilitated by engaging lower-level visuomotor processes that 
underlie learning through observational practice (Higuchi at al., 2012). This 
suggestion is further supported by data demonstrating that atypical biological motion 
is represented through observational practice (Andrew et al., 2016). 
The findings of similar motor learning performance without engaging in 
overt physical practice (Hayes et al., 2009; 2010; 2012; 2013; 2014) are now known 
to occur through common underlying neural (i.e., mirror neuron) systems (Fadiga et 
al., 1995; 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Buccino et al., 2004; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, 
Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Torriero, Oliveri, Koch, Caltagirone, & 
Petrosini, 2007; Vogt et al., 2007). For instance, fMRI data showed that similar 
changes in motor behaviour following a period of physical and observational 
practice of dance actions were underpinned by analogous activity in the premotor 
and parietal regions of the action observation network (Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, 
Kelley, & Grafton, 2009). Furthermore, a more recent study has illustrated that 
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observational practice and imitation also share similar neural substrates (Higuchi et 
al., 2012). Using a fMRI paradigm naïve participants were required to imitate finger 
position of pictured guitar chords. Results indicated that successful imitation was 
underpinned by activity within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as well as 
the frontoparietal mirror circuit. The second of two studies examined whether this 
neural circuits are also recruited during observational learning, or only physical 
practice. Again naïve participants observed new guitar chords yet were not required 
to immediately imitate. fMRI data illustrated that although prefrontal cortex activity 
was not constant in observational practice, prefrontal activation was correlated with 
behavioural practice effects indicating a crucial role of the prefrontal cortex in 
observational practice (Higuchi, Holle, Roberts, Eickhoff, & Vogt, 2012). 
Further support that the sensorimotor representation is refined through 
action-observation comes from behavioural work that shows interference of 
observational practice effects through simultaneously completing a secondary motor 
task during action-observation (Mattar & Gribble, 2005). Here then, participants 
observed naïve learners perform reaching movements using a robotic arm. This robot 
was programmed to perturb the upper-limb dynamics by applying force fields to the 
learner’s arm in a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction. When required to 
perform the action in a clockwise (i.e., retention test), those that observed the 
clockwise condition (i.e., congruent to practice) performed better than those that did 
not have the opportunity to practice (i.e., no observation). In contrast, those that 
observed the counter-clockwise condition (i.e., incongruent to practice) performed 
worse that the no observation group. Still, these positive effects of observational 
practice on reaching performance where attenuated when participants observed the 
counter-clockwise while simultaneously executing a secondary (i.e., incongruent arm 
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movement) motor task (Mattar & Gribble, 2005). It was concluded by the authors 
that the ability of visual information that drives motor learning through systems 
linking action with perception when the motor system is interfered with by the 
generation of unrelated movements. Though work examining observational practice 
in autism is limited, the suggestion that increase in imitation fidelity is associated 
with action-observation through repeated exposures to the model is supported by 
evidence of lower-level processing through automatic imitation in autism (Bird et al., 
2007; Leighton et al., 2008; Press et al., 2010; Sowden et al., 2016). Such as when 
participants with autism were required to perform finger movements in response to a 
number or coloured square while observing congruent or incongruent finger 
movements, automatic imitation effects (faster responses when the observed action 
was congruent, rather than incongruent) exhibited were similar to matched 
neurotypical controls (Sowden et al., 2016). These findings indicate that the lower-
level visuomotor processes that map the visual information onto the motor system 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; 2001; Buccino et al., 2004) are operating effectively during 
automatic imitation. 
 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
5.7.1 Limitations and Future Considerations 
 
5.7.1.1 Human Stimuli 
The experimental protocol used within the present thesis was designed in 
order to create an unmodulated condition that limited the influence of top-down 
factors that modulate lower-level processing of biological motion. As discussed in 
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the introductory chapter one such factor is social interaction. It has recently been 
suggested that impaired imitation in autism is associated with evaluation of social 
context (Southgate & Hamilton, 2008; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Indeed, when 
primed with pro-social attitudes neurotypical adults exhibit greater levels of 
automatic imitation than when primed with anti-social attitudes (Cook & Bird, 
2011). In comparison, adults with autism that do not show this modulation (Cook & 
Bird, 2012). Therefore, to control for the modulatory effects of social interaction, 
participants observed and subsequently imitated a non-human agent (white-dot) that 
had limited social context. By doing so, the findings reported in the present thesis 
cannot be directly comparable with those of imitation in human settings (Hobson & 
Hobson, 2007; Vivanti et al., 2008; Wild et al., 2012; Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2014). 
However, using an experiential protocol similar to that used in the present thesis, the 
influence of social interaction on imitation of biological motion in autism could be 
examined. Here then, using a stylus on a digital graphics tablet, participants with and 
without autism would observe and subsequently imitate typical and atypical 
biological motion kinematics (presented in a fixed presentation as per Chapter Four) 
following observation of non-human (i.e., a single white-dot; similar to the present 
thesis) or a human model (i.e., finger movement; similar to Wild et al., 2012). It 
could be expected that consistent with the findings reported in the Fixed experiment 
in Chapter Four (M = 27 %; SD = 9 %), when presented with a non-human stimulus 
in a blocked structure, adults with autism would show reasonably high-fidelity 
imitation of the atypical model, similar to matched neurotypical controls (M = 25 %; 
SD = 7 %). If then the processes underpinning impaired imitation in autism are 
associated with the social context (Spengler et al., 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2012), 
then it could be expected that when presented with a human stimulus (i.e., human 
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hand), imitation fidelity in autism would be attenuated. Adults with autism would 
exhibit kinematics similar to those reported in Chapters Two (M = 33 %; SD = 10 
%) and Three (M = 31 %; SD = 10 %). If, however, impaired imitation is not 
attributed to altered social top-down factors, then it could be expected that adults 
with autism would show no differences when imitating the human compared to non-
human stimulus. 
 
5.7.1.2 Autism Severity 
There is a large body of evidence gathering demonstrating that imitation 
abilities in individuals with autism positively correlates with the severity of their 
disorder (Stewart et al., 2013; Nebel et al., 2015). For example, twenty-five autistic 
children that were evaluated for autism using the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS) completed four imitation tasks (body movements and ‘action on 
objects’, using meaningful and non-meaningful tasks). Imitation abilities in all four 
tasks significantly correlated with autism severity where children with higher ADOS 
scores (indicating lower functioning) had lower imitation abilities (Zachor, Ilanit, & 
Itzchak, 2010). Consequently, additional correlation analyses were conducted within 
the current thesis to investigate whether the imitation dependent measure (i.e., timing 
accuracy and variability, magnitude and timing of peak velocity) in the present thesis 
correlated with autism severity (i.e., ADOS total score). These correlations revealed 
no relationship between any dependent variable and ADOS total score indicating that 
imitation abilities exhibited by the autism participants were not a consequence of the 
autism characteristics calculated via ADOS. The current thesis primarily examined 
only high-functioning individuals with autism which only represents a small 
proportion of individuals with autism. Many individuals with low-functioning 
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individuals have learning difficulties and other cognitive implications in addition to 
the core characteristics of autism which may modulate imitation of biological motion 
in the present thesis. Though these cognitive implications may influence imitation 
performance using the protocol in the present thesis. This protocol could be modified 
in order to accommodate and investigate imitation of atypical biological motion in 
low-functioning autistic children and/or adults. 
 
5.7.1.3 Volunteer Age 
In the present thesis imitation of biological motion was examined in autistic 
adults only. Although on the whole the adults with autism were of a relatively young 
age (Chapter Two = 26.4 years; Chapter Three = 21.7 years; Chapter Four = 21.7 
years), these findings observed are difficult to directly compare to previous studies 
examining imitation in children with autism (e.g., Rogers et al., 1996; Hobson & 
Lee, 1999; Hamilton et al., 2007; Vivanti et al., 2008; Stewart et al., 2013). It is 
difficult to postulate whether similar findings would be observed in children with 
autism. Recent work has demonstrated that imitation performance is correlated with 
chronological age in both adolescents with autism (Stewart et al., 2013) as well as 
typically developing children (Williams et al., 2014). For instance, in a study by 
Stewart et al. (2013), participants were required to imitate different sized shapes 
using a stylus on a tablet. Results showed that although overall adolescents with 
autism aged between 11 and 17 years were less accurate than matched typically 
developing adolescents, a correlation analysis showed that as age increased the 
imitation error decreased for all shape sizes. As a matter of interest consistent with 
these studies (Stewart et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014) in each experimental 
chapter the analyses for each dependent variable (timing error; timing variability; 
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peak velocity; time-to-peak-velocity) was re-run with age as a covariate. Similar to 
other work (Smith & Bryson, 2007) no effects of interest were found with respect to 
the age in adults with autism. Furthermore, in respect to imitation in children with 
autism, future work could use a similar protocol to examine imitation of biological 
motion. 
 
5.7.2 Translational Research and Practical Recommendations 
As a final point, the results across the present programme of work has 
translational research potential to promote social rehabilitation therapies in autism. 
Previous work has shown that video modelling is an effective tool when teaching 
children with autism social engagement (i.e., active participation in an activity with a 
peer; Bellini, Akullian, & Hopf, 2007), socially expressive behaviours such as 
gestures and facial expressions during social interaction (Charlop, Dennis, 
Carpenter, & Greenberg, 2010) as well as improving imitation skills (Cardon & 
Wilcox, 2011; Cardon, 2013). For instance, recent a recent study examined whether 
there is a relationship between imitation skills in four children with autism (2 male; 2 
female) and caregiver implemented Video Modelling Imitation Training through the 
use of an iPad. Following minimal training (2 hours each) four caregivers were able 
to successfully create video models and implement Video Modelling Imitation 
Training that occurred three times a week for a total of 12 sessions (40 minutes). 
During each session the caregiver showed the child a pre-recorded clip of one-step 
actions (e.g., touch their nose, hand cup to caregiver) and the autistic child was given 
10 seconds to imitate the action they had observed. Results indicated that children 
with autism significantly increased imitation performance (percent of actions 
imitated) across the 12 sessions which was not only maintained during the post-
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intervention (one and three weeks after final session) but also to varying degrees’ 
imitation following live modelling. In addition, analysis of language development 
after experience with the Video Modelling Imitation Training revealed expressive 
language skills increased for all participants (Cardon, 2012). These findings clearly 
demonstrate the positive influence of video modelling for social interaction in 
individuals with autism (Lindsay, Moore, Anderson, & Dillenburger, 2013; Cardon, 
2016). In the context of the findings of the current thesis, more specifically the 
kinematic data in the Fixed experiment in Chapter Four where adults with autism 
imitated high-fidelity of atypical biological motion to the same extent as 
neurotypicals (Figure 4.2b), it could be suggested that the acquisition in everyday 
sensorimotor skills such as writing with a pen, tying shoes laces, or riding a bicycle 
could be acquired through the presentation of non-human agent models using video 
modelling in a fixed (i.e., predictable) structure, as this increases sensorimotor 
integration and consolidation, leading to greater imitation performance. 
 
5.7.3 Summary 
In conclusion, the present thesis examined imitation of biological motion in 
adults with autism, and to investigated whether adults with autism could adapt and 
learn to imitate and represent biological motion following specific manipulations to 
the imitation context (e.g., instructions, feedback, practice type). The thesis utilised a 
novel behavioural protocol which required adults with autism and matched (age, 
gender, handiness, IQ) neurotypical controls to observe and subsequently imitate 
models that displayed movements that had identical spatial and temporal outcomes, 
yet displayed distinctly different, but biological plausible kinematics. 
 Chapter Two extended upon previous studies (Wild et al., 2012; Stewart et 
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al., 2013) that manipulated speed or amplitude of a movement by isolating lower-
level properties (e.g., velocity) of biological motion kinematics. As detailed in 
Figure 2.3, for the first time experimentally it was demonstrated that that adults with 
autism have difficulties imitating the velocity characteristics associated with atypical 
biological motion that ensured that the observer must configure the sensorimotor 
system to represent the novel kinematics. As though both groups performed similarly 
at imitating typical biological kinematics, but the control group was significantly 
more accurate than the autism group at imitating the atypical biological kinematics. 
Nonetheless, compared to neurotypical adults, adults with autism became 
significantly more accurate at representing movement time across trials thus 
illustrating that they actively engaged in the imitation task. This suggests the 
attenuation in imitating biological motion kinematics in autism is perhaps a 
compensatory strategy due to deficits in lower-level visuomotor processes associated 
with self-other mapping and/or motor ability, or that selective attention input to the 
processes that represent atypical biological motion kinematics. 
Chapter Three investigated whether the impaired imitation findings in 
Chapter Two could be underpinned by altered visual attention. Here, selective-
attention and eye movements in autism and controls were examined when imitating 
atypical and typical biological kinematics. To manipulate selective-attention, general 
instructions not specifying what aspects of the model to imitate were provided in the 
control phase. In the experimental phase, selective-attention instructions directed 
visual attention towards biological kinematics. As detailed in Figure 3.3, in the 
general-attention condition, kinematic data illusatred that both groups performed 
similarly at imitating typical biological kinematics, but the control group was more 
accurate than the autism group at imitating the atypical biological kinematics. 
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Moreover, as detailed in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, eye movement data showed the autism 
group had similar timing and peak smooth pursuit eye velocity, as well as a similar 
number, and amplitude, of saccades, during action-observation of both models as the 
control group. With selective-attention instructions, imitation of atypical biological 
kinematics remained unchanged, with the control group more accurate than the 
autism group. Only the control group became more accurate when imitating the 
typical biological kinematics. Eye movements were again similar between the 
groups, and modulated to become closer to the model after receiving selective-
attention instructions. Adults with autism still have difficulties imitating t atypical 
biological kinematics, yet they are unlikely to be underpinned by difficulties tracking 
the model with the eye, and thereby the focus of visual attention. The lack of 
modulation following explicit instructions suggests altered imitation in autism could 
be associated with differences in ‘input’ modulation, where processes associated 
with attention do not effectively control lower-level sensorimotor processes that 
encode biological motion. 
Chapter Four examined sensorimotor integration. In the Fixed experiment 
the models in a fixed structure which provides opportunity for the sensorimotor 
representation to be refined by updating error using and actual sensory consequences 
from trial n over similar trial types. It was demonstrated for the first time 
experimentally that adults with autism could imitate velocity characteristics 
associated with atypical biological motion to the same extent as matched 
neurotypicals. This suggests that imitation of biological motion in adults with autism 
may be associated increased sensorimotor integration and consolidation through 
presenting the model in a predictable structure. In the Interference experiment the 
models were presented in a fixed structure where participants completed a secondary 
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motor task during the inter-trial delay. It was demonstrated that adults with autism 
show difficulties imitating the velocity characteristics associated with atypical 
biological motion. This suggests that this increased sensorimotor integration and 
consolidation that results in imitation of atypical biological motion similar to 
matched neurotypicals may be taking place during the inter-trial delay. In the 
Random experiment the models in an unpredictable structure (similar to Chapter 
Two). It was demonstrated again that adults with autism show difficulties imitating 
the velocity characteristics associated with atypical biological motion. This finding 
confirms the suggestion that low fidelity imitation of atypical biological kinematics 
in autism is attributed to complications in integrating sensorimotor information on a 
trial-by-trial basis where there is opportunity for consolidation, or the previously 
reported problems in planning and execution occur due to the unpredictable 
presentation structure. 
Overall, the results have extended the imitation in autism literature, have had 
both theoretical and practical implications, and provided a catalyst for future 
research within the area. Providing a strong suggestion that imitation in individuals 
with autism spectrum disorders is associated with the integration and consolidation 
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